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Chinese Communist Party (CCP) grand strategy is undergoing a sweeping reorientation 
toward maritime power. Its leaders have declared becoming a “maritime great power” a vital 
objective. Its naval modernization has produced the largest navy in the world, and its 
investments in ostensibly civilian assets such as foreign ports and sensors able to track ship 
movements proliferate across the Indo-Pacific region. To what end? Prior efforts to explain the 
CCP’s bid for sea power and assess the threat it poses to the United States tend to extrapolate 
CCP intentions from observed capabilities. These explanations do not align with the CCP’s 
stated intentions and have not been predictive of its current fleets. This thesis uses a net 
assessment approach to align CCP capabilities with its intent over a span of decades to arrive 
at a different characterization of the threat CCP maritime transformation poses to U.S. interests. 
It finds that the CCP has been engaged in unannounced strategic competition with the United 
States since before the turn of the century, and its object in this competition is to displace U.S.-
led security architecture in pursuit of national rejuvenation. The accumulation and exertion of 
sea power plays a critical role in strategies to meet this objective; as a result, the CCP has 
undertaken significant efforts to accumulate and exert sea power to great effect against the 
United States. Continentalist interests in the CCP bureaucracy have imposed necessary 
modifications to how the CCP’s sea power manifests, giving rise to potential vulnerabilities in 
how the CCP builds and uses sea power.    
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I. Executive Summary 
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) describes itself as the main stabilizing force and 
power source of the world economy. From that status, it is attempting to lead what it argues is a 
necessary reshaping of interstate relations with a new model that displaces U.S. influence and 
elevates the CCP toward its objective of national rejuvenation. The frictions over whether U.S. 
influence will be displaced or maintained constitutes strategic competition between the CCP and 
the United States government (USG). CCP leaders further believe that accruing and exerting 
sea power is a prerequisite to national rejuvenation, and since 2012 the CCP has undertaken a 
sweeping maritime transformation reorienting its grand strategy from its continentalist roots to 
include a maritime vision.  
This thesis adopts the net assessment approach to characterize the threat CCP 
maritime transformation poses to U.S. interests and how that threat is likely to develop over a 
long-running competition. The net assessment approach rejects efforts to derive an actor’s 
intent from the capabilities it develops on the grounds that doing so risks mistaking transient 
developments for the enduring nature of a competition. In a strategic competition, making such 
mistakes can lead to crippling delays in policy responses. Given that reshaping a military force 
in response to a changing threat takes years to decades, such delays may close windows of 
opportunity once available to the USG and instead open opportunities for the CCP. To 
accurately assess threat in context of strategic competition, a broad analytical framework is 
needed. 
The CCP has historically been a continental power, and its current maritime 
transformation faces continuing bureaucratic opposition from continentalist interests. Not least 
of these is the People’s Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF), still the dominant service in the 
CCP’s military. The CCP’s maritime transformation can be identified by an inter-domain land-
sea integrated approach made necessary by those continental interests. With this approach, the 






and part of the Indian Ocean Region. However, the CCP does not yet have a sophisticated 
capability to gain and exploit sea control for useful periods in a kinetic conflict, and the PLAGF’s 
persistent influence threatens the PLA Navy’s ability to develop one.  
The CCP has also exerted its sea power through ostensibly civilian assets with dual-use 
purposes. A maritime militia comprised of fishing vessels, concerted investments from Chinese 
state-owned enterprises targeting strategically-located deep water ports, and maritime research 
satellites with ship tracking capabilities all mobilize civilian assets—in China and other 
countries—to advance the CCP’s military power. These civilian investments augment the CCP’s 
ongoing military modernization to cut into the U.S. military’s margin of military superiority, calling 
into question the credibility of U.S. security guarantees and thus stressing the U.S.-led security 
architecture in the Indo-Pacific.   
The following findings emerge from this assessment: 
1. There is no future in which CCP maritime transformation poses a low threat to U.S. 
interests. 
2. PRC economic growth determines the intensity of maritime transformation, but it is not 
the object of such. 
3. Sea control in the Indo-Pacific is on track to become prohibitively costly. 
4. The CCP’s vision of sea power is one that is deeply integrated across domains and 
elements of national power, military and civilian. 
5. The USG’s focus on high-end threats takes a narrow view of the maritime competition’s 
decisive terrain and does not adequately account for the peacetime implications of the 
CCP’s military and paramilitary power.  
6. Converting power into strategic influence remains a weakness for the CCP.  








II. Introduction  
Chinese Communist Party (CCP)1 grand strategy2 is undergoing a sweeping 
reorientation toward the sea. Once a continental power that considered China’s long land 
borders its preponderant international security concern, the CCP has demonstrated remarkable 
consistency in building commercial maritime and naval power. In 2020, the U.S. Department of 
Defense (DoD) declared the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy (PLAN) and the China Coast 
Guard (CCG) the “largest navy in the world,”3 and “by far the largest coast guard force in the 
world,” respectively.4 These fleets are not simply numerous. The PLAN and CCG have well-
armed, cruiser-sized warships5 that the services misleadingly term “destroyers” and “cutters,” 
respectively.6 In 2020, the PLAN launched its first such destroyer, the lead Type 055, which 
 
 
1 Throughout, this thesis refers to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) when discussing China’s state apparatus 
and the CCP when discussing political leadership. The term “China” where used refers to the geographic landmass 
and its inhabitants. 
2 This thesis uses Hal Brands’ definition of grand strategy: “a purposeful and coherent set of ideas about what a 
nation seeks to accomplish in the world, and how it should go about doing so.” See Hal Brands, What Good is Grand 
Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush, (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2014), 3. The topic of grand strategy is discussed further in the section “CCP Grand Strategy: 
Resolving Contradictions Toward National Rejuvenation.” 
3 The Department’s announcement lagged reality: by hull count, the PLAN won this title in 2016, when analysts 
determined it had 303 naval vessels while the U.S. Navy was reporting a total battle force of 275 ships. See Andrew 
S. Erickson, “Understanding China’s Third Sea Force: The Maritime Militia,” Fairbank Center Blog, September 8, 
2017, https://medium.com/fairbank-center/understanding-chinas-third-sea-force-the-maritime-militia-228a2bfbbedd; 
Andrew S. Erickson, “Exhibit 0-2. China’s Primary Naval Order of Battle (Major Combatants), 1985-2030,” in Chinese 
Naval Shipbuilding: An Ambitious and Uncertain Course, ed. Andrew S. Erickson, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 
2016), XVI; Naval History and Heritage Command, “US Ship Force Levels,” U.S. Navy, November 17, 2017, 
https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/us-ship-force-levels.html#2000.  
4 U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of 
China 2020, U.S. Department of Defense, September 1, 2020, viii & 71, 
https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-
FINAL.PDF.  
5 Modern definitions for destroyers and cruisers—a class of naval combatant typically larger and more capable than 
destroyers but smaller than aircraft carriers and battleships—have been inconsistent. The 1930 London Naval Treaty 
set destroyer displacement at 1,850 tons, with larger ships classified as cruisers up until 10,000 tons, at which point it 
was classified under the 1923 Washington Naval Treaty as a capital ship, e.g., battleship. The London-based 
International Institute for Strategic Studies currently classifies cruisers as warships displacing over 9,750 tons and 
destroyers as warships displacing between 4,500–9,749 tons. China’s Type 055 warship is expected to displace 
approximately 14,000 tons, and the U.S. Department of Defense classifies it as a cruiser. Nonetheless, the PLA 
classifies the Type 055 as a destroyer, following precedent set by the U.S. Navy’s 14,000-ton Zumwalt destroyers, 
the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force’s 24,000-ton Izumo-class helicopter destroyers, and the Republic of 
Korea Navy’s 11,000-ton Sejong the Great-class destroyers. See Keith Patton, “That’s a destroyer?” The Navalist, 
April 10, 2017, https://thenavalist.com/home/2017/4/10/thats-a-destroyer.  
6 Xinhua, “China's first Type 055 destroyer Nanchang commissioned,” January 12, 2020, 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-01/12/c_138698289.htm; Kyle Mizokami, “China Launches Another Monster 







features stealth capabilities and armaments exceeding those of the U.S. Navy’s Arleigh Burke-
class destroyers.7  
PRC maritime development extends beyond naval and paranaval activities. Since 2016, 
Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have proliferated ostensibly civilian but inherently 
dual-use sensors that improve Chinese maritime domain awareness in China’s maritime 
periphery.8 Since 2013, other Chinese SOEs have committed strategic investments in global 
maritime shipping infrastructure, seizing on potentially dual-use infrastructure in waters further 
from China’s shores.9 An expansive fleet of survey vessels operated by the PRC and its 
research institutions suggests CCP ambitions for undersea capabilities as far-reaching as 
Chinese maritime commerce.10 
To what end? Like that of any other governing regime, the CCP’s pursuit of maritime 
power is a political choice, and one that affects the United States.11 Fleet building is necessarily 
an “interactive enterprise”; states build the fleets they believe they need to secure—or seize—
their interests in the teeth of their adversaries.12 Whether and what sort of threat the CCP’s 
fleets pose to the United States government (USG) depends on PLAN capabilities as well as 
 
 
7 Daniel Caldwell, Joseph Freda, and Lyle J. Goldstein, “China Maritime Report No. 5: China's Dreadnought? The 
PLA Navy's Type 055 Cruiser and Its Implications for the Future Maritime Security Environment,” China Maritime 
Studies Institute, February 2020, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/5.  
8 J. Michael Dahm, “Exploring China’s Unmanned Ocean Network,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, June 16, 
2020, https://amti.csis.org/exploring-chinas-unmanned-ocean-network; J. Michael Dahm, “China’s ‘Ocean E-Stations’ 
Deployed to the South China Sea,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, December 10, 2018, 
https://amti.csis.org/chinese-ocean-e-stations-deployed-south-china-sea/.   
9
 Isaac B. Kardon, written testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on 
China’s Military Power Projection and U.S. National Interests, February 20, 2020, 
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Kardon_Revised%20Written%20Testimony_Feb2020.pdf; The Economist, 




 Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, “A Survey of Marine Research Vessels in the Indo-Pacific,” April 16, 2020, 
https://amti.csis.org/a-survey-of-marine-research-vessels-in-the-indo-pacific/; Ryan D. Martinson and Peter A. Dutton, 
“China Maritime Report No. 3: China’s Distant Ocean Survey Activities: Implications for U.S. National Security,” China 
Maritime Studies Institute, November 2018, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/3.  
11 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, (1890; reprint, New York: Dover, 
1987), 82.  
12 Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Red Star Over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. 






CCP intentions.13 Recent indicators of PLAN force employment suggest those intentions are 
bellicose: in 2018, a PLAN destroyer’s aggressive maneuvers nearly forced a collision with a 
U.S. Navy destroyer, and in 2020, another PLAN destroyer lased a U.S. Navy maritime patrol 
aircraft, threatening harm to the aircraft’s systems and crew, over international waters.14 Still, 
the contours of CCP maritime strategy remain to be defined. 
The question is complicated by a puzzle: why have regional states begun vocally 
aligning themselves against the CCP’s maritime posture now? Traditional balance of power 
theory approaches to international relations suggest that a state might improve its own military 
capabilities or seek security assurances in a coalition of allies balancing against a neighbor’s 
growing power.15 Seeing that East Asian states did not join such a coalition in response to 
growing PLA capabilities in the past two decades, balance of power theorists further elaborated 
that the “stopping power of water” reduces threats conveyed or perceived where states do not 
share a border, and as such, maritime East Asia is “defense dominant,” with most states in the 
region content to let the United States manage regional security issues without the aid of a 
balancing coalition.16 However, states on China’s maritime periphery have begun taking steps 
toward this balancing coalition. Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines have all begun or 
accelerated naval modernization efforts in response to the CCP’s maritime posture.17 Further, in 
 
 
13 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, (1966 reprint, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 36.  
14 U.S. Pacific Fleet Public Affairs, “People’s Liberation Army Navy lased a U.S. Navy P-8A in unsafe, unprofessional 
manner,” February 27, 2020, https://www.cpf.navy.mil/news.aspx/110928; Steven Lee Myers, “American and Chinese 
Warships Narrowly Avoid High-Seas Collision,” New York Times, October 2, 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/02/world/asia/china-us-warships-south-china-sea.html. 
15 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1948); Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979). 
16 On the stopping power of water, see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 2001), 114-125. On balancing against maritime power, see Jack S. Levy and William R. 
Thompson, “Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?” International Security 
35, no. 1 (Summer 2010), 7-43, https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00001. On the stopping 
power of water precluding a balancing coalition in East Asia, see Øystein Tunsjø, “Global Power Shift, Geography, 
and Maritime East Asia,” in International Order at Sea: How it is challenged How it is maintained, eds. Jo Inge 
Bekkevold and Geoffrey Till, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 41-58; Jennifer Lind, “Geography and the Security 
Dilemma in Asia,” in The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia, eds. Saadia Pekkanen, John 
Ravenhill, and Rosemary Foot, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 725-726. 
17 One News, “Navy Plans 50-Ship Maritime Force To Strengthen Claims On Disputed Seas; BRP Jose Rizal 






2020 several states in and beyond Southeast Asia for the first time began coalescing around a 
2016 international tribunal ruling that deemed illegal much of the PRC’s actions and claims in 
the South China Sea.18 Decades into PLAN modernization, a balancing coalition has begun to 
form. Traditional theories and approaches to analyzing CCP sea power have not provided an 
accurate threat assessment, and a new approach is needed. 
Research Question and Hypothesis 
This thesis has two aims: 1) to understand the strategic logic and political drivers of the 
CCP’s approach to building maritime power and 2) to assess this process as a dimension of 
USG-CCP strategic competition, including its impact on U.S. allies and partners. To meet the 
former objective, this thesis investigates CCP strategic planning and PRC foreign policymaking 
processes. To meet the latter objective, this thesis draws on balance of power theory at its 
intersection with sea power theory in order to investigate the extent to which recent PRC 
maritime developments bolster CCP strategic influence counterposed to the United States.  
This thesis approaches its research questions through the lens of maritime 
transformation, defined as the reorientation of a regime’s grand strategy from a continentalist 
vision to a maritime vision.19 To that end, this thesis poses the following research question: what 
is the driver of CCP maritime transformation, and what sort of threat does it pose to the United 
States? To answer this question, this thesis uses the net assessment approach to examine 
CCP intentions for maritime transformation and any proclivities with which the policy of maritime 
transformation is implemented. 
 
 
disputed-seas-brp-jose-rizal-arrives; Ralph Jennings, “As China Looms, Vietnam Aims to Develop a More Modern, 
Skilled Navy,” Voice of America, August 12, 2019, https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/china-looms-vietnam-
aims-develop-more-modern-skilled-navy; Nikkei, “Japan to convert helicopter carrier Izumo into aircraft carrier,” 
December 11, 2018, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Japan-to-convert-helicopter-carrier-Izumo-into-aircraft-carrier.   
18 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Annual Report to Congress, December 2020, 360-361, 
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-12/2020_Annual_Report_to_Congress.pdf. 
19 Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein, “Chinese Perspectives on Maritime Transformation,” in China Goes to 
Sea: Maritime Transformation in Comparative Historical Perspective, eds. Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and 






I hypothesize that CCP maritime transformation indicates a CCP objective to advance its 
strategic influence in a zero-sum competition against the United States by building Mahanian 
sea power;20 however, while the CCP effectively secures public Chinese support for this 
objective, ossified continentalist interests distort CCP maritime strategic planning and hinder 
implementation at the bureaucratic level, collectively posing an enduring challenge for maritime 
competition against the United States. This hypothesis addresses CCP intent as well as PRC 
and PLA capabilities. Thomas Schelling observed that “it is a tradition in military planning to 
attend to an enemy’s capabilities, not his intentions.”21 This thesis attempts both.  
Previous Scholarship on Chinese Maritime Transformation 
The topic of PRC maritime transformation has a robust but fragmented literature. 
Chinese policy documents do not discuss a cohesive maritime strategy. In fact, the term rarely 
arises in CCP official statements or strategy documents.22 While this may indicate 
compartmentalization in planning and implementing PRC maritime transformation, what is 
certain is that much of the analytical literature reflects this same compartmentalization by 
focusing largely on PRC, especially PLA, maritime capabilities, with much less attention given to 
CCP strategic intentions.23 A common approach in the literature is to adopt a structural realist 
view of domestic politics as black boxes, with instruments of power as the key measurable 
variable. Following this approach, much of the literature defines CCP intentions in terms of 
threat perceptions and the military capabilities which respond to them. Leading existing 
 
 
20 Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) was an officer in the U.S. Navy whose publications on sea power remain highly 
influential in maritime strategy. A definition and detailed discussion of Mahanian sea power is given on pages 39-41. 
21 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, (1966 reprint, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 35.  
22 Ryan D. Martinson, “Panning for Gold: Assessing Chinese Maritime Strategy from Primary Sources,” Naval War 
College Review 69, no. 3 (Summer 2016), https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss3/4.  
23 One marked exception is the 2009 edited volume by Andrew Erickson, Lyle Goldstein, and Carnes Lord, which 
takes a comparative approach to understanding PRC maritime transformation which explicitly considers the 
development of Chinese maritime capabilities alongside its domestic dialectic on choosing sea power. See Andrew S. 
Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and Carnes Lord, eds., China Goes to Sea: Maritime Transformation in Comparative 






explanations for PRC maritime transformation which consider both intention and capability fall 
into three broad categories: 1) naval nationalism, 2) responding to shifts in geopolitical threat, 
and 3) survival.  
Naval Nationalism 
One interpretation of PRC maritime development is that it is not maritime transformation 
at all. PRC maritime development could be explained as one component of a prestige strategy, 
in which the CCP remains a continental regime with an invariably continentalist vision but faces 
rising domestic pressures to build a navy. Under this framework, the CCP builds capital ships to 
appeal to the national impulses of Chinese citizens without committing to maritime competition 
with the United States. Robert Ross calls this approach “naval nationalism.”24  
According to naval nationalism, the CCP faces outsized continental threats along its land 
borders and an insurmountable maritime obstacle in the U.S. Navy. As such, it eschews direct 
naval competition with the United States and instead invests in a small number of high-profile 
warships, including aircraft carriers. This “prestige fleet” feeds popular support among Chinese 
citizens for a prestigious navy and offers some minor capabilities to complicate U.S. naval 
operations near China’s shores without incurring the prohibitive defense spending and 
opportunity cost to border security that would be required of a genuine naval buildup. PLAN 
expert Bernard Cole, elaborating on Ross’s explanation, offers that the CCP does not attempt to 
surpass or supplant the United States but nonetheless invests in its prestige fleet in an effort to 
“reestablish its country and culture as central to the region and possibly to the world.”25  
 
 
24 This section largely follows the argument laid out in Robert S. Ross, “China’s Naval Nationalism: Sources, 
Prospects, and the U.S. Response,” International Security 34, no. 2 (Fall 2009), 46-81, 
https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2009.34.2.46; and Robert S. Ross, “Nationalism, Geopolitics, and Naval Expansionism 
From the Nineteenth Century to the Rise of China,” Naval War College Review 71, no. 4 (2018), 11-45, https://digital-
commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/4.  
25 Bernard D. Cole, China’s Quest for Great Power: Ships, Oil, and Foreign Policy, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 
2016), 6. Also see Bernard D. Cole, Asian Maritime Strategies: Navigating Troubled Waters, (Annapolis: Naval 






The PRC remains a land power by necessity of its geopolitical status: China’s greatest 
security threats remain on its extensive land borders, which it shares with 14 countries including 
Afghanistan, India, North Korea, Russia, and Pakistan. These continental threats are 
exacerbated by domestic instability threatening China’s territorial integrity in Xinjiang, Tibet, and 
Inner Mongolia. PLA force structure reflects this threat assessment: despite repeated personnel 
cuts, the PLA Ground Force’s (PLAGF) nearly 1 million active duty servicemen makes up 
approximately half of the active duty personnel in the entire PLA.26 Further, PLAGF officers 
continue to dominate operational leadership, leading three of the PLA’s five theater 
commands.27 The PLAGF is supplemented by yet another million personnel in the paramilitary 
People’s Armed Police (PAP), who fulfill a primary mission of maintaining domestic stability 
under CCP rule.28 By comparison, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 
estimates the PLAN has only 250,000 active duty personnel.29 These continental threat 
perceptions and army building tendencies represent the latest iteration of Imperial China’s long 
history of a continentalist strategic culture.30 Moreover, the gap between the U.S. Navy and the 
PLAN in force structure, technological sophistication, and seamanship is also prohibitive of any 
serious CCP consideration for maritime competition against the United States. In fact, CCP 
leaders understand that investment in blue water naval capabilities would invite competition with 
the United States, ultimately undermining rather than bolstering CCP security. As such, the 
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January 3, 2019, 55, 
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CCP’s security calculus remains overwhelmingly and enduringly focused on continental threats, 
and any increase in maritime focus for PLA strategic planning or resource allocation must come 
on the margins of continental considerations.  
Despite the absence of clear national defense reasoning and prohibitive technology 
limitations, the Chinese public grew increasingly interested in a Chinese aircraft carrier.31 As 
Ross rationalizes, “aircraft carriers are a symbol of great-power status, so realization of the 
China dream required China to develop a fleet of them.”32 Ross further demonstrates the link 
between Chinese public nationalism and PLAN force structure by pointing out that public 
support in the PRC for building an aircraft carrier emerged in the early 2000s.33 Beginning then 
and continuing thereafter, civilian CCP and PLA officials began publicly endorsing the notion of 
a Chinese aircraft carrier for reasons of national pride, most prominently when PRC Minister for 
National Defense Liang Guanglie [梁光烈] reportedly said in a 2009 visit to his Japanese 
counterpart, “among the big nations, only China does not have an aircraft carrier. China cannot 
be without an aircraft carrier forever.”34 Accordingly, PLAN force development is shaped by the 
CCP’s decades-long pursuit of a highly specific form of naval power: one supplementary to 
border security and which rode a swell of public demand for capital ships.  
Following the framework of naval nationalism, CCP maritime development, merely the 
strategically unimportant outgrowth of a continental power, poses a decidedly manageable 
threat to U.S. interests. The CCP maritime objective is to bolster its domestic support by feeding 
Chinese public nationalism through the visible launch and operation of capital ships. 
 
 
31 On the limits of Chinese technology and shipbuilding infrastructure necessary for building and maintaining a 
Chinese aircraft carrier, see Andrew S. Erickson and Andrew R. Wilson, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Dilemma,” Naval 
War College Review 59, no. 4 (2006), 13-45, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss4/4.  
32 Robert S. Ross, “Nationalism, Geopolitics, and Naval Expansionism From the Nineteenth Century to the Rise of 
China,” Naval War College Review 71, no. 4 (2018), 32, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/4.  
33 Ibid, 32.  
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Accordingly, the purpose of any Chinese aircraft carriers or large warships is to show the flag 
and contribute to fervent propaganda narratives of the CCP championing Chinese interests and 
restoring national pride. While this objective may pose some risks as warships from the U.S. 
military and PLA operate in proximity to one another, as well as insofar as nationalism also 
shapes how these warships will be used, PLAN capital ships are not designed to address a 
perceived maritime threat, and as such, U.S. security interests are untargeted and largely 
unthreatened.  
Shifting Geopolitical Threat 
A second explanation for CCP maritime transformation could be that CCP leaders 
observed a geopolitical shift in the CCP’s threats and interests. Michael Glosny and Phillip 
Saunders cogently argue that “as continental pressures on China have diminished, strategic 
pressures from the sea have become more salient,” so driving the CCP’s investment into its 
navy.35  
China’s long land border with Russia was an overwhelming security concern for PLA 
planners following the Sino-Soviet split in 1960. However, the record of PLA military strategic 
guidelines (MSGs), which are the irregularly-issued but authoritative documents which detail the 
PLA’s strategic opponent and associated war planning concepts, reveal a decisive shift away 
from concern over China’s land borders. Every MSG promulgated between 1964 and 1980 
identified the Soviet Union as the CCP’s primary strategic opponent and further identified that 
the center of gravity for PLA defense planning was to China’s north.36 These perceptions began 
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to shift in the early 1980s. For several months in 1985, the PLA’s Central Military Commission 
(CMC), its highest decision making body, and Chinese paramount leader Deng Xiaoping met to 
assess the strategic situation and revise PLA strategy accordingly. On June 6, 1985, Deng 
authoritatively declared, “we have changed our view that the danger of war is imminent,” a 
judgment that the CCP’s security challenges, primarily threats along China’s northern border, 
were unlikely to include total war.37 Following this declaration of the CCP’s revised threat 
perception, the PLA recalibrated its attentions. Liberated from single-minded preparation to 
repel a Soviet overland invasion, the PLA was charged in 1988 to reorient toward local wars on 
China’s coast, including toward ongoing sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea.38 
At the same time China’s continental threats receded, its economic maritime interests 
grew. In 1979, Deng identified four “special economic zones,” (SEZs) wherein both taxes and 
certain restrictions of China’s planned economy were relaxed, to be established along China’s 
coast: Shenzhen, Shantou, Zhuhai near Hong Kong, and Xiamen, across the Strait from 
Taiwan.39 These SEZs lowered the cost of production and increased the amount of capital 
flowing into the PRC, financing China’s early industrialization and eventually growing to become 
regional and global hubs of investment that drove remarkable economic growth in China for 
over three decades.40 As of 2017, the activity through only three clusters of port systems 
accounted for approximately 36 percent of China’s gross domestic product (GDP).41  
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Receding continental threats and growing maritime economic interests drove Chinese 
naval investment. Recognizing that the PRC has growing overseas interests, then-CCP General 
Secretary Hu Jintao issued the “New Historic Missions,” in 2004, charging the PLA with a slate 
of new missions, including safeguarding PRC economic interests along sea lines of 
communication (SLOCs), which Hu described as “a strategic resource treasure-house for the 
sustainable development of humanity.”42 Changes to PLA force planning reaffirmed these new 
missions. In 2006, the PRC released a Defense White Paper (DWP), a document released 
approximately every two years detailing PLA perceptions and reforms, announcing that the PLA 
will transition from focusing on territorial defense to instead focus on offshore defense 
operations by investing in the PLAN’s and PLA Air Force’s (PLAAF) strategic depth.43 All 
subsequent DWPs have echoed this call for strategic depth as well as for additional investment 
in naval and air capabilities. In this context, strategic depth is constabulary, not expeditionary. 
PLA force structure adhered to force planning: PLAN and PLAAF projected force structure for 
the next decade strongly suggests focus on protecting overseas investments, not operating in 
contested environments.44 
Following the geopolitical framework, PRC maritime transformation is not a concerted, 
long-term competitive strategy but rather a recent response to two shifts in CCP perceptions: 1) 
diminishing threats along China’s land border, and 2) increasing economic interests along 
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SLOCs to be protected. The PRC is undergoing a maritime transformation only insofar as it 
reflects the CCP’s efforts to minimize threat and maximize economic gain. While PLAN 
investments are clearly intended to secure Chinese commercial shipping and not to wage a 
high-end kinetic war against the U.S. Navy, the probability of accidental escalation increases 
with PLAN capabilities, as PLAN escorts continue further along their SLOCs, and as the U.S. 
and PLA navies operate in closer proximity to one another. Moreover, the CCP’s interest in 
operating its own navy suggests a disinterest in relying on the U.S. Navy to secure its SLOCs, 
suggesting potential CCP suspicion or distrust of the United States military, which can 
contribute to risky military interactions. Nonetheless, the United States is not the CCP’s 
designated adversary, and any PLAN capabilities built up are intended for escort, not 
warfighting. So long as the United States and the CCP foster robust mil-mil communication 
mechanisms and have de-escalation procedures in place to manage any friction that arises as 
the CCP builds its naval capabilities, the United States enjoys minimal threat from the CCP’s 
benign, economically-minded intentions. 
Survival 
A third explanation for CCP maritime transformation is that the CCP faces existential 
threat from historically imperial powers and must build a defensive naval capacity to deny these 
countries’ attempts to impinge upon the PRC’s rejuvenation as a great power. This 
interpretation, pervasive in current research from Chinese analysts, is particularly common in 
PLA literature and has been explored at length by Lt. Colonel Dr. Shi Xiaoqin [师小芹] and 
Senior Colonel Wu Xiaoyan [吴晓燕]. Both researchers are also members of the PLA Academy 
of Military Science, a top-level PLA research institute which reports directly to the CMC, 
suggesting these perspectives are part of the discussion among top PLA decision-makers. This 
explanation is not a strictly military perspective. It is shared by civilian academics participating in 






Ocean of China [中国海洋发展研究中心] and the China Association of Marine Affairs [中国海洋
发展研究会].45 
According to this explanation, any assessment of the drivers behind PRC maritime 
transformation must begin with China’s historic military defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War 
(1894-1895), which was a critical turning point in the Qing Dynasty’s colonization by other 
countries. As Col. Wu explains, “without a strong maritime defense and a well-trained navy, 
China lost the wars in resisting foreign aggressors.”46 Similarly, the PLAN’s top officer and top 
commissar claimed that inadequate naval power during that period left China helpless against 
imperialist forces, which proceeded to invade China over 470 times and force the ruling Qing 
dynasty into signing extractive and nationally humiliating treaties.47 External imperialism remains 
a persistent threat. Western sea powers, such as the United States and United Kingdom, and 
their acolytes such Japan, continue to prosecute strategies aligned with Alfred Thayer Mahan’s 
approach to sea power, which takes as its foundation the imperialist idea that a state must 
either expand or collapse and, as such, makes an interstate conflict an inevitability.48 In this 
reading of Mahanian sea power, states leverage offensive maritime strategies in zero-sum 
competitions to maximize their own interests. Upon reaching an unspecified critical point, this 
competition for sea power becomes one for “sea hegemony.”49  
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In this strategic environment, the PRC’s maritime transformation is a bid for survival, not 
domination. China’s maritime economy is a critical part of the “grand strategy of China’s rise” 
through peaceful development, and to succeed, the CCP must ensure China’s economic 
development by safeguarding its SLOCs.50 Yet the CCP’s strategic interests are complicated by 
China’s ethno-nationalist character. The Chinese people are inherently peaceful: CCP General 
Secretary Xi Jinping declared, “the blood of the Chinese people carries no gene for invading 
others or proclaiming oneself a global hegemon,” and the eunuch Zheng He’s peaceful maritime 
expeditions as early as 1405 demonstrate this peaceful national character has a long history.51 
Moreover, Western countries, like the United States, as well as non-Western countries that 
would learn from them such as Japan, do have imperialist genes.52 The CCP thus faces a 
tension between China’s peaceful national character and the strategic pressures thrust upon the 
CCP by Western sea powers vying for hegemony.53  
Reflecting both influences, Chinese maritime power is built with single-mindedly 
defensive or “anti-aggressive” intentions.54 While China’s peaceful national character precludes 
the CCP from adopting an offensive maritime strategy as those exhibited by Western powers, 
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the CCP is also decidedly abandoning the naval passivity which enabled China’s colonization 
after the First Sino-Japanese war.55 A yawning gap in power between the coalition of sea 
powers and the PLAN reinforces China’s peaceful national character to ensure that the PLAN’s 
development is strictly defensive. PLA strategic guidelines all embody the principle of “active 
defense,” which Taylor Fravel describes as “how to conduct operations when facing a superior 
enemy, numerically or technologically, and thus when on the strategic defensive.”56 As such, 
while Western powers may use a Mahanian lens to mistakenly interpret the CCP’s pursuit of 
maritime power as a potential threat, the Chinese national character anchors Chinese sea 
power as the strength necessary to deter foreign expansionist interests from obstructing China’s 
rise.57 
Following the framework of national survival, PRC maritime transformation builds a 
limited conventional deterrent against the expansionist policies of other countries. While such 
actions may be threatening when undertaken by countries with imperialist genes, the national 
survival framework suggests the PRC’s maritime ambitions are characterized by China’s 
peaceful national character rather than Mahan’s imperial-era strategic logic. Rather than bidding 
for maritime hegemony, the PRC’s maritime transformation is in service to a CCP grand 
strategy of peaceful development and rising back to great power status. The absence of 
expansionist CCP intent means that PRC maritime transformation’s threat to the United States 
is entirely nonexistent, regardless of whatever defensive capabilities the PLAN may or may not 
develop. Under this framework, to avoid conflict between the U.S. Navy and the PLAN, the USG 
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should restrain its own hegemonic ambitions and avoid encroaching on China’s peaceful 
development, as failure to do so will force the PLAN to defend its interests.  
Gaps in Explaining PRC Maritime Transformation 
Taken separately, each of these three drivers for maritime transformation would have 
distinct influences on PRC maritime planning, especially PLAN force structure. These 
characteristics are summarized in Table 1 below. 
Table 1: Drivers of PRC Maritime Transformation and Resultant Types of PLAN Forces 
 CCP intent PLAN force type Threat to the United 
States 
Naval nationalism Appeal to rising 
domestic nationalism 
Prestige fleet of 
capital ships  
Low; prestige fleet 
has little warfighting 
capability 




with growing power 
projection capabilities 
Low-moderate; U.S. 
and CCP interests 
are not in conflict, but 
navies operating in 




Survival Deter imperialism Capable of deterring 
an expeditionary 
force near China’s 
shores 






Naval nationalism’s driver would produce a prestige fleet with a few, well-publicized 
capital ships but fewer of the escorting, comparatively less-prestigious supply ships needed to 
operate a functional carrier strike group. The geopolitical driver would produce a blue water58 
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but largely constabulary force shaped to deter or defeat pirate elements but unable to effectively 
engage the U.S. Navy. The survival driver would produce a fleet capable of prevailing in a high-
end kinetic conflict against the United States near China’s shores but may not include 
expeditionary capabilities. In reality, all of these drivers likely explain aspects of PLAN force 
structure and employment, by extension also explaining some aspects of PRC maritime 
transformation. Reflecting the nationalist influence in PLAN activities, the PLAN continues to 
produce capital ships to great fanfare, and any development regarding either PLAN aircraft 
carrier, the currently solitary Type 055 destroyer, and the hospital ship Peace Ark feature 
prominently in official propaganda.59 Reflecting the geopolitical driver, the full PLA has been 
engaged in a decades long turn away from a primarily continental military to a primarily maritime 
one, and the theme is a recurrent feature in published strategic documents, defense white 
papers, and service reforms.60 And the notion of defensive intentions facing existential threats 
has been a staple of CCP propaganda regarding the PLA, certainly the PLAN, for decades.61  
Still, no combination of these explanations completely explains PRC maritime 
transformation. None of these proposed drivers specifically explains the timing or extent of PRC 
investment in a blue water navy over the last decade. Moreover, with the exception of the semi-
regular defense white paper publications, these explanations largely eschew use of top-level 
CCP strategic documents in determining CCP maritime objectives or threat perceptions. This 
section overviews gaps in the explanatory and predictive power of each proposed driver. 
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Nationalism and Border Threats? 
Naval nationalism is unlikely to explain, or explain away, PRC maritime transformation. 
The explanation’s proposal that PLAN force structure reflects a prestige strategy meant to 
address growing Chinese nationalism does not accurately reflect military or civilian realities in 
China.  
The narrative that popular nationalism in China is potent enough to shape top-level CCP 
decisions, such as building a prestige fleet, appears empirically unsubstantiated. Research from 
Alastair Iain Johnston and, separately, Andrew Chubb using survey data in China find that 
popular nationalist sentiment in China has not grown or disapproved of PRC policy over the last 
two decades. Rather, the opposite appears to be the case: Johnston found that “most indicators 
show a decline in levels of nationalism since around 2009,” the same year Ross first published 
his argument on naval nationalism.62 Chubb similarly found Chinese citizens who get their 
information from traditional media are more likely to favor compromise, suggesting significant 
PRC ability to manage domestic opinions.63 One analyst commenting on Chubb’s research 
noted that the narrative that CCP decision makers are constrained by Chinese public 
nationalism appears to be largely promulgated, perhaps fabricated whole cloth, by 
representatives of PRC state institutions interested in convincing foreign observers of this 
narrative.64  
Elite discourse and PLA reform similarly offer an account of CCP threat perception which 
naval nationalism cannot explain. While domestic propaganda supports the argument that the 
PLA’s prestige matters to the CCP, state media has since 2006 been increasingly critical of the 
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PLA’s actual warfighting capability.65 These criticisms, including charges that PLA officers are 
incapable of accurately assessing a combat situation or making any operational decisions, 
being published in popular state-run outlets such as the PLA Daily or Xinhua directly 
undermines the CCP’s ability to benefit from PLA prestige.66 Nor does the emphasis on 
warfighting capability over prestige support Ross’s characterization of the PRC as deeply 
insecure and facing serious threats along its borders. The CCP has openly declared that its 
external security environment has significantly improved from when it perceived significant 
overland threats: observing that a Soviet invasion was unlikely, in 1978 Deng Xiaoping declared 
“peace and development” the “main theme of the era,” and every subsequent CCP General 
Secretary has evaluated and reaffirmed this determination.67 Reflecting this assessment, PLA 
reforms on improving warfighting capability have prioritized strategic depth past China’s coast 
rather than hardened defenses along its land borders. The PLAGF continues to shrink with each 
reform as the CCP invests in PLAN, PLAAF, and PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) strategic depth.68 
Naval nationalism predicts a small prestige fleet secondary to PLAGF units securing China’s 
borders. It is not the fleet the PLAN has built.  
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Securing Maritime Trade? 
The explanation of shifting geopolitical pressures is similarly inadequate for PRC 
maritime transformation. Although this explanation has a more accurate perception of CCP 
threat perception than naval nationalism, its image of a PRC developing naval capabilities 
proportionate to its needs to guard its growing interests in maritime trade does not align with the 
reality of the CCP strategic ambitions and steps the PRC and PLA have taken to realize them.  
PLAN force employment in the Western Pacific has been provocative in ways that would 
undermine a supposed strategy of conflict management in order to ensure PRC economic 
interests. While SLOC protection has long involved escorts and naval exercises intended to 
deter potential adversaries, PLAN aggressions against Southeast Asian states and the United 
States stretch well beyond these missions.69 PLA aviators and captains have demonstrated an 
enduring behavioral pattern of provocatively engaging U.S. assets in the Western Pacific: in 
2001, a PLA pilot undertook dangerous maneuvers around a U.S. Navy EP-3 reconnaissance 
plane flying over the South China Sea, resulting in a collision fatal to the Chinese pilot.70 In 
2009, Chinese vessels similarly harassed the USNS Impeccable, an unarmed surveillance 
vessel.71 In 2018, a PLAN destroyer’s aggressive maneuvering threatened a collision with a 
U.S. Navy destroyer.72 The PLAN escalated these provocations to new heights in 2020 when a 
PLAN destroyer lased a U.S. Navy P-8A surveillance aircraft, conducting a directed energy 
attack threatening damage to the aircraft’s systems.73 Nor is the United States the sole target of 
aggressive Chinese behavior: CCG vessels aggressively patrol the South China Sea, in several 
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cases sinking and threatening to fire on fishing boats and patrol vessels from Southeast Asian 
countries.74 In none of these instances was the PLAN or CCG acting to defend maritime 
shipping. Moreover, the United States is not a claimant in the South China Sea, and U.S. policy 
during these provocations did not support or deny CCP claims to sovereignty over the South 
China Sea.75 The CCP has used maritime power for reasons beyond those offered by the 
geopolitical explanation: SLOC protection or unresolved sovereignty disputes. Rather, the PLAN 
and CCG appear to be executing an operational vision in which no military, certainly not that of 
the United States, can operate with impunity near China’s shores.76 
What exactly it means to be “near” China’s shores appears to be changing. With the 
2001 incident, the U.S. crew of the EP-3 was close enough to China to execute an emergency 
landing on Hainan.77 By the 2020 lasing incident, the U.S. Pacific Fleet reported the lased P-8A 
was flying approximately 380 miles west of Guam, or around 1,500 miles from China’s coast.78 
The 2015 DWP for the first time referred to “open seas protection” [远海护卫] as a “strategic 
requirement” [战略要求] and declared that the PLAN will develop expeditionary capabilities to 
meet this strategic requirement.79 Despite some PLA force structure appearing shaped to 
support overseas investments, PLA force employment has already demonstrated aggressive 
intentions in conflict with U.S. interests to operate where permitted under international law, and 
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public PLA force planning information appears tailored to building the blue water navy needed to 
realize these intentions on a larger scale.80 The shifting geopolitical pressures explanation 
predicts the PLAN will be deployed to secure its SLOCs and ensure growing economic 
development. However, PLAN operations have indicated that the CCP has greater maritime 
ambitions than trade and prosperity. 
Survival? 
A CCP bid for survival through naval power leaves many gaps as an explanation for 
PRC maritime transformation. Because this explanation largely regards threat perceptions and 
does not specify needed naval capability or capacity, it is consistent with any PLAN able to pose 
a credible threat to militaries threatening to invade China. However, this narrative runs counter 
to the stated threat perceptions of CCP leaders. Moreover, arguments turning on claims of 
ethno-national character are difficult to substantiate, and the argument’s proponents do not 
succeed in doing so.  
The narrative that the PRC faces existential threat from Western powers that never 
deviated from Mahanian imperialist approaches does not accord with CCP pronouncements. 
Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 declaration that “peace and development” were characteristics of the 
modern era was the CCP leadership’s determination of fundamental dynamics of international 
relations, indicating a significantly lower probability of war with other major powers. Deng’s 
“peace and development” line replaced his predecessor Mao Zedong’s assessment that the 
international security environment was one of “war and revolution” in which the PLA should 
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expect “early war, major war, and nuclear war.”81 By contrast, “peace and development” 
indicated “the possibility of a world war was remote, the chance of a nuclear war between the 
superpowers was slight, China did not face the prospect of imminent invasion, and China would 
enjoy at least two decades of a peaceful international environment.”82 In 2002, Deng’s 
successor CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin renewed this assessment for another two 
decades by declaring at the CCP’s 16th National Congress that the PRC is enjoying a “period of 
strategic opportunity,” [战略机遇期] when it will be free to develop unencumbered by the threat 
of major war.83 In 2020, the CCP Politburo, led by Xi Jinping, reaffirmed that the PRC remains in 
a period of strategic opportunity even despite unspecified new developments and challenges.84 
These are authoritative pronouncements which maintain Deng’s assessment that the PRC is not 
facing threat of a major war, including invasion by Western maritime powers.  
Appeals to the absence of expansionist genes in “Chinese blood” and the presence of 
such genes among U.S., UK, and Japanese citizens are similarly not predictive of PLAN and 
CCP behavior, including the aggressive actions PLAN and CCG captains have taken against 
the United States and Southeast Asian countries, noted in the prior section. The CCP has 
demonstrated a distinct willingness to, even a proclivity toward, using force when the balance of 
forces permits.85 The PLA are commonly aggressors in interstate conflict, having initiated wars 
against India in 1962 and against Vietnam in 1979 after intervening in the Korean War in 1950; 
Chinese accounts maintain both were defensive wars despite their being fought on foreign or 
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disputed soil.86 PLA strategy and doctrine also facilitate escalatory behavior. Some PLA 
literature suggests even firing direct shots on foreign vessels may be reasonable crisis control 
activities for persuading a foreign vessel to leave an area.87 Further, PLA strategists develop 
bellicose doctrine that does not reflect a largely defensive strategy. The last two editions of the 
PLA Academy of Military Science’s Science of Military Strategy include discussions of the PLA’s 
need to develop capabilities of “war control,” [战争控制] an operational concept describing 
controlling, even escalating or extending, military crises for political benefit rather than seeking 
de-escalation.88 Ethno-nationalist claims of an inherently peaceful Chinese national character 
appear distinctly disconnected from national history and modern doctrine, lending credence to 
Andrew Scobell’s assessment that the CCP is an entity that “assertively protects and 
aggressively promotes its own national interests, up to and including acts of war, but that 
rationalizes all military moves as purely self-defensive.”89 If any military act can be rationalized 
as self-defensive, then when facing a marked Chinese naval buildup, the United States cannot 
interpret claims that the CCP is without “expansionist genes” as an absence of threat.  
Framing CCP Intent 
Each of the three existing explanations for PRC maritime transformation are predicated 
on a belief that the PRC’s and PLA’s activities, and any developments therein, largely reflect 
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and can be used to determine CCP intentions. However, the explanations’ inability to offer 
interpretations of CCP intentions that are predictive of PLA activities reveal limits to this 
assumption, which ultimately confuses enduring intentions with transient approaches.90 While 
the naval nationalism and geopolitical explanations may have appeared more likely in the early 
2000s given then-contemporary PLAN force structure and force employment, they have not 
been robust to uncertainty over time. Instead, these approaches overinterpreted transient 
factors such as rising PRC domestic nationalism and the CCP’s risk-minimization approach to 
economic development. Explanations which overinterpret transient factors as enduring political 
intention have limited predictive power for determining long-term policy trajectories involved in 
maritime transformation, such as reshaping a navy. To accurately assess the threat PRC 
maritime transformation poses to the United States, any analysis must examine proclivity 
towards conflict or competition in enduring CCP intention while accounting for the obfuscating 
but ultimately transient effect of limited resources or capabilities. Drawing on expert analytical 
views, this section argues that CCP intention can be most accurately derived from select official 
Party and government documents, while current or developing PLA activities are, taken alone, 
unreliable indicators of enduring CCP interests.  
Cheap Talk and Grand Strategy: Identifying Authoritative Sources  
Maritime transformation is a shift in grand strategic vision, necessarily emerging from 
enduring interests and intentions. The record of elite CCP policy speeches and planning 
documents offer open source accounts of the CCP’s enduring intentions and should be given 
outsized influence in assessing intention and threat. Given their public nature and often-
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belligerent tone despite robust economic ties between the United States and the PRC, some 
scholars91 dismiss elite CCP policy pronouncements as “cheap talk,” or information sharing in 
which the sharer has not substantiated or otherwise made credible a position by accepting costs 
to maintain it.92 The caution is salient given rife overestimation of cheap talk among U.S. 
analyses of CCP policy: books such as Unrestricted Warfare, written by two PLA colonels in 
their personal capacities, and exhortations by CCP General Secretaries to “prepare for war” are 
commonly misinterpreted as authoritative indicators of CCP intent.93 These examples do not 
undermine the authority of consensus-driven, bureaucracy-directing policy pronouncements 
delivered from the highest echelons of the CCP.  
The CCP’s authoritative policy pronouncements are products of a costly consensus-
building process necessitated by the regime’s authoritarian nature. Without meaningful elections 
renewing the CCP’s absolute control over offices with governing authority in the PRC, the 
Chinese Party-society relationship lacks an obvious means of legitimizing CCP rule.94 As such, 
CCP elites must continuously prosecute strategies of inclusion with Party and state elites to 
maintain their ruling legitimacy, thus opening opportunities for bargaining within the Party as 
well as between Party, state, and society in the CCP’s policymaking process.95 The scale of this 
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bargaining should not be understated: David Lampton described the bureaucratic aspects of the 
CCP’s governing system as distinctive for how frequently a decision might require many 
individuals or groups to reach consensus before action can be taken.96 Lucian Pye observed 
that factionalism in the CCP has previously given rise to political “immobilism” while intraparty 
conflicts are resolved out of public view.97 Bargaining and the leverage to do so is rife between 
CCP elites as well as between CCP principals and their agents in the state bureaucracy. PRC 
academics recognize the leverage members of state and society have when bargaining with the 
CCP elite, noting the popular refrain, “the higher ups may have policies, but those below have 
countermeasures” [上有政策，下有对策], is a reality of governing in China.98 The phrase’s entry 
on Baidu Baike, an online encyclopedia subject to PRC content requirements, describes it as a 
mentality “pervasive through all levels of Party and government work committees in China.”99  
Pressures to achieve consensus among key stakeholders constrain the CCP elite policy 
making process while simultaneously lending authority to their products. The Political Work 
Report delivered every five years at the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party100 
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is “the most significant document of governance in contemporary China,” endowed with the 
authority to “set the fundamental guidelines for the Party in the years to come” precisely 
because it is the product of a consensus-building process designed to secure buy-in across the 
Party elite; according to Wu Guoguang [吴国光], who in 1987 participated in drafting the 13th 
Party Congress Work Report as a member of the CCP central policy group on political reform, 
the consensus-building ahead of the Party Congress is far more important in setting the CCP’s 
agenda than the proceedings of the Party Congress itself.101 The Work Report’s yearlong 
consensus-building process is one that constrains the CCP General Secretary from exercising 
plenary power and in exchange reflects a broad leadership consensus in its concessions.102 The 
authority-conferring process of consensus-building is not exclusive to setting five-year 
guidelines delivered at Party Congresses; the same process legitimizes the CCP’s day-to-day 
governance on national and regional levels.103 For example, the Central Foreign Affairs 
Commission and its predecessor, the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group,104 does not submit 
recommendations to the Politburo until consensus is reached among its members, which 
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includes comparatively junior Party members being prepared for the next generation of 
leadership.105 The policy pronouncements and official documents produced from these 
consensus-building processes are not without authority or cost. In fact, the opposite is true: the 
CCP’s consensus-building process is so laborious and often brittle that the costs associated 
with changing or reversing course on a decided policy are often prohibitive.106  
CCP leader speeches and official documents produced from a consultative process are 
not cheap talk. They derive authority from a laborious process by which the Party maintains its 
authoritarian regime. As such, these documents are authoritative sources of CCP intentions, 
and the long-running record of these documents reveal the CCP’s enduring interests.  
Principal-Agent Problems in CCP Authority 
One tradeoff of the CCP’s consensus-driven authority is that the most authoritative 
documents are also the most bargained over and therefore the most vague.107 The CCP and 
PRC are aggregate entities of networked constituencies and as such are subject to principal-
agent problems common to any policymaking network: network actors with bargaining power 
have discrete interests and incentives, share asymmetric interdependencies, and can expect 
those interests, incentives, and interdependencies to change over time.108 Vague guiding 
documents which different actors can interpret according to their own interests facilitate 
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consensus-building, making these documents more authoritative while creating room for 
misalignment between national and bureaucratic interests.109 The CCP attempts to manage this 
misalignment as a form of federalism, continuing a Maoist legacy of vague leader decisions that 
empower regional and local implementers to innovate.110 More recent CCP leaders temper the 
governing chaos that characterized Mao’s governance with a well-defined hierarchy of central 
government document types (e.g., orders [命令], decisions [决定], regulations [规定], opinions 
[意见], and so on) in which documents issued at the highest ranks must be implemented without 
delay, while lower-ranked documents offer growing degrees of flexibility in implementation.111 
Despite the CCP’s efforts to manage its principal-agent governance problem, some gaps 
between CCP interest and PLA interest exist. PLA resistance to CCP reforms has been a 
consistent issue.112 A 1998 CCP directive that the PLA must divest from operating businesses 
using military resources was largely ignored, inciting the need for a renewed order in 2015.113 
Similarly, modern PLA training exercises exhibit weaknesses which longtime analyst Dennis 
Blasko argues represent “multiple systemic failures to execute Jiang Zemin’s guidance from two 
decades ago” to improve the quality of PLA equipment and training.114 Beyond resisting CCP 
reforms, the PLA has occasionally exhibited outsized influence in shaping the CCP foreign 
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policy agenda. Beginning in the late 1980s, for example, a PLAN interested in expanding its 
mission set successfully cornered CCP elites into pursuing an aggressive military expansion in 
the South China Sea, forcing the CCP leaders to set aside concerns of budgetary limits and 
risks of diplomatic isolation.115 As such, PLA actions and capabilities may reflect their own 
bureaucratic interests or create within the CCP a transient interest of placating PLA interests. 
PLA actions and capabilities are not reliable indicators of CCP intentions. In fact, PLA 
actions and capabilities may obfuscate enduring CCP interests insofar as the PLA’s 
bureaucratic interests conflict with or prevail over CCP political interests. Reflecting the authority 
of elite CCP documents produced by a consultative process and recognizing the obfuscating 
nature principal-agent problems may pose to analysts attempting to understand CCP intent 
through PLA capability, this thesis will consider PRC and PLA capabilities as either reinforcing 
or countervailing CCP intentions, not reliable indicators of such, when assessing the threat of 
PRC maritime transformation to the United States.  
Research Approach: Net Assessment  
This thesis draws on the net assessment approach. For the purposes of this research, 
net assessment is a comparative analysis, comprehensive across military and nonmilitary 
variables, which diagnoses problems and opportunities in long-running strategic interaction 
between national security establishments. These establishments, once informed of their 
problems and opportunities, can formulate competitive strategies around the disadvantages and 
advantages on which a competition turns. A net assessment’s diagnosis thus serves as the 
foundation of “a system of competitive strategy based on long-term interaction between national 
security establishments along with an advanced understanding of organizational dynamics.”116 
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In short, net assessment is a way to understand a potential adversary’s enduring political 
intentions, evaluate their bureaucratic performance in light of those intentions, and from that 
evaluation identify threats to the assessor as well as potential vulnerabilities in the assessed. 
Competitive strategies can then be developed from that understanding of threat to oneself and 
opportunity to exploit vulnerabilities in others. 
Net assessment is an approach rather than a method, and as such, it is also a concept 
that has been varyingly defined. A DoD directive describes it as the “comparative analysis of 
military, technological, political, economic, and other factors governing the relative military 
capability of nations,” typically to understand a military balance between two or more 
competitors or to understand the landscape of international strategic competition.117 The same 
DoD directive further argues the purpose of net assessment is to identify “problems and 
opportunities that deserve the attention of senior defense officials.”118 However, the scope of net 
assessment extends beyond the defense bureaucracy to consider all variables relevant to 
competitions taking place between national security establishments in both war and peace.119 
As former net assessors James Roche and Thomas Mahnken explain, “senior officials have a 
compelling need to assess the posture of the United States vis-à-vis potential adversaries taking 
into account the relevant non-military variables.”120 
Net assessment’s scope is necessarily broad because it is a precursor to developing 
competitive strategies. Competitive strategies focus on the “peacetime use of latent military 
power...to shape a competitor’s choices in ways that favor our objectives. Specifically, the 
competitive strategies approach focuses on peacetime interaction among and between defense 
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establishments.”121 The competitive strategies approach begins with the assumption that large 
organizations, including national security establishments, are intended to systematize activities 
and so are designed not to change; as such, these establishments may be locked into static 
routines unsuited to long-term changes in a dynamic security environment. These gaps between 
established routines and the changing world become vulnerabilities in strategic competition, and 
because no two national security establishments are identical, the gaps will inevitably vary and 
constitute organizational asymmetries.122 That is, all national security establishments have gaps, 
but they are not likely to be the same gaps. If these gaps are enduring, they become strengths 
and weaknesses on which long-term strategic competition might turn. A state locked in strategic 
competition with an adversary can shape its competitor’s choices by driving the compet ition to 
areas in which it has enduring strengths but its adversary has enduring weaknesses and by 
resisting any developments to the contrary. Net assessment uses comprehensive comparative 
analysis to identify these gaps. Because these gaps arise from complexes of variables specific 
to particular competitions between certain national security establishments at specific points in 
time, there is no universally applicable template, formula, or method for conducting a net 
assessment.123 
Using the net assessment approach, this thesis rejects the unitary rational actor 
assumption in which capabilities indicate intent and thus threat to other states.124 This thesis’s 
approach lowers the unit of analysis from a unitary state to the national security establishments 
of interacting states to assess whether and how PRC maritime transformation has changed the 
peacetime strategic environment at sea and what the future trajectory of this change might be. 
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The assessment will also consider enduring strengths and weaknesses endogenous to how the 
CCP’s national security establishment conceptualizes and implements its ongoing maritime 
transformation. 
Organization of the Study 
Until this point, this thesis has only discussed CCP intentions and PLA capabilities. 
However, maritime transformation is a shift in grand strategy, not defense planning. As such, 
this net assessment will not be a traditional study of a military balance but rather a broader 
examination of USG-CCP125 strategic competition in the maritime space, to include military, 
political, and economic lines of effort. As will be demonstrated in the next sections, both U.S. 
and CCP policy planners understand their bilateral relationship in these terms.  
Eliot Cohen, once a Military Assistant to the Director of Net Assessment, offers a 
valuable guide for conducting net assessments measuring military balances between two or 
more competitors. This thesis will modify Cohen’s template to consider a strategic balance 
rather than strictly a military one. Cohen lists four key points for net assessment: 1) frame the 
nature of the balance, 2) identify long-term trends, 3) understand differing concepts of 
operations, and 4) identify asymmetries in objectives and capabilities.126 This thesis will largely 
follow Cohen’s structure. The first two sections of this net assessment comprise an executive 
summary and introduction of the research question, existing literature, and research approach. 
The third section will address the assessment’s geographic, functional, and temporal 
parameters. The fourth section will describe the evolution of PRC grand strategy, its maritime 
transformation, and the military strategy necessary to implement CCP strategy over time. The 
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fifth section will contextualize this maritime transformation by introducing competing U.S. 
interests and capabilities in the relevant theater. Taken together, the third, fourth, and fifth 
sections address the nature of the balance. The thesis proceeds from the strategic level to the 
operational level in the sixth section, which details significant trends and operational 
asymmetries shaping the trajectory of USG-CCP maritime competition. The seventh section will 
contextualize these trends with case studies of U.S. and CCP policy interactions in the South 
China Sea. A final section will leverage the assembled information to conduct an alternative 
futures analysis. 
III. Parameters: How to Think about the USG-CCP Maritime Balance 
This thesis argues that PRC maritime transformation takes place in the context of USG-
CCP strategic competition. The USG and CCP have published strategic documents describing 
the United States as the world’s dominant power and the PRC as an emerging power 
challenging the global status quo.127 As the following sections will demonstrate, the object of this 
challenge is relative strategic influence, defined in this thesis as a state’s ability to compel 
desired behaviors from other states. Arguably, the most significant international strategic 
influence is exerted through security cooperation agreements, up to and including formal military 
alliances.128  
The current state of play reveals the stakes of USG-CCP strategic competition: under 
General Secretary Xi Jinping, the CCP has consistently championed an explicitly-stated 
objective of advancing a “new model of interstate relations” [新型国际关系] defined by a 
multipolar system fostering “win-win cooperation” that would displace the current U.S.-
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dominated model, which CCP officials and documents describe as a Cold War-era relic 
tantamount to a hegemonic power structure.129 Xi’s latest Work Report, delivered to the CCP 
19th Party Congress in 2017, announced that the PRC will “encourage the transformation of the 
global governance system.”130 The PRC’s State Council Information Office released a 
subsequent white paper clarifying that evolution as one to a multipolar world in which no one 
country or bloc, implying the United States and its allies, is globally dominant. This proposed 
evolution has consequences beyond global security architecture:131 the same white paper 
articulates the CCP’s argument that the world has entered a “new era” defined by the economic 
rise of developing countries such as the PRC and retrenchment in the overextended West.132  
The “new era” narrative claims Chinese economic growth is catalyzing an ongoing, 
fundamental change to the world economic and political system, and the U.S. and its allies must 
make room for the now rich and powerful PRC by abandoning military alliances to which the 
United States is party.133 For its part, the USG considers the CCP a revisionist power leveraging 
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its increasing capabilities to reorder the Indo-Pacific geopolitical dynamic to Chinese strategic 
advantage and in accordance with authoritarian principles.134 To the extent that the USG resists 
the CCP’s destruction of its security architecture, the U.S. and PRC are locked in competition 
for strategic influence. As will be demonstrated in this thesis, the USG aspires to preserve its 
strategic influence broadly to thicken, expand, and internetwork existing alliance systems, while 
the CCP aims to accrue strategic influence vis-à-vis the U.S. and undermine the security 
partnerships which affords the U.S. outsized strategic influence.  
Sea Power  
The USG-CCP competition for strategic influence involves a significant maritime 
component, in which sea power will confer a significant advantage. This thesis uses Alfred 
Thayer Mahan’s concept of sea power, which has two key components: 1) market access to 
overseas resources and 2) battlefield command which guarantees such access when 
challenged.135 More simply, sea power describes a state’s ability to securely benefit from the 
oceans. According to Mahan’s classic formulation, a state with sea power necessarily has 
domestic industry, overseas markets, the ships to access them, and navies able to secure that 
access.136 Yet sea power is something a state can have as well as exert. Each component has 
strategic implications: market access facilitates economic interdependence, navies confer 
threats or reassurances, and fleet sizes determine the scale of those implications. A state 
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objectives, including changing a regional or global balance of power.137 In this way, international 
strategic competition in the maritime domain is animated by competing sea power strategies. 
These strategies are shaped by the nature and objects of their competition. The CCP 
asserts that the PRC is the primary force stabilizing and powering the world economy.138 From 
that status, it claims the right to lead what it argues is a necessary reshaping of interstate 
relations, including the eventual breakup of U.S. alliances.139 Whether other nations agree or 
can be persuaded to act in agreement with this assertion to the detriment of U.S. strategic 
influence defines the essential character of the overall USG-CCP strategic competition. The 
extent to which maritime theaters can be leveraged to gain an advantage defines the character 
of the USG-CCP maritime balance. How the CCP plans to gain that advantage defines its sea 
power strategy. 
The CCP’s sea power strategy draws on the PRC’s still-emerging sea power. The PRC 
and Imperial China before it are historically continental powers pursuing grand strategies with 
continentalist visions. The CCP’s turn toward sea power in strategic competition is a 
comparatively new phenomenon which constitutes a maritime transformation. PRC maritime 
transformation serves to build the CCP’s sea power and exert it in strategic competition, not 
least against the United States.  
Sea power is not the same as naval power, and maritime transformation is not a strictly 
military endeavor.140 Similarly, neither the CCP or USG pursue sea power or command of the 
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seas as ends in themselves. Rather, states develop sea power strategies to exert sea power in 
pursuit of continental political objectives.141 As such, sea power itself is not strategic influence, 
nor is completing a maritime transformation the end goal of strategic competition. It is a means, 
not an end. In the context of competing sea power strategies, sea power is the latent economic 
and military resources and capabilities that a state can leverage to accrue strategic influence in 
maritime theaters.142  
Time Frame 
To capture long-term trends, this assessment’s temporal scope will run from 
approximately 1999 to 2049, both dates marked by CCP objectives for strategic competition. 
Specifically, the CCP anticipates that the bulk of USG-CCP strategic competition will take place 
between these years. While neither the USG nor this thesis need to subscribe to this perception, 
that the CCP appears to believe it makes these dates bookends to an important range of USG-
CCP strategic competition. 
1999 is the year the CCP modulated Deng Xiaoping’s policy axiom, that “peace and 
development are the theme of the times,” [和平与发展是当代世界的主题] to allow for active 
strategic competition with the United States.143 If CCP leaders believe 1999 is the start of long-
term USG-CCP strategic competition, they almost certainly believe it will end by 2049. That year 
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2017 Work Report strongly implied it is the deadline for the CCP to realize its ultimate, loosely 
defined goal of “national rejuvenation” [民族复兴].144 
Theater 
This assessment’s geographic scope will cover the Indo-Pacific region and distinguish 
between theater waters nearby and distant from continental China. The U.S. Department of 
Defense and Department of State have both identified the Indo-Pacific as top priorities.145 
Similarly, the latest (2013) edition of the PLA Academy of Military Science’s Science of Military 
Strategy, an authoritative publication on PLA strategic thought which one leading scholar 
describes as “the apex of the PLA’s professional military literature on the study of war,” 
identifies a corresponding “two oceans region” [两样地区] which at minimum covers an “arc 
shaped strategic zone that covers the western Pacific Ocean and the northern Indian Ocean” 
but may also describe an expanse beyond the full breadth of the Indian and Pacific Oceans.146 
The 2013 Science of Military Strategy describes interlinked strategic spaces with continental 
China as support and backstop [本土为依托], the two oceans region as the focal point [两样地区
为重点], and space and cyber domains as the crux [太空和网络空间为关键].147 Within the Indo-
Pacific, the PRC additionally distinguishes between its coastal “near seas” [近海], comprising 
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Blueprint for Sea Power,” China Brief, July 6, 2016, https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-blueprint-for-sea-power/.  







the Bohai, Yellow, East China, South China Seas, and waters east of Taiwan, and the “far seas” 
[远海] beyond.148 Of the near seas, the South China Sea merits special attention following its 
designation as a “core interest”149 by CCP officials in 2010 and 2016.150 Of secondary but 
significant importance is the East China Sea, where CCP officials have reportedly described 
sovereignty over the disputed Senkaku islands as a core interest.151 Of the far seas, the Indian 
Ocean Region (IOR) deserves special attention.152 Chinese media refers to PLA operations in 
the IOR, particularly operations in the Gulf of Aden, as implementing its “far seas strategy” [远海
战略].153  
IV. Objectives: The Maritime Turn in CCP Grand Strategy 
The CCP has three nested objectives pertinent to maritime transformation: 1) achieving 
“national rejuvenation,” 2) making the PRC a “maritime great power,” and 3) making the PLA a 
“world-class military.” Under General Secretary Xi Jinping, achieving national rejuvenation is 
clearly situated as the CCP’s primary objective from which lower objectives particular to 
 
 
148 PRC Ministry of Natural Resources, First Institute of Oceanography [自然资源部第一海洋研究所], “Which Seas 
Comprise China’s Near Seas?” [我国的近海都包括哪些海？], May 4, 2017, http://www.fio.org.cn/news/7291.htm; 
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149 The CCP designates its nonnegotiable issues “core interests” [核心利益]. While the CCP initially only designated 
unification with Taiwan as its core interest, the list of these interests has grown to include the South China Sea and 
other areas. See Michael D. Swaine, “China’s Assertive Behavior Part One: On ‘Core Interests,’” China Leadership 
Monitor 34, February 22, 2011, https://www.hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-monitor/winter-2011.   
150 Xinhua, “PLA navy chief urges China-U.S. cooperation in handling South China Sea,” July 19, 2016, 
http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-07/19/content_7162158.htm; Edward Wong, 
“Chinese Military Seeks to Extend Its Naval Power,” The New York Times, April 23, 2010, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/world/asia/24navy.html.  
151 Caitlin Campbell et al., “China’s ‘Core Interests’ and the East China Sea,” U.S.-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission, May 10, 2013, https://www.uscc.gov/research/chinas-core-interests-and-east-china-sea.  
152 This assessment borrows another net assessment’s definition of the IOR. See Anthony H. Cordesman et al., The 
Indian Ocean Region: A Strategic Net Assessment, August 30, 2014, 1-3, https://www.csis.org/analysis/indian-ocean-
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implementing entities are derived.154 Attending to national rejuvenation are supporting national- 
or ministry-level objectives, such as building the PRC into a “maritime great power” [海洋强国], 
which in turn requires the PLA, particularly the PLAN, to become a “world-class military” [世界一
流军队] underpinning the CCP’s maritime power.155 As will be demonstrated, the process by 
which the CCP’s approach to national rejuvenation has increasingly incorporated maritime 
goals, including the objective of building the PRC into a maritime great power, constitutes PRC 
maritime transformation. This section offers a diachronic description of the plans and strategies 
that Chinese policymakers and military leaders have put into place to identify and realize these 
objectives. 
CCP Grand Strategy: Resolving Contradictions Toward National Rejuvenation 
This thesis defines strategy as how an actor arrays its resources in space and time to 
achieve its aims against its competitors.156 What makes strategy a grand strategy is the addition 
of a third variable: scale.157 When the scope of the actor’s competition grows to a scale at which 
an individual mind “would ordinarily miss or would perceive only after long study and reflection” 
the nature and outcome of the contest’s motions, it is grand.158 Yet competition is a dynamic 
process, and the inherently competitive element of a grand strategy precludes time-consuming 
study and reflection before taking action. As such, a grand strategy cannot be a long-
considered, detailed plan with a rigid formulation of ends, ways, and means. Rather, grand 
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strategy is a coherent conceptual framework that clarifies an actor-of-scale’s competitive 
ambitions, remains flexibly tethered to changing operational realities, and proves robust to 
uncertainty over time. It is “the intellectual architecture that gives form and structure” to 
competitive policy, but it is not the policy itself.159 
The CCP’s bid for national rejuvenation is a grand strategic objective. While “national 
rejuvenation” is modern terminology for a flexible conceptual framework which has been 
varyingly named over time, the consistent defining theme of CCP top-level policymaking is of 
aggrandizing the PRC in opposition to identified adversaries—particularly the United States.160 
Across the scale of competing states, these objectives, paired against designated opponents, 
became what is now recognizable as a CCP grand strategy of national rejuvenation.161  
Chinese state media authoritatively describes the PRC as from its 1949 inception 
consistently opposed to behaviors it perceived as U.S. imperialism.162 This top-level strategic 
concept offered an objective to achieve as well as an opponent against whom to achieve it. In 
1949, then soon-to-be Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai articulated the CCP’s chief objective as 
reclaiming once-controlled territories lost in war, such as Tibet and Taiwan, together into a 
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single “China,” a statement of national invention which overlays the imported idea of a nation-
state over a militarily unified territory.163 CCP Chairman Mao Zedong identified the United States 
as the CCP’s key opponent in its national invention when he used Marxist-Leninist 
terminology164 to label the United States to be the PRC’s “principal contradiction” [主要矛盾].165 
This intellectual architecture guided CCP foreign policy, including shaping Mao’s decision to 
enter the Korean War to secure a military buffer against the United States, until the principal 
contradiction changed again.166 In the 1970s, worsening Sino-Soviet relations, culminating in 
what the CCP considered Soviet invasions into Chinese territory, made the United States the 
PRC’s “secondary contradiction” [次要矛盾] relative to the Soviet Union.167 This was a shift in 
emphasis, not strategy: at no point did the CCP adopt an approach which was not competitive 
or not competitive against the United States. So long as CCP national policy continues to 
pursue a comprehensive objective such as national rejuvenation against an opponent such as 
one designated in its principal contradiction, the CCP is prosecuting a grand strategy. 
The most recent versions of the CCP’s principal contradictions, revised in 1981 and 
2017, continued to indicate CCP pursuit of national rejuvenation against an American 
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antagonist.168 While these revised contradictions focused on economic development and are not 
as obviously competitive as prior indicators involving military threat, the CCP’s transient 
prioritization of economic development belied enduring CCP interests in international 
competition which carry military risk. During the 1981 revision, the perspective that the United 
States was in decline dominated CCP discourse, leading CCP leaders to conclude that an 
insular focus on PRC economic development would be how the PRC would catch up with the 
developed economies of the world and, implicitly, restore China to great power status—in 
modern terminology, achieve national rejuvenation.169 Notably, even as the CCP in the 1980s 
continued to consider economically catching up to the United States a distant objective, it 
nevertheless benchmarked its progress against the United States economy, implicitly targeting 
American power in the CCP’s explicit goals to “catch up and surpass” the economies of 
developed countries.170 The CCP’s designation of seemingly non-confrontational economic 
principal contradictions enabled the PRC to build economic foundations for strategic competition 
without appearing to do so, and CCP propagandists sought to preserve that advantage with 
narratives of “China’s peaceful rise” or “peaceful development” while castigating any concerns 
of analysts in the United States and elsewhere as “China threat theory.”171  
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The CCP has a grand strategy. Its ambitions for national rejuvenation and competitive 
perspective against the United States form a coherent intellectual architecture spanning space, 
time, and scale, from which the PRC’s national- and ministry-level competitive policies are 
derived. Like all grand strategies, the CCP’s is consistent in intellectual frame-working and 
flexible in approach in the way necessary to respond to a dynamic world.172 While competitive 
elements targeting the United States have been present in CCP strategy and policy since the 
founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, the post-Cold War incarnation of strategic 
competition began in ideation around 1993 and in earnest after 1999. The following section 
overviews three shifts in the CCP’s approach to its grand strategy of rejuvenation: 1) a turn 
toward actively prosecuting strategic competition from 1993–1999, 2) trends toward increasing 
international leadership from 2000–2013, and 3) the modern era of the CCP’s naked ambition 
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Table 2: CCP Grand Strategic Shifts, 1993–2020 
 Change in CCP 
guiding ideology 
Revised CCP security 
assessment  
Revised CCP policy 




development” in a 
“period of strategic 
opportunity” 
The United States will 
not decline 
precipitously and will 
continue to be a 
threat to CCP 
interests for decades 
Concerted effort to 
build capabilities in 
an unannounced 
competition against 
the United States 
during a period of 
strategic opportunity 
Shift 2: 2000–2013 
 
“Hide and bide” plus 




The PRC economic 
model contrasts 
unexpectedly 
favorably against that 
of liberal democracies 
Growing but still-
restrained interest in 
an international 
leadership role 









unseen in a century” 
Growing USG-CCP 
tensions may be 
closing the period of 
strategic opportunity  
Open advocacy for 
the CCP to lead a 
global effort to 
replace U.S.-led 
alliances with a new 
global security 
architecture 
Prelude: Toward Strategic Opportunity, 1993 to 1999 
The CCP’s first grand strategic shift, completed in 1999, was one which recharacterized 
the threat it faced from the United States. In 1993, CCP leaders released official speeches and 
guidance that once again identified the United States as its primary strategic adversary on its 
path to national rejuvenation. This determination was a response to CCP perceptions of 
converging trends in the global balance of power, which CCP leaders believe positioned them 
well to begin a concerted long-term competition against the United States in pursuit of national 
rejuvenation. The CCP’s decisions reflected three of its perceptions: 1) a sharp reduction in the 
Soviet Union’s threat to PRC territory and to the CCP regime, 2) an important but nonurgent 
increase in the United States’ threat to CCP long-term interests, and 3) a long-term trend of 






From the CCP’s perspective, developments in the 1980s began a broad and enduring 
trend of easing security pressures on Beijing. In a series of meetings from May through July 
1985, the Central Military Commission including paramount leader Deng Xiaoping determined 
that the intensity of bilateral U.S.-USSR military competition made the Soviet Union no longer 
likely to invade China, and as such, the CCP could plan long-term policy that did not need to 
account for total war.173 The following year, Chinese officials began announcing another 
assessment that both the Soviet Union and the United States were in the midst of long-term 
decline and that a multipolar international structure was emerging in the space once dominated 
by the two states’ military competition.174 The year after that, the CCP formally adopted Deng’s 
tifa [提法]175 which assessed that “peace and development are the themes of the times” [和平与
发展是当代世界的主题] would characterize the CCP’s experience for several years to come.176 
This tifa expresses a fundamental strategic assessment that the CCP enjoys a low threat of war 
and as such would be able to dedicate its efforts toward economic development for at least two 
decades.177 Deng first proposed this assessment at the Third Plenary Session of the CCP 
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Central Committee in 1978, and he continued publicly giving this assessment until it was 
formally adopted by the Party at the 13th National Party Congress in 1987.178 
The converging trends underpinning the “peace and development” assessment began to 
fray in the early 1990s. The Soviet Union’s 1991 collapse removed the military threat on China’s 
northern border but also upended the careful bipolar detente on which the CCP’s peaceful 
assessment rested.179 The CCP’s official postmortem on USSR collapse also identified political 
factors, including a U.S. strategy of “peaceful evolution” to force regime change in countries 
under Communist Party rule, as a new threat the United States posed to the CCP.180 Further 
tilting the global balance of power, the U.S. military’s performance in the Gulf War struck PLA 
researchers as the beginnings of a revolution in military affairs (RMA) [军事革命],181 or a 
significant shift in the nature of warfare which affects how future wars are likely to be fought.182  
Mounting CCP perceptions of the United States as a threat were significant enough to 
return the United States to primary competitor status in CCP strategy but, despite measured 
dissent among CCP leaders, did not change the official CCP position that the U.S. remains in 
decline. Two of General Secretary Jiang Zemin’s 1993 speeches show the CCP’s relative 
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ambivalence about the new opponent it designated. The first, delivered to PRC diplomats 
stationed abroad, noted that the USG-CCP diplomatic relationship will be one of “struggle and 
compromise.”183 Jiang echoes Mao’s identification of the United States as the CCP’s principal 
contradiction by using this speech to label the United States as the CCP’s “principal adversary 
in foreign affairs for a long time to come,” suggesting this adversity cannot end so long as the 
United States holds a globally preponderant position.184 All the same, Jiang notes that the 
United States’ prosecution of a global strategy creates economic demands such that the United 
States has no choice but to cooperate with the CCP in order to access the PRC’s markets.185 In 
Jiang’s telling, the same global stature which brings the United States into systemic competition 
and conflict with the PRC also fosters American dependence on Chinese markets, giving the 
CCP an outsized advantage in the competition.  
Jiang’s other 1993 speech, which provided the PLA with guidance as it adopted a new 
military strategy, offered an equally optimistic military analysis. According to Jiang, despite 
deepening issues between and within Western countries that worked contrary to global peace, 
the PRC in 1993 was enjoying the “best” regional security environment since the founding of the 
People’s Republic.186 While the CCP faced few current security threats, Jiang emphasized an 
emerging threat to CCP long-term ambitions in delivering his assessment that “hegemonism 
and power politics have become major obstacles to world peace and development,” using the 
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common Chinese pejoratives to refer to U.S. global presence and policy.187 This speech framed 
the introduction of new military strategic guidelines which reoriented the PLA toward war under 
“high-technology conditions,” reflecting the perceived RMA unveiled in the 1991 Gulf War, but 
also saw any potential conflict with the United States as a distant future possibility which would 
be deterred by economic interdependence, especially as the U.S. declines and a multipolar 
structure arises.188  
Speaking before the CCP’s diplomatic and military bureaucracies in 1993, Jiang issued 
policy guidance which revealed the CCP’s revised outlook as one which recognized the United 
States as the CCP’s principal strategic adversary. The assessment he offered was tempered by 
faith in U.S. decline, ultimately producing a grand strategy of nonurgent competition against the 
United States, in which rising military threats from a U.S. RMA are overtaken by economic 
interdependence, which only becomes more restrictive on U.S. policy decisions as the United 
States continues to decline.   
The CCP’s grand strategic approach of nonurgent competition, as well as Deng 
Xiaoping’s “peace and development” tifa underpinning it, came under fire in 1999. The CCP’s 
formal adoption of this tifa in 1987 ran roughshod over meaningful dissent among Party 
leadership, and elements of the CCP continued to doubt whether the “peace and development” 
assessment was accurate in its displacement of previous paramount leader Mao Zedong’s 
earlier tifa: that the international security environment was one of “war and revolution,” [战争与
革命] and the CCP needed to prepare for near-term war with the United States and the Soviet 
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Union.189 In 1999, a series of foreign policy disasters for the CCP, including closer U.S.-Japan 
ties on theater missile defense, renewed threats of Taiwan independence, and NATO 
intervention in Kosovo involving the inadvertent bombing of the PRC embassy, catalyzed quiet 
but longstanding doubts about “peace and development” within parts of CCP central 
leadership.190 The ensuing debate forced the CCP to reassess its official assessment of the 
international situation and was only resolved with a revision in CCP grand strategy.  
Although the debate’s proceedings remain unclear, Jiang Zemin definitively settled the 
debate between August and September 1999 by promulgating a new analytic Party “line” 
upholding “peace and development” as the overriding trend of the times, though tempering that 
finding with three new findings: “hegemonism and power politics are on the rise, the trend 
toward military interventionism is increasing, and the gap between developed and developing 
countries is increasing.”191 These three findings describe the United States as a global hegemon 
that destabilizes the world with military intervention. While proponents of the “peace and 
development” tifa and the apparent shapers of CCP grand strategy in 1993 perceived the United 
States as in decline and therefore not a threat to their long-term ambitions, the new findings 
determined the United States would remain a hegemon able to threaten CCP interests for 
another two decades, and the CCP would need to prepare for bilateral competition as it 
developed. The findings did not reflect the assessment of the “war and revolution” tifa that a 
U.S.-PRC war was either imminent or unavoidable, but they did reveal sharply increased CCP 
suspicions of U.S. intentions. To account for this instability, the CCP pursued internal and 
external balancing strategies, investing heavily in the PLA while pursuing closer ties with 
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Russia.192 A revised grand strategy responding to perceived near-term threats from the United 
States was in place.  
The year following, Jiang Zemin delivered a Party Congress Work Report announcing 
that the PRC was enjoying a “period of strategic opportunity,” [战略机遇期] in which the PRC, 
enjoying a stable security environment while the United States was embroiled in conflicts 
outside East Asia, would be able to invest in domestic reforms without needing to expend 
significant resources deterring U.S. military activity on its periphery.193 While Jiang had made a 
similar announcement in his 1993 speech, and although discussions of the period of strategic 
opportunity commonly focus on economic development, the strategic imperatives emerging from 
the 1999 debate between Mao’s “war and revolution” and Deng’s “peace and development” 
make clear that the period is “strategic” insofar as it is an opportunity for the PRC to develop 
capabilities necessary to compete against perceived U.S. hegemonic activity and military 
intervention.194  
Toward Striving for Achievement, 2000 to 2013  
The CCP’s second grand strategic shift since renaming the United States as its primary 
strategic opponent was the result of another debate over Deng’s tifa: taoguang yanghui [韬光养
晦], commonly translated as “hide your capabilities and bide your time,” or simply “hide and 
bide.” Notably, the object of the “hide and bide” debate was not relitigating the determination of 
the 1999 debate. While the earlier debate, between “war and revolution” and “peace and 
development” was about accurately assessing the external threat facing the CCP, the debate 
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over “hide and bide” regarded the PRC’s power and how the CCP should respond to its external 
threat as that power grows.  
“Hide and bide” is a tifa reflecting a long running trend in Chinese foreign policy of 
predicating foreign policy interactions on the CCP assessment of the parties’ power 
relationship.195 While all diplomats of any country are likely to be aware of power dynamics at 
play in the international negotiations they join, the official Chinese approach to this assessment 
and how they permit negotiations to proceed afterward is distinctively formulaic.196 The CCP’s 
assessment of the USG-PRC power relationship produced the defining logic of the “hide and 
bide” approach: relative to the United States, the PRC was weak. As such, Deng Xiaoping in 
1992 articulated a policy guidance that included a literary reference to a Qing Dynasty-era work, 
which became the now-famous tifa: “Only by hiding our capabilities and biding our time for 
several years can we become a true political power, and the PRC’s international 
pronouncements will carry a distinct weight. After we become more capable, we must improve 
our science and technology, national defense, and cutting-edge weaponry.”197 Accurately 
assessing the CCP as having ambitions which outstrip the PRC’s capabilities, Deng 
emphasized that with the “hide and bide” approach, the PRC must also eschew any 
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international leadership role and avoid the costs thereof, ensuring the CCP has the flexibility to 
exploit any opportunities, as they arise, to become an international political power.198 “Hide and 
bide” is necessarily competitive and suggests deception for strategic ends. As leading Chinese 
professors Chen Dingding and Wang Jianwei write, “it cannot be denied that the term [hide and 
bide] connotes trick and conspiracy in traditional Chinese culture.”199 
Jiang Zemin indicated his acceptance of a modification of the “hide and bide” approach 
in 1995 by pairing it with a second phrase: yousuo zuowei [有所作为], a reference to the writings 
of Mencius, commonly translated “make a difference.”200 The added phrase connotes only 
modest ambitions, and Jiang offered this modification to “hide and bide” as a compromise, 
expressing that pairing “hide and bide” with “make a difference” reaffirmed the CCP behind 
Deng’s assessment of the international situation while loosening its restraints in the event the 
CCP finds immediate action more advantageous than hiding and biding.201 The resolution of the 
“peace and development” debate of 1999 and Jiang’s subsequent “period of strategic 
opportunity” only reinforced the prudence of “hide and bide” as the default Chinese foreign 
policy position, urging restraint in dealing with an adversary that CCP leaders now believe will 
wield hegemonic power for decades. 
 The 2008 global financial crisis sparked a second grand strategic debate within the CCP 
as some Party members, seeing U.S. economic fallout during the crisis, began to question 
whether “hide and bide” was still the correct approach to PRC foreign policy. Shortly after the 
crisis’ outbreak in September 2008, PRC state media began messaging that the crisis is a step 
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in the global trend toward multipolarity, as Deng predicted in his initial assessment of “peace 
and development” being the theme of the times, and that the PRC’s international stature is 
increasing in the midst of the crisis.202 Beginning one or two years after the effects of the crisis 
had subsided in the PRC, state media narratives emphasize the PRC’s increased significance in 
continuing to guide the global economy.203 
CCP narratives of the PRC’s growing importance in the economic affairs of an 
increasingly multipolar world were simultaneously critical of U.S. political systems and the extent 
of American influence. Western analysts partially affirmed this impression with renewed interest 
in a possible “Beijing Consensus” by which developing countries align their economic policies 
with the PRC-inspired state control rather than the free markets and democratic elections which 
characterized the reportedly now-tarnished “Washington Consensus.”204 Liu He, who in 2008 
served as the Deputy Director of the Office of the Central Leading Group for Financial and 
Economic Work [中央财经领导小组办公室] and has been a leading voice on PRC economic 
policy since his elevation to the Politburo in 2017, brought intellectual rigor to the disadvantages 
of liberal democracies and relative benefits of the CCP’s approach to resolving the financial 
crisis.205 Writing in a postmortem lauded by Harvard professors Graham Allison and Larry 
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Summers, Liu described the 2008 crisis as exacerbated by “inability to reform and election 
considerations” as “governments tended to resort to populist policy announcements to appease 
the public” rather than taking decisive steps, as he suggests the CCP did, to stabilize the global 
financial system.206  
Some elements of the CCP, seeing the global financial crisis as the beginnings of a 
global realignment of power away from the United States, questioned whether the USG-CCP 
power relationship was the same in 2008 as it was when Deng evaluated it in 1992, also calling 
into question whether “hide and bide” plus “make a difference” was still the most prudent 
guidance for PRC foreign policy.207 Recognizing this dispute, CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao 
attempted to split the difference in a 2009 speech to the PRC’s diplomats stationed abroad, in 
which he describes “hide and bide” and “make a difference” as a “dialectical unity” [辩证统一] to 
which he appended two modifiers: “persist in hide and bide and actively make a difference” [坚
持韬光养晦，积极有所作为] (emphasis added).208  
While the text of Hu’s speech seemed to simultaneously elevate both sides of the 
dialectical unity, Hu was reported to have personally insisted on the “actively” modifier to “make 
a difference,” suggesting a greater inclination toward the active foreign policy in line with “make 
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a difference” than with continued adherence to “hide and bide.”209 Hu’s other foreign policy 
initiatives indicated he preferred that the CCP increasingly “make a difference” in the world; in 
2006, Hu delivered a speech to the United Nations envisioning a “harmonious world” [和谐世界] 
which official Party documents describe as an expansive vision advancing a new security 
concept, reforming the international order, and reshaping norms of interstate behavior in 
opposition to “hegemonism and power politics,” an indirect but clear criticism of U.S. foreign 
policy.210 While not explicitly departing from Deng’s guidance to never seek international 
leadership, Hu’s “harmonious world” ambitions suggested growing interest among CCP leaders 
to take leading roles in international order-reforming and norm-reshaping.211 Still, Hu’s 
compromise did not settle the debate, and Chinese partisans toward increased global 
engagement selectively mixed Deng’s formulation with Hu’s, tacitly advocating for the CCP to 
“actively make a difference” while making perfunctory reference to the unmodified “hide and 
bide.”212  
The “hide and bide” debate was not resolved until current CCP General Secretary Xi 
Jinping took power and introduced two of his own policy-guiding phrases: “Chinese Dream” [中
国梦] and “strive for achievement” [奋发有为]. Xi's initial contribution to the discourse was the 
“Chinese Dream,” a phrase melding Chinese ambitions for “national rejuvenation” with 
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nationalist agitation and which he introduced in a speech given two weeks after his appointment 
as General Secretary.213 Xi’s speech, delivered at what John Pomfret describes as a “deeply 
xenophobic museum exhibition” called “The Road to Rejuvenation” [复兴之路], emphasized a 
“Chinese Dream” anchoring the objectives of PRC foreign and domestic policy in deep ly-held 
historic grievances accumulated over 170 years.214 The “Chinese Dream” quickly became a 
CCP guideline around which important policy was organized, with Yang Jiechi leading the 
elaborations for foreign policy.215 Yang, previously the PRC Foreign Minister under Hu Jintao, 
enjoyed a dramatic elevation in stature in 2013 when he was appointed as a State Councilor 
and as the Director of the Central Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group, reporting directly to Xi 
Jinping on all matters of PRC foreign policy. While Yang’s early speeches to foreign audiences 
suggested that the prosperity-focused Chinese Dream was comparable to and compatible with 
the “American Dream,” which he left undefined, he also introduces a tacit competitive edge by 
pairing the Chinese Dream with “bottom line thinking,” [底线思维]216 which he describes as 
“working for the best but preparing for the worst.”217  
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Having established the Chinese Dream and all its grandeur as his policy objective, Xi’s 
foreign policy speeches in 2013 and thereafter abandoned the “hide and bide, make a 
difference” formulation. Instead, Xi’s new formulation, introduced in a speech delivered to PRC 
diplomats, emphasized “striving to achieve” the CCP’s objectives and marked a dramatic shift 
from the comparatively restrained “actively make a difference” or “hide and bide.”218 This trend 
continued in 2014, as Xi’s major foreign policy speech to the Central Military Commission 
included a call to “strive for achievement” in pursuit of “grand rejuvenation” without reference to 
“hide and bide.”219 While the Xinhua readout of another similarly significant foreign policy 
speech Xi delivered that year, before the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference, did not 
specify a reference to “striving for achievement,” it does indicate he discussed the Chinese 
Dream, national rejuvenation, and a charge that Chinese foreign affairs work should advocate 
for new security concepts and models of great power relations in the world.220  
Xi Jinping effectively settled the CCP debate over whether PRC foreign policy should 
continue to adhere to Deng’s “hide and bide” tifa by displacing it entirely with a call to “strive for 
achievement.” Where Hu began measured departures from “hide and bide” by emphasizing 
“actively make a difference” and proposing a “harmonious world” concept of PRC foreign policy 
which implied increased PRC leadership in international relations, Xi has entirely cast aside 
Deng’s “hide and bide” guidance and instead called on the CCP’s military and foreign service to 
“strive for achievement” toward a Chinese Dream defined by nationalist fervor.221  
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The CCP’s grand strategic debates are parts of a dialectic process with compounding 
results: In 1993, the CCP determined the United States was once again its primary strategic 
adversary; in 1999, the CCP determined the United States would remain a dangerous 
competitor for decades more and that the CCP would need to invest in capabilities to compete; 
and in 2013, the CCP determined that the USG-PRC power relationship no longer required the 
CCP to eschew all international leadership positions, freeing the CCP to openly pursue its 
ambitions. Contiguous through these determinations is a common CCP ambition for greatness 
and international stature. Thereafter, CCP foreign policy under Xi Jinping has openly pursued a 
position at the top of a hierarchical global order.  
Toward Naked Ambition, 2014 to Present 
The CCP’s third grand strategic shift since 1993 remains underway as the implications of 
a CCP “striving to achieve” its objectives in foreign affairs unfolds. While analysts cannot know 
with certainty what debates may be taking place in Zhongnanhai, reports and several official 
speeches and documents suggest that CCP leaders, having adopted a posture in direct and 
largely unvarnished opposition to the United States, are reconsidering whether the intensifying 
competition with its primary strategic adversary has brought its “period of strategic opportunity” 
to an end. Likely consideration for CCP leaders may include whether the U.S. response to the 
CCP’s assertive posture following its shift from “hide and bide” to “striving to achieve” is an 
acceptable cost to the chosen policy, as well as how the CCP should respond.  
 Arguably the boldest new priority which the CCP under Xi is striving to achieve is the 
reordering of the Asia-Pacific security environment in direct opposition to U.S. regional 
influence. Speaking at the fourth Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures 
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(CICA) summit in 2014, Xi explicitly called for Asian countries to “establish a new regional 
security cooperation architecture,” calling the existing U.S.-led alliance system the “outdated 
thinking from the age of Cold War and zero-sum game.”222 This narrative quickly promulgated 
the narratives of high-ranking PRC diplomatic and military policymakers, who expressed with 
urgency the need to build a “new model of great power relations” [新型大国关系] with the United 
States while simultaneously accusing the United States of being a destabilizing regional 
force.223 The PRC began coordinating its foreign policy around undermining U.S. military ties in 
the region: for example, while negotiating a shared code of conduct in the South China Sea with 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the CCP initially demanded that the code 
of conduct include a provision precluding any “foreign military power,” to include the United 
States, from having a military presence in the region.224  No longer was the CCP content with 
increasing its normative power in international affairs, as Hu Jintao’s “harmonious world” 
described. Under Xi Jinping, the CCP’s “striving to achieve” meant advancing a vision for 
international order which would displace the U.S. alliance network.225    
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The CCP’s nationalist turn toward ambitions of international leadership in opposition to 
U.S. alliance networks was clarified and extended to include the security architecture beyond 
East Asia in Xi Jinping’s 19th Party Congress Work Report. In his report, Xi unambiguously 
declared that the PRC will compete against the United States for global strategic influence and 
further claimed that CCP governance is entering a new era [新时代] in which the CCP would 
encourage the transformation of global governance to a multipolar system.226 
The CCP adheres to a Marxist dialectical tradition that presupposes scientific natural 
laws [规律] by which the CCP can objectively understand and drive social progress.227 This 
progress is the resolution of contradictions [矛盾] which arise from misalignment of a society’s 
economic base and its politico-social superstructure, or political order; as the former develops, 
the latter must also evolve pursuant to natural law. Contradictions constitute the CCP’s 
theoretical conclusion that a political order is incompatible with emerging economic realities and 
must be rectified.228 Xi Jinping’s 19th Party Congress Work Report asserts that the principal 
contradiction facing Chinese society is one of inadequate development despite the populace’s 
growing needs.229 The CCP’s ongoing resolution of this contradiction is also Xi’s argument for 
global leadership: as the PRC develops in a way to successfully meet the needs of Chinese 
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society, other states should replicate this success by adopting the “Chinese plan of action” [中国
方案] for economic development.230 In Marxist terms, the PRC will lead other states to reshape 
the global economic base, creating an emerging economic reality which necessitates change in 
the global political order.231 In his 2017 Work Report, Xi called this a change one to a “new 
model of interstate relations” defined by a “community with shared future for mankind” [人类命运
共同体].232 
The CCP further clarified this political change in a 2019 white paper reaffirming its belief 
that the global “economic structure is undergoing a profound adjustment,” specifically that “the 
rise of China and other...developing countries is fundamentally altering the international 
structure of power” such that one country or a bloc can no longer “exercise dominance in world 
affairs.”233 Xi claimed that in the new era of transition toward the new model of interstate 
relations, the PRC is approaching center stage in world affairs, where the CCP will exert greater 
leadership than before; his assessment on the changing structure of international power all but 
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should not be understated: in a December 2017 speech to PRC diplomats stationed abroad, Xi 
introduced what quickly became a new tifa when he said the new era is characterized by 
“profound changes unseen in a century” [百年未有之大变局],235 including the “irreversible” global 
trend toward multipolarization.236 
While Xi’s 2017 work report did not explicitly offer a revised security assessment, CCP 
foreign policy and military planning white papers issued in 2019 described the new era as one in 
which “the world is facing the danger of a relapse into fragmentation and even confrontation,” 
and the United States, by investing in its defense capabilities and strengthening its military 
alliances, is a significant driver of that danger.237 The CCP’s sense of increased danger because 
of the United States as portrayed in these white papers was not cheap talk; they appeared to 
reflect a growing debate beginning before Xi’s 19th Party Congress Work Report on whether 
tensions with the United States had effectively downgraded the PRC from a “period of strategic 
opportunity” to a “period of historic opportunity” [历史机遇期], with the salient change being 
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impressions among the CCP elite that they no longer enjoyed the permissive external 
environment Jiang Zemin highlighted in 2002.238 While Xi’s Work Report did reaffirm that the 
PRC remained in a period of strategic opportunity and not a historic one, subsequent speeches 
and other articles from Xi and other Party leaders referenced the “period of historic opportunity,” 
suggesting that the debate had not yet been resolved and that the voices calling for the end of 
the period of strategic opportunity may have grown louder since the 19th Party Congress.239  
The CCP’s communiqué following the 19th Party Congress’s Fifth Plenum, in October 
2020, appears to indicate that CCP leaders have maintained confidence that they remain in a 
period of strategic opportunity while accepting the costs of winning strategic competition against 
the United States. The communiqué specifically states that despite significant new challenges 
and opportunities, the PRC will remain in a period of strategic opportunity because of the 
“profound changes unseen in a century,” including “profound adjustments to the international 
balance of power.”240 Even so, the CCP leaders who believe they remain in a period of strategic 
opportunity appear to be giving ground. While the communiqué’s description of adjustments to 
the international balance of power reaffirmed the CCP belief in multipolarization and U.S. 
decline, the 2020 document’s characterization is less sanguine than Xi Jinping’s speech at the 
18th Party Congress Fifth Plenum in 2016, which described “unprecedented positive changes” 
in the international balance of power.241 Moreover, the 2020 communiqué introduced, and Xi’s 
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remarks at a subsequent Politburo group study session reaffirmed, a new emphasis on 
coordinating development with security [统筹发展和安全], apparently in recognition of the 
increased risks to development under a period of strategic opportunity that the CCP accrues as 
it continues to advocate a foreign policy at odds with the United States.242 This elevation of 
security interests alongside economic interests was reaffirmed in the 2020 revisions to the PRC 
National Defense Law; article 6 of the law was revised to describe “coordinated, balanced, and 
compatible development” between economic and national defense efforts, while the prior 
version243 stated that the PRC will “strengthen national defense while focusing on economic 
development,” clearly prioritizing economic development over security interests.244  
CCP Maritime Strategy: Becoming a Maritime Great Power 
CCP leaders have over the past decade described their pursuit of national rejuvenation 
as dependent on achieving a prerequisite goal of transforming the PRC into a “maritime great 
power,” [海洋强国]. When then-CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao first used the term in the 18th 
Party Congress Work Report in 2012, the phrase had, as Liza Tobin lays out, four 
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August 27, 2009, http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2009-08/27/content_1403326.htm.  
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characteristics: 1) the ability to exploit ocean resources, 2) a developed maritime economy, 3) 
preservation of the marine environment and 4) resolute protection of “maritime rights and 
interests” [海洋权益].245 A few years afterward, General Secretary Xi Jinping described a 
broader concept involving economic development, international trade, ecological protection, and 
a modern navy as key constituents of the PRC becoming a maritime great power.246 Xi’s own 
policy pronouncements couch this pursuit in terms of “land-sea integrated planning” [陆海统筹] 
and further describes becoming a maritime great power as a critical step in realizing the CCP’s 
paramount objective of national rejuvenation.247  
This section will argue that Hu’s 2012 definition was a compromise which injected a new 
emphasis on sea power into elite CCP discourse at the highest levels despite having a definition 
drawing largely on Jiang Zemin-era terminology for maritime policy. Moreover, this compromise 
was a critical step for the CCP under Hu to begin envisioning its grand strategy in maritime 
terms rather than continental terms—in other words, to begin a maritime transformation. 
Jiang Zemin’s Maritime Terminology 
Jiang Zemin introduced into the PRC’s political discourse many of the foundational 
concepts of modern Chinese maritime policy and was the first CCP leader to establish “building 
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China into a maritime great power,” which he called an “important historical task” to be studied, 
as a national objective.248 This 2000 declaration sparked a surge of academic and policy articles 
in China attempting to define sea power and its application to the PRC.249 While the question of 
Chinese sea power was not settled during Jiang’s time as General Secretary, his leadership did 
anchor the debate in three interlinked phrases which persist in modern discourse on PRC 
maritime strategy: 1) the PRC’s “maritime rights and interests,” 2) Chinese “sea consciousness,” 
[海洋意识] and 3) the “blue Chinese soil” [蓝色国土] that is the sea. Consistent with CCP grand 
strategic perspectives leading up to 1999, these terms referred largely to economic 
development without concerted efforts at international strategic competition. 
Each of Jiang’s maritime terms is a flexible assertion of Chinese maritime sovereignty 
and right to exploit ocean resources for economic development. The PRC’s “maritime rights and 
interests” first entered Chinese legal parlance with passage of the 1992 PRC Territorial Sea and 
Contiguous Zone Law [中华人民共和国领海及毗连区法] as the plenary power to control foreign 
and domestic activity in China’s territorial seas250 and contiguous zone.251 The “rights” generally 
refer to exclusive rights to exploit maritime resources in waters over which the PRC lays claim, 
and the “interests” appear to secure SLOCs in China’s maritime periphery.252 Maritime rights 
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and interests remain a staple of PRC policy, regularly appearing in official PRC five-year plans 
and responses to foreign governments over maritime disputes.253 Notably, these rights and 
interests are not rigorously bounded to PRC territorial waters, contiguous zone, or even China’s 
maritime periphery. As of 2010, the Director of the PRC State Ocean Administration referred to 
the PRC’s rights and interests in the polar regions, several thousand miles from China’s 
northernmost point, and by 2012 the SOA director insisted that it was necessary for the PRC to 
defend its maritime rights and interests beyond its territorial seas.254 
Chinese “sea consciousness” is less well-defined, seemingly referring to Chinese 
popular interest in and support for policies regarding these maritime rights and interests as well 
as other political, economic, and military applications of the sea.255 As early as 1995, Jiang 
Zemin had personally urged greater understanding of the ocean’s strategic value for the PRC’s 
long-term economic development and called for “enhancing the Chinese people’s sea 
consciousness.”256 A 1998 white paper on PRC maritime industry similarly described sea 
consciousness as necessary for advancing the PRC’s maritime economic development.257 
Interest in building sea consciousness appears to be an enduring policy priority for the PRC, as 
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five year plans in 2006 and 2016 include specific campaigns to build national sea 
consciousness, with the latter plan setting an objective of building a national sea consciousness 
propaganda-education-cultural system by 2020.258 
Jiang and other top CCP officials under Jiang’s leadership made repeated reference to 
China’s maritime periphery as “blue Chinese soil,” with U.S. and PRC experts alike assessing 
that the CCP’s use of this phrase deliberately connotes an equivalence between territorial 
claims and maritime claims in the way typical of a continental power.259 As early as 1991, Jiang 
discussed as maritime strategic objectives protecting the “blue Chinese soil” and “blue treasure 
house” [蓝色国土和蓝色宝库] of the ocean, conferring the PRC’s sovereignty and economic 
maritime interests.260 In 1996, then CMC Vice Chairman and Politburo Standing Committee 
member Liu Huaqing [刘华清] similarly called on the PLAN to develop its combat capabilities to 
become “strong defenders of blue Chinese soil.”261 Like “maritime rights and interests” and “sea 
consciousness,” “blue Chinese soil” has remained an enduring part of CCP discourse on 
maritime policy, with PRC Ocean Development Reports [《中国海洋经济发展报告》] in 2010 
and 2016 both using the phrase.262  
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Hu Jintao’s Great Power Ambitions and Maritime Transformation 
In the course of shaping greater international ambitions for the CCP, Hu Jintao began 
but could not complete within his tenure a PRC maritime transformation to realize those 
ambitions. Hu’s ambitions for the CCP to “actively make a difference” in shaping a “harmonious 
world” and his inability to set aside the Deng-era political restraints on CCP foreign policy 
paralleled his partial success in enlisting sea power as handmaid of the PRC’s rise in global 
power and influence.  
Hu began clarifying a position that the CCP should openly seek great power status and 
that building sea power was the means to do so quickly after he took office in 2002. Having 
weak military credentials and ultimately spending much of his tenure attempting to earn the 
PLA’s goodwill rather than firmly directing their activities, Hu made outreach to the PLAN a key 
pillar of his sea power effort.263 After Jiang Zemin delivered his final Party Congress Work 
Report, which announced the period of strategic opportunity and spoke of maritime policy only 
with regard to economic development, Hu struck a more assertive tone, calling on the PLAN to 
expand its mission and capability set by making a “gradual transition to far-seas defense, 
enhancing the far-seas maneuvering operations capabilities.”264 He strengthened this call in 
2004 when he announced the PLA’s “new historic missions,” which expand the PLA’s mission 
set to safeguard national interests in, among others, the far reaches of the maritime domain.265 
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The defense white paper released that year similarly introduced an imperative for the PLAN to 
be able to seize “command of the sea,” [夺取制海] a defining component of Mahanian sea 
power.266 
Hu’s overtures to the PLAN ran parallel to a campaign he waged within the CCP to make 
becoming a maritime great power a defining objective. This effort began in 2003 with two steps: 
first, the PRC releases a long-term maritime development plan which describes the “overall goal 
of developing the maritime economy” as, among other things, “gradually building the PRC into a 
maritime great power.”267 While this specification, the last in a lengthy list of maritime economic 
development objectives, was released with little fanfare, it was an early articulation in a high-
level planning document that becoming a maritime great power was now a PRC objective and 
no longer only a matter to be studied, as Jiang had directed three years prior. Second, Hu’s 
speech at the final Politburo group study session in 2003 regarded the history of the rise of 
great powers, and the study session concluded by commissioning a study into the factors giving 
rise to countries becoming great powers.268 While presently available open source documents 
do not offer any certainty that Hu intended to or did successfully shape the findings of this study, 
the results were congruous and fortuitously timed with other steps Hu took to urge the CCP to 
prioritize making the PRC a maritime great power.  
Also in 2003, CCP propaganda outlets began previewing the 600th anniversary of Zheng 
He’s 1405 voyage, scheduled to fall in 2005; this propaganda campaign stressed an invented 
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narrative of China’s proud maritime tradition and associated it with “the greatness of Chinese 
Civilization.”269 The propaganda campaign included establishing July 11, 2005 as the first 
annual “Navigation Day,” during which state media outlets celebrate PRC themes such as PRC 
maritime greatness and the peaceful nature of Chinese civilization.270 In 2013, retired PLAN 
Admiral Zheng Ming [郑明] stated openly that promulgating the Zheng He narrative was 
instrumental in increasing Chinese sea consciousness and building the PRC into a maritime 
great power.271 
After laying the foundations in 2003 and campaigning for greater sea consciousness in 
the years following, official documents and one of Hu’s own speeches published in 2006 
appeared to reveal Hu’s bid to build a maritime vision into how the CCP pursues great power. 
First, the 11th Five Year Plans published in March offered new imperatives and challenges in 
PRC maritime development. The Five Year Plan for Social Development included a section 
acknowledging Jiang’s maritime terms of sea consciousness and maritime rights and interests 
before emphasizing in comparatively stronger terms the need to exploit marine resources in the 
PRC’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and seabed resources along China’s continental shelf 
and in international waters.272 The 11th Five Year Plan for the Development of Marine Science 
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and Technology specified that the PRC is a “maritime large power but not a maritime great 
power” [我国是一个海洋大国，但不是海洋强国].273 
As if to answer the new interests and challenges raised in the 11th Five Year Plans, the 
study on factors contributing to great power status commissioned in 2003, called Rise of the 
Great Powers [大国崛起] was completed and published in November 2006. As Andrew Erickson 
and Lyle Goldstein explain, the study “suggests that national power stems from economic 
development fueled by foreign trade, which can in turn be furthered by a strong navy...The Rise 
of Great Powers suggests that developing maritime power is necessary but not sufficient to 
support the rise of a great power.”274 Ensuring the findings are publicized, the study was 
published as an eight-volume book set and a twelve-part documentary on the state television 
network, where it received significant popular and expert attention.275  
In December 2006, Hu Jintao again spoke to the PLAN at the 10th PLAN Party 
Congress, where he explicitly called the PRC a “maritime large power” in need of a more 
powerful navy to ensure PRC security and sovereignty.276 The several threads of Hu’s 
messaging through CCP and PRC organs between 2003 and 2006 coalesce into three key 
points: 1) the PRC is a maritime large power but not a maritime great power, 2) the PRC should 
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dedicate resources to and pursue in earnest a goal of making the PRC a maritime great power, 
and 3) the components of sea power, including foreign trade safeguarded by a powerful navy, 
are also components of great power status.  
Although state media articles surrounding the release of The Rise of Great Powers 
made reference to national rejuvenation, Hu’s campaign for the CCP to undertake a concerted 
effort toward maritime great power status faced opposition from adherents to a continental 
grand strategic vision and as such did not include a public, explicit statement that making the 
PRC a maritime great power is necessary for national rejuvenation.277 When delivering his Work 
Report at the 17th Party Congress in 2007, Hu was only able to offer that the marine industry is 
among those which ought to be transformed from “large” to “strong” [促进工业由大变强].278 
Despite Hu’s apparent preference for a maritime transformation in the CCP’s grand strategy, his 
efforts between 2004 and 2006 did not accrue enough political support to pass the consensus-
building process in advance of the 17th Party Congress.  
 Chinese academic and bureaucratic publications at this time generally agreed that sea 
power was important, but whether it was so important as to displace a primarily continentalist 
view of threat perception, economic and military investment, and diplomatic strategy remained 
hotly disputed.279 In 2003, a recognizable “sea power school” among Chinese academics 
asserting that command of the seas is a teleological evolution from command of land in the 
course of human development began taking shape,  drawing criticism from prominent 
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academics such as Ye Zicheng [叶自成] at Peking University and Xu Qiyu [徐弃郁] at the PRC 
National Defense University, who considered the informal group’s emphasis on sea power and 
deviation from a land power focus dangerously fallacious.280 The PLAGF, which as the largest 
PLA service dominated the military’s structure and readily used its bureaucratic heft to defend 
its mission sets and resource allocation, likely lodged similar protests in private, given the likely 
tradeoffs the PLAGF would endure if the PRC resourced the PLAN to pursue rejuvenation 
through sea power.281  
Hu Persists with Land-Sea Integration 
Writing in 2007, Peking University professor Li Yihu [李义虎] distilled the land power vs. 
sea power debate as one which required “establishing a holistic concept integrating land and 
sea priorities to replace the traditional mentality that the land outweighs the sea.”282 While Li did 
not originate this concept or phrase, his proposed solution touched on a recurring theme in Hu’s 
second and final term as CCP General Secretary. Perhaps suggesting the influence of Li’s 
holistic concept, he was appointed to the Foreign Affairs Committee at the 11th National 
People’s Congress [全国人民代表大会外事委员会] the following year.283 In Hu’s second term, 
this holistic land-sea approach became a prominent message which defanged continentalist 
opposition to a greater maritime emphasis in PRC foreign policy planning and ultimately 
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empowered Hu to include making the PRC a “maritime great power” a national objective in his 
18th Party Congress Work Report.  
Hu continued pressing forward with ambitions of beginning a maritime transformation, 
notably attending the 60th anniversary of the PLAN, which state media and foreign analysts 
described as the PLAN’s “coming out” as a modern navy.284 In the years following, several PRC 
state organs released high-level policy and strategic documents emphasizing the need for a 
holistic approach to the PRC’s continental and maritime priorities. In 2010, the National People’s 
Congress Vice Chair Chen Changzhi [陈昌智] described the primary task of PRC maritime 
economic policy as taking a holistic approach to continental and maritime development [首先要
统筹海陆发展].285 At the same time, State Oceanic Administration head Sun Zhihui [孙志辉] 
described the PRC maritime development strategy as one which adheres to a holistic land-sea 
approach [坚持海陆统筹].286 These themes return in 2011 as part of the PRC’s 12th Five Year 
Plan, which includes a chapter promoting development of the marine economy which, for the 
first time, describes greater PRC engagement in international maritime affairs.287 The 12th Five 
Year Plan also calls for formulating a maritime development strategy which implements a 
holistic approach to land and sea.288 
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These efforts to defang continentalist objections partially paid off in 2012, when several 
elite CCP developments and statements, including the 18th Party Congress Work Report, 
appeared to reinforce parts of Hu’s interests in applying a concerted effort, including increased 
naval investment, toward transforming the PRC from a maritime large power into a maritime 
great power in pursuit of national rejuvenation. Although Hu-era messaging did not emphasize 
or develop Jiang-era terminology, Hu’s partial success came from framing the objective of 
becoming a maritime great power in those terms. Hu renewed Jiang’s focus on maritime rights 
and interests for the purpose of increasing CCP hard power at sea. In 2012, the CCP saw 
renewed interest in preserving these maritime rights and interests in the form of a newly-
established Central Maritime Rights Protection Leading Small Group [中央海洋权益工作领导小
组] as well as a newly-emboldened paranaval interest in securing those rights: in July 2012, 
PRC Maritime Surveillance [中国海监总队] Party Secretary Sun Shuxian [孙书贤] introduced a 
newly belligerent line in the PRC’s regard for its rights and interests by calling for use of military 
force, up to and including waging a war, to defend disputed maritime claims.289 When Hu 
announced in the 18th Party Congress Work Report that one of the CCP’s objectives was now 
to make the PRC a maritime great power, he characterized that objective as largely Jiang-era 
goals of maritime development, adding only a hard military edge to resolutely protect maritime 
rights and interests [坚决维护国家海洋权益，建设海洋强国].290  
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As delivered, Hu’s 18th Party Congress Work report tied the “maritime great power” 
objective back to Jiang-era sovereignty and economic development concerns rather than 
forward-looking ambitions of national rejuvenation and global leadership he exhibited when 
emphasizing the CCP should “actively make a difference” in global affairs.291 Hu was unable to 
overcome objections in the consensus-building process ahead of the 18th Party Congress and 
could not tie Chinese sea power to national rejuvenation. Some indicators that year following 
the Party Congress hint that these aspects of the Work Report represented a compromise 
position, and some bureaucratic elements expressed positions more in line with Hu’s vision for 
great power status rather than Jiang’s narrower focus on maritime rights and interest. State 
Oceanic Administration head Liu Cigui [刘赐贵] offered an authoritative interview in which he 
described becoming a maritime great power as the only way for the PRC to become a global 
great power and additionally offered that becoming a maritime great power is necessary for the 
PRC to defend its maritime rights and interests beyond its territorial seas.292 Similarly, the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences began publishing articles assessing the PRC as a maritime large 
power and discussing ways it could become a maritime great power.293 
Xi Jinping Continues PRC Maritime Transformation 
Not unlike their respective efforts to turn the CCP toward a more activist foreign policy, 
Xi benefitted from and continued Hu’s work in driving PRC maritime transformation. Shortly after 
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assuming power in 2012, Xi presided over a 2013 Politburo group study on increasing the 
CCP’s attention to oceanic affairs and unambiguously declared that becoming a maritime great 
power was necessary for PRC national rejuvenation.294 In the same speech, Xi struck a veiled 
bellicose tone when elaborating on resolute protection of maritime rights, saying the CCP needs 
to balance its interests in regional stability with its interest in safeguarding maritime rights, 
adjusting this policy to match the PRC’s national strength.295 Xi signaled that as the CCP strives 
for achievement and builds its national power, it would begin to adopt an increasingly 
confrontational maritime posture against foreign countries, including the United States. This was 
a tacit shift away from the passive power-building policy characteristic of Jiang Zemin’s “period 
of strategic opportunity”: under Xi, the PRC would amass as well as exert power.  
Reinforcing these signals, that same year the PRC State Council formed a State 
Oceanic Commission [国家海洋委员会] under the State Oceanic Administration to “strengthen 
the holistic planning and comprehensive coordination of maritime affairs” [为加强海洋事务的统
筹规划和综合协调] as well as “formulate a new national maritime development strategy” [制定国
家海洋发展战].296 The same State Council reforms added a hard edge to this strategic planning 
by consolidating PRC constabulary and paranaval forces within the newly-created China Coast 
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Ministry of Public Security’s border defense and maritime customs police.297 Official PRC 
planning documents under Xi’s leadership would continue to emphasize the need to transform 
the PRC into a maritime great power and centralize maritime strategic planning. The 13th Five 
Year Plan, released in 2016, closes its section on maritime rights and interests with a line 
referencing strengthening top-level planning of an existing “maritime strategic plan” [加强海洋战
略顶层设计]. The 13th Five Year Plan also distinguishes itself from its past two predecessors 
with greater international security ambitions, referring to the PRC’s overseas interests as well as 
an intention to build a system to protect those interests [海外利益保护体系].298 In 2018, the CCP 
further empowered the Central Maritime Rights Protection Leading Small Group by elevating it 
to the Office of Maritime Rights and Interests [海洋权益工作办公室] within the newly-created 
Office of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission [中央外事工作委员会办公室]. As noted earlier, 
commissions wield policy decision making power that is denied to leading small groups, which 
largely serve a policy coordinating function between multiple implementing agencies.299 
Like Hu, Xi faced significant continentalist opposition in the PLAGF, and policy 
documents issued under his leadership continued situating maritime ambitions for the PRC in 
terms of a holistic land-sea approach: the 13th Five Year Plan and Xi’s first Work Report, 
delivered at the 19th Party Congress in 2017, emphasized adhering to the holistic land-sea 
approach in making the PRC a maritime great power.300 However, Xi’s speeches and guiding 
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documents issued under his leadership were also more combative against PLAGF influence. 
The PRC’s Defense White Paper released in 2015 urges that “the traditional mentality that land 
outweighs sea must be abandoned,” [必须突破重陆轻海的传统思维] closely referencing Li 
Yihu’s 2007 rationale for the holistic land-sea approach.301 PLA analysts were keenly aware of 
Xi’s interest in cutting down the size of the PLAGF: in a two-part PLA study on Xi Jinping’s 
thoughts on the military, several papers included repeated reference to language calling for the 
end of a “big ground force” [大陆军] mentality.302  
Xi’s statements and official documents published under his leadership similarly 
continued Hu’s partiality for PLAN investment over PLAGF interests. The 2015 Defense White 
Paper signaled Xi’s strong support for the PLAN’s modernization into a blue water navy and 
explicitly stated that the PLAN will “gradually shift” its focus from “near seas” defense to 
simultaneous near and far seas protection; since the 2006 Defense White Paper called for 
extending PLAN strategic depth, all Defense White Papers (issued in 2008, 2010, and 2013) 
had used the same boilerplate language stipulating that the PLAN has a near seas defense 
strategy and remains in the course of building capabilities for far seas protection.303 Even more 
explicitly, Xi’s remarks at the 12th PLAN Party Congress clarified that building a powerful navy 
is necessary for a world-class military [建设强大的现代化海军是建设世界一流军队的重要标志], 
 
 
301 PRC State Council Information Office, China’s Military Strategy, May 27, 2015, 
http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm; Li Yihu [李义虎], “From 
Discrete Sea and Land to a Sea-Land Comprehensive Concept—Re-examining China’s Sea and Land Power [从海陆
二分到海陆统筹——对中国海陆关系的再审视], Contemporary International Relations [《现代国际关系》] 8, (2007), 1-
7, http://www.aisixiang.com/data/97720.html. 
302 John Chen, “Choosing the ‘Least Bad Option’: Organizational Interests and Change in the PLA Ground Forces,” 
footnote 8, in Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms, eds. Phillip C. Saunders et al., 
(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2019), 115. 
303 “逐步实现近海防御型向近海防御与远海护卫型结合转变” PRC State Council Information Office, China’s Military 
Strategy, May 27, 2015, http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm; 
PRC State Council Information Office, The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, April 2013, 
http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/content_281474982986506.htm; PRC State Council 
Information Office, China’s National Defense in 2010, March 2011, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/publications/2017-
04/11/content_4778206.htm; PRC State Council Information Office, China’s National Defense in 2008, January 2009, 
http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7060059.htm; PRC State Council Information Office, China’s 






provides strategic support for transforming the PRC into a maritime great power [是建设海洋强
国的战略支撑], and is an important component of realizing Chinese national rejuvenation [是实
现中华民族伟大复兴中国梦的重要组成部分].304 
Xi-era statements and official policy documents demonstrate that the sea power school 
has prevailed over the land power school at the highest levels of the CCP’s consensus-building 
process. By linking the national objective of becoming a maritime great power to the CCP’s 
grand strategic objective of national rejuvenation, Xi completed the maritime transformation of 
CCP strategic planning. However, operationalizing the newly accepted maritime vision will 
require a laborious maritime transformation at the bureaucratic level, including standing down 
the entrenched interests of the PLAGF. To that end, PRC maritime transformation is not yet 
complete. 
CCP Military Strategy: Toward a World-Class Navy 
Xi Jinping’s 2017 work report provides the latest iteration of the CCP’s “three-step” PLA 
modernization timeline; according to this timeline, the PLA should “basically realize 
mechanization” while laying the groundwork for informationization by 2020, “basically realize the 
modernization of national defense and the military” by 2035, and be a fully-built “world-class 
military” by midcentury, likely 2049.305  Although the “world-class” designation proliferates CCP 
and PLA planning documents as well as state media articles, no clear definition exists for what 
exactly the CCP would consider a world-class military.306 PLAN leaders have undertaken this 
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charge as one to develop the PLAN into a “world-class navy” [世界一流海军] that is 
“commensurate with China’s nationhood in the world.”307 As noted earlier, Xi has specified that a 
world-class navy is necessary for making the PRC a maritime great power and achieving 
national rejuvenation.308 These ambitions remain distant: the CCP describes the PLA as lagging 
“far behind the world’s leading militaries” and repeatedly notes an outstanding need to develop 
a modern maritime military force able to fulfil its mission set, including deterring U.S. operations 
and being able to “win” conflicts.309 CCP efforts to build PLAN capabilities largely fall into 3 
categories: 1) technological and theoretical development, 2) PLAN modernization, and 3) 
training. This section will overview CCP objectives of PLAN force development “world-class” 
status before turning to force employment in the service of increasing CCP strategic influence, 
directly through military diplomacy and indirectly by securing other influence-building policy 
initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). 
The first area the CCP is has targeted PLAN capabilities for improvement regards 
technological and theoretical development. The CCP believes the PLA faces risks of 
“technology surprise” and a “growing technological generation gap” which foster CCP fears that 
the U.S. will develop innovations which constitute “absolute military superiority.”310 To address 
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these challenges, the CCP has directed the PLA to improve its technological innovation 
capabilities.311 In pursuit of greater military technological innovation, the CCP in the Xi era is 
taking a two-pronged approach, including its 2016 National Innovation-Driven Development 
Strategy [国家创新驱动发展战略], which directs political capital toward prioritizing potentially 
dual-use technological innovation in the course of economic development, and a military-civil 
fusion [军民融合] initiative to guide corporate and local government investment in China toward 
dual-use sectors.312 Xi has personally endorsed these efforts in his speeches, urging the PLA to 
develop and leverage emerging technologies as a component of broader PLA modernization.313 
These efforts are not new; the PRC has put forward centrally-planned strategies to advance 
technological innovation with a focus on dual-use technologies since the release of the Medium 
and Long-Term Defense Science and Technology Development Plan in 2006.314 The parallel 
plans’ significance is the introduction of the obvious military objectives driving the CCP’s interest 
in technological innovation. The 2016 National Innovation-Driven Development Strategy sets 
milestones paralleling the PLA’s three-step modernization timeline, aiming for the PRC to be an 
“innovation nation” by 2020, an international leader of innovation by 2030, and a “world great 
power of scientific and technological innovation” [建成世界科技创新强国] by 2050.315 
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The second category of CCP efforts regards PLAN modernization. Ongoing PLA reforms 
demonstrate CCP expectations that a modernized PLAN must be capable of: blue-water power 
projection as well as achieving joint operational synergies with other PLA services, including the 
CCG and People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM).316  
PLA strategists understand blue-water projection as pushing the PLA “strategic front-
line” further from China’s shores and securing strategic depth.317 This process involves 
improving PLAN warship quantity and quality. By sheer hull count, PLAN shipbuilding has 
proceeded at an impressive rate, with Chinese shipyards launching 10 destroyers in 2019, 
illuminating scale to the shipbuilding effort which also includes launching eight of the flagship 
Type 055 destroyers in just over three years (August 2017 to August 2020).318 PLAN destroyers 
also feature capabilities approximate to those of their U.S. counterparts: while expert analysts 
consider the PLAN Type 052D destroyer inferior to the U.S. Navy’s Arleigh Burke-class 
destroyer, the PLAN’s Type 055 destroyer is widely considered to have capabilities exceeding 
any Arleigh Burke.319 The PLAN’s pursuit of improved capabilities has opened a gap with the 
U.S. Navy in terms of ship-launched anti-ship missiles. PLAN guided missile destroyers, 
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particularly the Type 052C, Type 052D, and Type 055 are equipped with YJ-18 anti-ship cruise 
missiles (ASCM) boasting operational ranges of 290 nautical miles and HQ-9 anti-air missiles 
(80 nm).320 The U.S. Navy, which equips its warships with the Harpoon ASCM featuring an 
operational range under 80 nautical miles, has had to invest resources to improving their anti-
ship missile capabilities to close this gap.321 
Figure 1: PLAN Warships Commissioned, 1994-2019 
 
Sources: Jane’s Fighting Ships, accessed December 10, 2020; Congressional Research Service, China 
Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress 
RL33153, August 1, 2018, 36-38, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33153/222. 
 
Parallel to building a surface combatant force structure capable of blue-water projection, the 
PLAN has also been modernizing its fleet of supply ships for replenishment-at-sea, which 
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remains a known capability gap in the PLAN.322 Analysis from Jane’s has found that the Type 
903A and Type 901 PLAN supply ships currently have the capacity and speed, and are being 
produced at a rate such that the PLAN will soon also have the requisite number, to enable 
expeditionary operations.323 
Joint operational capability is an acknowledged PLA weakness.324 CCP efforts to rectify 
this include rebalancing the service blend among students in military education and increasing 
PLA participation in international military exercises, but demonstrated technological and 
operational capabilities for joint operations remain nascent; the PLAN only received its first 
command and decision-capable vessel in 2019, and the PLA at large appears to still be 
experimenting with different command information networks at the brigade level, suggesting the 
military is not yet equipped for joint command across an integrated interservice command 
information network.325 While PLAN coordination with other PLA services appears weak, PLAN 
coordination with the CCG and PAFMM remains a distinct strength; PLAN-CCG-PAFMM 
coordination has markedly increased following incorporation of the paramilitaries into the PLA 
command structure and ongoing interaction between the services.326 The PRC has also taken 
steps to strengthen legal authorities for the CCG’s use of force in 2020 by passing a revised 
PAP Law permitting PLA-PAP joint exercises for noncombat operations, offering new legal 
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authorities for the CCG to take constabulary action pursuant to securing the PRC’s 
interpretation of its maritime rights, and drafting a Coast Guard Law offering limited discretion 
for the CCG to fire its weapons on foreign vessels if justified as a police action.327 
The final category of CCP efforts to build a world-class navy regards PLAN training. The 
PLA assesses its officers as lacking combat experience, resulting in the “Five Cannots” [五个不
能]: they cannot 1) judge the situation, 2) understand superiors’ intention, 3) make operational 
decisions, 4) deploy troops, or 5) handle surprises.328 The PLA solution is leadership training, 
and their sense of progress can be tallied in frequency of term use.329 PLA servicemen broadly 
lack combat experience as well, which the PLA is attempting to remedy with virtual reality 
training experiences and increased peacekeeping deployments to the Gulf of Aden.330  
A world-class PLA would offer the CCP an effective tool for realizing the CCP’s 
envisioned new model of interstate relations by acting as a potent tool able to displace the U.S. 
alliance structure insofar and erode U.S. strategic influence in and beyond the Indo-Pacific 
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region. The Indo-Pacific is the key theater which the CCP intends to reorder as its community of 
shared future for mankind.331 Xi’s speeches and CCP documents discussed earlier identify the 
CCP’s interest in diminishing the region’s U.S.-centric regional security architecture as Xi urged 
in his 2014 speech at CICA and replacing it with regional multilateral institutions which do not 
rise to the level of military alliance.332 To achieve these goals, PLAN is tasked with developing a 
“balanced, stable, open and inclusive Asian security architecture” to displace the “hegemon[ic]” 
U.S. regional alliance network.333 The PLAN does so by leading international military exercises 
and security dialogues which exclude the United States; PLA military diplomacy emphasizes 
Asia, where nearly half of all such interactions occur.334 As shown in Figure 2 below, Asia 
remains the PLA’s primary focus for military diplomacy. 
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Figure 2: Senior-Level Military Visits Abroad by Geographic Region, 2002-2019 
 
Source: Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Chinese Military Diplomacy Database version 3.0 
(Washington, DC: National Defense University, June 22, 2010). 
 
In China’s far seas, CCP documents describe reshaping the global superstructure from 
one of “Cold war mentality and power politics” to one which reapportions greater power to non-
Western, developing countries and displaces military alliances with dialogue-driven 
partnerships.335 The PLA’s role in building this new model of international relations is primarily 
military diplomacy, which the CCP hopes will build international support for its preferred rules of 
behavior.336 As shown in Figure 3 below, the PLAN is a significant driver of the PRC’s military 
diplomacy, leading a plurality of international exercises over the past two decades. The PLAN’s 
importance has continued to grow over time: looking at only 2019 data, the PLAN accounts for a 
full 50% of the PLA’s international military exercises.337 
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Figure 3: Total PLA International Military Exercises by Service, 2002-2019 
 
Source: Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Chinese Military Diplomacy Database version 3.0 
(Washington, DC: National Defense University, June 22, 2010). 
 
Although the PLAN’s functional effort in the far seas is largely the same as in the near 
seas, the strategic environment in which the PLAN is building its partnerships is decidedly 
different, as PLAN strategy dictates an “active posture” in the near seas and a “reactive posture” 
in the far seas, which makes the far seas a less complex security environment for PLA military 
diplomacy.338 The CCP more readily quantifies far-seas diplomatic engagements and measures 
progress by number of: countries participating in exchanges; PRC military attaché offices 
established abroad; foreign attaché offices in China; and defense dialogue mechanisms in 
place.339 The CCP shows steady progress as more countries engage the PLA and more 
engagements become more combat-oriented with deterrence potential.340 
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While not explicitly discussed in Defense White Papers, the PLAN also appears to 
advance CCP strategic influence abroad by safeguarding the Belt and Road Initiative and by 
taking advantage of dual-use investments associated with the BRI to extend PLA reach. Xi 
Jinping first proposed the initiative as a massive infrastructure investment campaign ostensibly 
leveraging Chinese capital and labor to improve nodes of connectivity with China’s neighbors 
and enhance economic exchange and joint development.341 The BRI is not simply a means for 
the PRC to unload excess capital: notably, CCP sources describe the BRI as a “strategy.”342 
The BRI has become a framework for Chinese economic leadership abroad, and the CCP 
advances BRI objectives in the belief that improved infrastructure will foster increased economic 
integration, which fosters regional cooperation in turn.343 The BRI is also an opportunity for the 
PLA to expand global military access and build military-to-military contacts with countries 
beyond the Indo-Pacific. This military goal is among Xi’s explicitly-stated objectives for the BRI: 
in a 2019 address to the Central Party School, Xi described protection of the PRC’s overseas 
interests as an “imperative” to be addressed by building a “security guarantee system for the 
Belt and Road Initiative.”344  
BRI investments have included commercial seaport facilities with limited dual-use 
applications which appear to be what PLA strategic documents consider “strategic 
strongpoints,” i.e. PRC-controlled ports which in times of crisis can offer limited forward basing 
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services such as replenishment.345 According to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission, the PRC has already successfully leveraged economic cooperation through the 
BRI to secure PLA access in foreign airfields.346 Similarly, the port of Gwadar, among the BRI’s 
largest investments, is designed with specifications that could feasibly support the largest PLAN 
vessels and does regularly support Pakistan Navy vessels purchased from the PRC.347 The 
PLAN itself has not yet used Gwadar as an overseas base, however, and despite the CCP’s 
broad efforts to derive military benefit from overseas investments, developing the requisite 
facilities and infrastructure for a military presence has remained a persistent challenge.348  
V. Competitor: USG Maritime Interests and Operations 
The United States uses military power to secure enduring interests of physical security, 
economic growth, and free democratic institutions by defending these same interests abroad, 
creating what observers commonly term the “liberal” or “rules-based” international order.349 In 
other words, the United States projects power globally to create environments in which U.S. 
interests are secured, and challenging that global power projection or reshaping the 
environment correspondingly threatens U.S. interests. American power shapes a global status 
quo defined by imperfectly implemented principles such as free trade and democratic values 
across the globe, and one underpinned by forward military basing in allied countries and 
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command of the commons, by which the U.S. military can project to any theater to secure its 
interests.350 States enacting foreign policies that appear to challenge the international status quo 
are thus “revisionist” powers, and the prospect that the PRC is a revisionist state has endured 
for decades.351 USG documents during the Trump Administration began referring to the PRC as 
a “revisionist” power.352 While the Biden Administration has not used the same term, its Interim 
National Security Guidance similarly characterizes the PRC as undermining “the rules and 
values at the heart of an open and stable international system.”353 
The USG secures American interests by denying efforts at revisionism. The USG has 3 
key objectives to deny revisionist activities: to 1) develop competitive advantages, 2) defend the 
rules-based international order, and 3) preserve American strategic influence. Each objective is 
available in public strategy documents: The 2017 National Security Strategy stipulates that the 
USG must increase its competitive advantages vis-à-vis the PRC, particularly in operations 
“below the threshold of open military conflict.”354 The 2019 DOD Indo-Pacific Strategy Report 
accuses the CCP of undermining the region’s rules-based international order.355 Finally, the 
U.S. Navy’s mission includes preserving U.S. strategic influence by deterring aggression and 
defeating adversaries should deterrence fail.356  
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These objectives are the latest iteration of a U.S. grand strategy that has remained 
largely consistent since its formation during the Cold War: U.S. grand strategy shifted from 
“containment” of the Soviet Union to “primacy” across economic, military, and diplomatic lines of 
effort in building and subsequently maintaining a world order in which American power is 
preponderant.357 Despite undulations between administrations favoring far-reaching maximalist 
foreign policies and those favoring global retrenchment, which one scholar-practitioner observes 
arises because “almost every new occupant of the Oval Office thought the world had changed in 
some fundamental way that his predecessor either totally misunderstood or failed to manage 
effectively,” this cycle of maximalist-retrenchment foreign policies consistently circled debates 
over how best to manage the accepted fact of U.S. primacy.358  
Sustaining U.S. Primacy 
Michael Green’s comprehensive survey of U.S. policy in Asia demonstrates a “central 
theme” contiguous over time: “that the United States will not tolerate any other power 
establishing exclusive hegemonic control over Asia or the Pacific,” and in line with this theme, 
U.S. policy has made the USG the “preeminent power in the Pacific.”359 That is, USG has 
denied the rise of regional hegemons in the Indo-Pacific with policies in pursuit of U.S. primacy. 
President Donald Trump’s administration considered maintaining “U.S. strategic primacy in the 
Indo-Pacific region” its primary national security challenge in the region.360 The USG sustains its 
primacy and meets its key objectives for the maritime balance via 3 operational objectives: 1) 
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increase the U.S. military’s margin of superiority vis-à-vis its competitors, 2) expand and 
integrate its network of allies and partners, and 3) demonstrate political resolve. 
Regarding the first operational objective, the USG is developing new military capabilities 
and operational concepts to maintain its margin of military superiority. Following the Cold War, 
the U.S. has enjoyed military superiority sufficient for hegemonic leadership in every region of 
the world.361 This overmatching superiority underpins a denial strategy that constrains the 
ambitions of would-be regional hegemons, with advanced military capabilities and operational 
concepts that leverage forward operating bases and technological advantages.362 DoD 
considers forces based in-theater integral for achieving U.S. strategic goals insofar as they 
deter adversaries, enable immediate response to aggression, and prevent tactical losses which 
would require the USG to transition strategies from denial to punishment or rollback.363 Similarly, 
every U.S. National Security Strategy since 2000 prioritizes maintaining U.S. technological 
leadership.364  
While progress on new technologies remains classified, USG efforts toward developing 
new operational concepts have been pronounced. The U.S. national defense policy community 
has responded to the National Defense Strategy Commission’s urgent call for new operational 
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concepts.365 For the Pacific theater, for example, DoD leadership considered operationalizing a 
maritime pressure strategy involving deployment of survivable, land-based precision-strike 
networks within the PLA long-range strike threat envelope.366 The USG has made a priority of 
developing new strategic and operational concepts for maritime competition with the PRC: the 
FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act required the President to submit a whole-of-
government strategy for competition with the PRC, including the use of military means available 
to the CCP to affect the United States and its allies.367 Similarly, U.S. military services are 
making concerted efforts to reimagine and retool themselves for strategic competition with the 
PRC: U.S. Navy has planned large-scale exercises in 2021 to test new operational concepts to 
frustrate Chinese surveillance capabilities, the U.S. Marine Corps has released a radical new 
force design concept to become a naval expeditionary force extending threat over the CCP’s 




365 Commission on the National Defense Strategy for the United States, “Providing for the Common Defense: The 
Assessment and Recommendations of the National Defense Strategy Commission,” 2018, viii, 
https://www.usip.org/publications/2018/11/providing-common-defense.  
366 Thomas G. Mahnken et al., “Tightening the Chain: Implementing a Strategy of Maritime Pressure in the Western 
Pacific,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, May 23, 2019, 
https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/implementing-a-strategy-of-maritime-pressure-in-the-western-
pacific/publication/1; Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Pentagon Chief in Favor of Deploying U.S. Missiles to Asia” The New 
York Times, August 3, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/03/world/asia/us-missiles-asia-esper.html.  
367 U.S. Congress, John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 Sec. 1261, 
https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr5515/BILLS-115hr5515enr.pdf.  
368 David B. Larter, “With China gunning for aircraft carriers, US Navy says it must change how it fights,” 
DefenseNews, December 6, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2019/12/06/with-china-gunning-for-aircraft-
carriers-the-us-navy-says-it-must-change-the-way-it-fights/; Megan Eckstein, “Large Scale Exercise 2020 Will Be 
Postponed Amid COVID-19 Pandemic Concerns,” USNI News, March 25, 2020, 
https://news.usni.org/2020/03/25/large-scale-exercise-2020-will-be-postponed-amid-covid-19-pandemic-concerns; 
U.S. Marine Corps, Force Design 2030, March 2020, 
https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%
20and%20II.pdf?ver=2020-03-26-121328-460; Michael R. Gordon, “Marines Plan to Retool to Meet China Threat,” 
Wall Street Journal, March 22, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/marines-plan-to-retool-to-meet-china-threat-
11584897014; Jen Judson, “US Army to prioritize long-range missile capability to go after maritime targets,” 
DefenseNews, March 26, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/global-force-
symposium/2019/03/26/army-to-prioritize-long-range-missile-capability-to-go-after-maritime-targets/; David Lague, 
“Special Report: U.S. rearms to nullify China's missile supremacy,” Reuters, May 6, 2020, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-missiles-specialreport-us/special-report-u-s-rearms-to-nullify-chinas-






The USG’s second operational objective is to expand and integrate the U.S. alliance 
network. The USG considers its network of allies and partners a “force multiplier” for deterrence 
and interoperable369 warfighting capability and is working to thicken its ties with regional allies.370 
The U.S. alliance network in the Indo-Pacific is a series of bilateral security guarantees; as 
such, factors which reassure allies such as demonstrated military capability or preparedness 
meaningfully contribute to Pacific alliance cohesion insofar as they assure allies of the U.S. 
military’s ability to deter or prevail over an adversary.371 To reassure allies in the face of PLA 
naval modernization, DoD is preparing for high-end competition through procurement of 
advanced platforms.372 DoD is also evolving in-theater U.S. force posture by expanding defense 
cooperation with Pacific Island nations, for example recently partnering with the Australian 
government to develop a naval base on Papua New Guinea’s Manus Island.373 This effort 
signals an extension of existing U.S. commitments to Pacific Island nations, in particular the 
Compact of Free Association, which offers U.S. security guarantees in exchange for military 
access and basing.374  
The U.S. is also promoting increased U.S. military interoperability with its allies and 
partners as well as between U.S.-allied militaries; while these efforts thicken the United States’ 
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security ties, those ties have not reliably increased international political cohesion. U.S. 
experience with Japan and Singapore illustrate this point. 
The U.S.-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of American power in the Asia-Pacific, 
exhibiting both increased military interoperability and political alignment over time. The U.S.-
Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines, updated in 2015, created an Alliance Coordination 
Mechanism expanding military coordination across all levels of conflict, provided for enhanced 
training, and increased functional domain awareness cooperation.375 The Japanese government 
has also accepted greater responsibility for regional security by increasing military spending and 
procuring an island to serve as a training site for U.S. forces.376 The Abe Shinzo and Suga 
Yoshihide governments maintain an outsized role in networking U.S. regional security partners 
Australia, India, and, unofficially, Taiwan.377 Of these, Japan-Australia ties are the most 
developed, with the two states announcing preliminary agreement on a defense arrangement 
permitting their forces to train in each other’s countries and, separately, agreed in principle for 
the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force to protect Australian maritime assets; both steps are 
apparent signals of balancing against Beijing.378 Nonetheless, Tokyo suspended a planned 
deployment of the U.S. Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense system, citing the program’s costs 
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despite its strategic importance to the U.S. military posture against the PRC, and Japanese 
officials have so far declined to host American land-based missiles which could threaten the 
Chinese mainland.379 
The U.S.-Singapore strategic partnership reflects a close military partnership which 
drives only partial alignment between political agendas. Singapore is the foreign country with 
the largest military presence on U.S. soil, and the two countries continue to upgrade their 
security partnership with military facilities agreements and joint exercises.380 Even so, U.S.-
Singapore strategic cooperation does not translate into total political alignment; Singapore 
Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong argued at the 2019 Shangri-La Dialogue that “the rest of the 
world has to adjust to a larger role for China,” and the United States, as “the preeminent power, 
has the most difficult adjustment to make.”381 Similarly, when in 2020 the U.S. Secretary of the 
Navy proposed basing a new Indo-Pacific fleet near where the Indian and Pacific Oceans meet, 
perhaps in Singapore, the Singaporean Ministry of Defense appeared cool to the idea, noting 
only that no adjustment is being made or requested from current policy.382 
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The USG’s third operational objective is to demonstrate political resolve lending 
credibility to its foreign policy.383 The USG makes credible its security guarantees, 
simultaneously tightening its alliances and deterring potential adversaries, with expressions of 
political resolve.384 Adversity is endogenous to resolve; a nation exhibits political resolve against 
competitors who attempt to demonstrate the converse and erode its political credibility, so 
presaging future failures in aggression deterrence.385 Various USG policies and documents 
since 2000 signaled a resolve to militarily dominate the PRC.386 During the George W. Bush 
administration, the Office of Net Assessment’s (ONA) 2001 Defense Strategy Review (DSR) 
discussed coming military challenges that ONA Director Andrew Marshall described as shifting 
U.S. long-term focus toward Asia.387 The DSR findings informed the 2001 and 2006 
Quadrennial Defense Reviews’ areas for enhancing military capability; then-Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense Thomas Mahnken described the latter document as being “really—albeit 
not exclusively—about China.”388 The Bush administration began revising U.S. military force 
posture in Asia, which the Barack Obama administration continued as part of its Pivot to 
Asia/Asia-Pacific Rebalance. Among other efforts, the Rebalance involved deploying new high-
end platforms such as “F-22, Virginia-class submarines, and Terminal High Altitude Area 
Defense (THAAD)” to the theater.389 The Obama administration paired this change in U.S. Indo-
Pacific force posture with direct appeals from then President Obama and then Secretary of 
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State Hillary Clinton to Southeast Asian states, urging them to directly challenge PRC activities 
while suggesting these challenges would have U.S. support.390 The Donald Trump 
administration’s military tool of choice to signal maritime resolve in the Indo-Pacific has been the 
Freedom of Navigation (FON) operation (FONOP), which asserts freedom of navigation 
regardless of other nations’ excessive claims; DoD will continue these operations and 
encourage allies to participate in such.391 The Trump administration escalated PRC-targeting 
FONOPS, conducting 7 in 2018, up from 4 in 2015 and 2016 each.392 
USG resolve-demonstration policy produced mixed results, with particular weaknesses 
in the Obama administration’s policy. After implying political support for challenges to PRC 
South China Sea claims in 2011, the USG withheld political support for the Philippines when it 
issued one such challenge at Scarborough Shoal in 2012, during which “the United States 
chose to accept the outcome of China’s assertiveness.”393 As U.S. credibility declined, 
Philippine Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana declared intentions to strengthen or 
abandon the Philippines’ mutual defense treaty with the United States, which required an appeal 
from then Secretary of Defense Mark Esper to maintain.394 USG policy has also made 
successful assurances, including President Obama’s declaration that the contested Senkaku 
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islands under Japanese administration are protected under the U.S.-Japan security treaty as 
well as receiving increased support from Australia, Canada, France, Japan, New Zealand, and 
the UK for FON in the South China Sea.395  
Central to the varying results of U.S. policy toward the PRC prior to its recent turn toward 
USG-CCP competition was its principle of engagement, which sought to shape the CCP into a 
pliable partner for the United States by fielding a capable military capable of deterring by denial 
any potential of PLA mischief while simultaneously aligning the CCP’s interests with U.S. 
interests by establishing Kissingerian linkages between CCP political decisions and its ability to 
benefit from global markets.396 This policy dramatically overestimated the USG’s ability to shape 
CCP decision making; as senior Obama Administration officials Ely Ratner and Kurt Campbell 
came to recognize, CCP ambitions and insecurities vis-à-vis the United States exceeded USG 
analyst assessments, to the extent that the mere presence of U.S. military forces and alliances 
in Asia were “unacceptable” to the CCP.397 Not until the Trump and Biden Administrations did 
public USG national security documents recognize the CCP for the revisionist power that it is or 
adopt policies regarding the CCP as a competitor rather than a regime that can be managed to 
avoid competition altogether.398  
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Enduring USG Maritime Interest: Freedom of the Seas  
U.S. expressions of political resolve in maritime affairs demonstrate the American 
predisposition toward upholding the freedom of the seas, which in current iteration is predicated 
on U.S. military access wherever permitted by international law. American maritime policy in the 
Asia-Pacific demonstrates consistent values and operations but muddled objectives since the 
late 1970s. U.S. maritime policy, including FONOPs, across administrations emphasized 
freedom of the seas as an American value not to be constrained by a great power competitor or 
by international law. Although the U.S. FON Program self-describes as “based on principle,” the 
logic and expression of U.S. FONOPs prioritize U.S. military access in competition with foreign 
powers while demonstrating measured indifference to international law.399 This section offers 
the strategic logic behind the U.S. FON Program during the Cold War and contiguous elements 
with current operations targeting excessive PRC maritime claims. 
The history of U.S. maritime policy shows an American predisposition toward the 
freedom of the seas, loosely defined by confidence that law-abiding citizens can cross 
international waters free from the fear of molestation by foreign vessels, especially precluding 
seizure of private property.400 The ideal underpinned the U.S.-Prussia Treaty of 1785, the 
second of President Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points in 1918, the controversial League of Nations 
meeting at the Hague in 1930, and U.S. negotiations on the United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea in 1958.401 Following the Cold War, the U.S. military’s singular ability to leverage 
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command of the commons for global power projection further cemented the principle’s 
importance in American strategic culture.402  
While FONOPs are not the sum of U.S. policy reflecting freedom of the seas, they are 
the product of a policymaking approach which self-interestedly pursued that freedom while 
disregarding international agreements. U.S. interest in FONOPs arose with the United Nations 
Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), an international agreement enumerating the 
limits of maritime claims and permissible types of activities in them. In 1979, as a third round of 
UNCLOS negotiations were underway, President Jimmy Carter directed his National Security 
Council (NSC) to identify options to ensure FON for the United States even if it does not 
become an UNCLOS signatory. Carter’s NSC recommended a formal FON Program by which 
the United States “protest claims of other States that are inconsistent with international law and 
U.S. policy, with particular reference to extended territorial sea claims as well as the regime 
therein.”403  
Carter’s NSC recommended a FON Program that served as the basis for President 
Ronald Reagan’s 1983 Oceans Policy, which had two key points: 1) the U.S. will recognize the 
rights of other states pursuant to UNCLOS if that state reciprocates for the U.S. and other 
states, and 2) the U.S. “will exercise and assert its navigation and overflight rights and freedoms 
on a worldwide basis in a manner that is consistent with the balance of interests reflected in the 
convention” but will not “acquiesce in unilateral acts of other states designed to restrict the rights 
and freedoms of the international community in navigation and overflight and other related high 
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an international “balance of interests,” and this message continues to be how the modern U.S. 
FON Program describes itself.405  
Reagan’s messaging was a veneer over self-interested U.S. policy set the year prior. In 
December 1982, the Reagan White House issued National Security Decision Directive 72, 
wherein the USG would follow a set schedule of FONOPs to “protect U.S. navigation, overflight, 
and related security interests in the seas through the vigorous exercise of its rights against 
excessive maritime claims,” to ensure the U.S. enjoys UNCLOS’ benefits without being subject 
to its restrictions.406 Moreover, Reagan-era FONOPs were primarily assertive tools by which the 
U.S. shaped its strategic environment with threats of escalation, not tools to champion 
international freedom of navigation. FONOPs deployed in the Cold War included presence 
operations threatening provocative Soviet activities. The Soviet Union was geographically 
disadvantaged for maritime competition and depended heavily on passage through the Black 
Sea to deploy one of its three major fleet concentrations.407 Accordingly, the Reagan 
administration deployed warships on innocent passage FONOPs through the Black Sea on a 
regular basis, culminating in Soviet naval vessels ramming two U.S. warships in 1988, to which 
the Reagan administration responded by launching FONOPs directly following major Soviet 
naval exercises and sending a nuclear-powered cruiser to transit the Black Sea.408 International 
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to bottle the Soviet navy at geographic chokepoints in the Black Sea and so fulfilled their 
primary purpose. 
President George H. W. Bush modified Reagan’s FON policy by discontinuing the preset 
FONOP schedule and additionally specifying that the program’s purpose is to “preserve the 
global mobility of U.S. forces by avoiding acquiescence in excessive maritime claims of other 
nations,” and President Bill Clinton’s administration left Bush’s policy unchanged.409 
After the Cold War, the U.S. FON Program was little publicized until President Barack 
Obama restarted FONOP patrols in the South China Sea. In 2015, the Obama administration 
ordered the USS Lassen to conduct a FONOP sailing within twelve nautical miles of Subi Reef, 
a feature of disputed sovereignty administered by the PRC; while the United States does not 
recognize Subi Reef as an island conferring a twelve nautical mile territorial zone as is the right 
of islands under UNCLOS, PRC statements at that time implied a sovereign claim to Subi Reef, 
among other South China Sea features, as well as twelve nautical miles of territorial sea around 
those features.410  
Though much of the public discourse surrounded interpreting UNCLOS and the 
legitimacy of the PRC claims,411 the 2015 FONOP’s timing suggests it was a retaliation to a 
growing military threat rather than sovereignty per se. In 2014 and 2015, the PRC escalated its 
South China Sea island-building campaign, by which it poured sand atop features not normally 
above sea level, dredged harbors, and constructed radars, airstrips long enough for military 
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bomber takeoff and landing, and piers long enough for warships to dock.412 These islands offer 
the PLA a forward-leaning posture that threatens U.S. military overmatch in the region and risks 
the U.S. military’s ability to guarantee seaborne transit in the region.413 
Correspondingly, the Lassen’s transit in October 2015 was the first in a semi-regular 
FONOP schedule targeting Chinese claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea through 
2016.414 President Donald Trump’s administration increased the South China Sea FONOP 
tempo; the USG conducted two South China Sea FONOPs in 2015, three in 2016, six in 2017, 
five in 2018, and nine in 2019.415  
The Trump administration followed the Reagan administration’s pattern of executing a 
self-interested FON Program for great power competition akin to Reagan’s National Security 
Decision Directive 72 while publicly describing the FON Program as the most visible part of a 
comprehensive policy defending “freedom of navigation and overflight in the Indo-Pacific” region 
broadly.416 DoD describes its FONOPs as protecting the region’s “stable economic order,” and 
the State Department asserts its FON Program operates with Indo-Pacific partners “so that all 
nations can access and benefit from the maritime commons.”417 This description suggests the 
Trump administration attempted, as Reagan’s administration did, to prosecute a great power 
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competition strategy under the veneer of defending public goods for allies and partners in the 
Indo-Pacific.  
Despite public narratives of U.S. values aligning with international law, U.S. maritime 
interests have consistently prioritized military access. The DoD FON Program exemplifies U.S. 
priorities with presence operations which reject potential adversaries’ activities or force postures 
that may restrict U.S. military access. 
VI. Trends and Asymmetries 
This section discusses key trends in the CCP’s maritime transformation and relevant 
operational asymmetries with the USG. Trends discussed span the multifunctional nature of sea 
power as an instrument of strategic competition. Discussed trends include trajectories in CCP or 
USG national security policymaking, such as their respective visions for naval force structure, 
and CCP responses to the enduring realities to which the competitors are forced to respond, 
such as Indo-Pacific geography. Appended to the discussion of each trend and its role in CCP 
maritime transformation are the operational asymmetries in each sides’ national security 
establishment that might give the trend outsized impact to one competitor.  
China’s Economic Future 
PRC economic growth and how it is perceived constitute the competitive baseline from 
which other enduring trends of the USG-CCP strategic competition are derived. As detailed in 
Section IV, CCP white papers assert a narrative that the world has entered a “new era” of 
development defined by the economic rise of developing countries, led by explosive Chinese 
economic growth, and receding U.S. influence.418 Xi Jinping explicitly tied PRC economic 
development to global leadership at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in 2017, saying 
 
 







“China’s development is an opportunity for the world,” and the PRC “will open our arms to the 
people of other countries and welcome them aboard the express train of China’s 
development.”419  
The demonstrated success of PRC economic growth has two functions in USG-CCP 
strategic competition. First, the international perception of continued PRC growth underpins the 
CCP’s Marxist justification for driving change in the global superstructure: the CCP’s exhibition 
of a superior economic model is necessary to increase its stature and claim to global leadership. 
The narrative of a rising PRC and a declining West is the CCP’s fundamental argument in USG-
CCP strategic competition. Second, sustained economic growth funds CCP maritime 
transformation through sustained commercial investments and long-term PLAN 
modernization.420  
Figure 4: The CCP’s Argument: Percentage Share of the World Economy Between 
Advanced Economies and Emerging Markets 
 
Source: PRC State Council Information Office, China and the World in the New Era, September 27, 2019, 
30, 
http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201909/27/content_WS5d8d80f9c6d0bcf8c4c142ef.html.   
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However, declining returns on fixed asset investment and Beijing’s persistent inclination 
to rely on investment as a stimulus of economic growth suggests that the once-explosive rate of 
Chinese economic growth will not be enduring. To the extent that this growth represents a 
systemic change in the global order, the most significant effects of such have likely already 
occurred. This subsection considers the PRC’s future economic growth before turning to identify 
key budgetary asymmetries between the PRC and USG pertinent to the future of the maritime 
balance. 
Trend: Diminishing Returns on Chinese Fixed-Asset Investment 
The PRC sustained remarkable annual GDP growth for decades, peaking at 14.23 
percent in 2007 followed by steady growth rate declines.421 Much of this growth was driven by 
an investment-led growth model largely dependent on fixed-asset investments. Declining GDP 
growth rates over the past decade indicate structural changes in the PRC economy which 
require a new growth model to arrest the decline. Official PRC publications indicate CCP 
leaders are aware of the need for a new growth model; still, Chinese leaders continue to pursue 
investment-led growth to arrest economic downturn. 
 
 







Figure 5: Annual PRC GDP Growth Rate and Growth Target, 1999-2019 
 
Sources: various.422  
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Long-term economic growth potential is determined in the short term by demand side 
factors423 and long term by supply side factors.424 PRC economic growth policy emphasizes 
demand. Beginning in the mid-2000s, the contribution of fixed asset investment to PRC GDP 
growth spiked after the global financial crisis of 2007-2009.425 This reflected broader trends: 
PRC economic growth since 1990 has been increasingly dependent on high levels of fixed 
asset investments in terms of volume as well as investment consistency.426 Just as importantly, 
CCP leaders have been inclined toward increasing state-funded fixed asset investments to 
increase PRC economic growth, particularly in times of crisis. 
For decades, the PRC successfully grew its fixed asset investment stream; the PRC 
maintained an average annual growth rate of 20.2 percent in fixed asset investment from 1981 
to 2017.427 PRC gross capital formation, which includes fixed-asset and inventory investment 
but during this period was overwhelmingly driven by the former, consistently grew as a share of 
its GDP from the inception of the People’s Republic.428 This trend continued in the PRC’s recent 
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economic history, with gross capital formation comprising 34.11 percent of PRC GDP in 1999 
and growing to 43.79 percent in 2018.429 
The PRC’s rapid economic growth through the mid-2000s is due in large part to this 
fixed asset capital investment, which grew to, then maintained a high rate because of a 
consistently high rate of return, a ready labor supply, and entrepreneurial expectations of rapid 
economic growth.430 Rapidly growing investments required financing, and the PRC’s capital 
investment, financed by significant domestic savings and foreign investment, drove a virtuous 
cycle defined by rapid productivity growth.431 A landmark study published by the World Bank 
Group and the PRC State Council’s Development Research Center (DRC) argues that PRC 
total factor productivity measured about 3.51 percent from 1998-2008, and that these levels 
helped explain the PRC’s elevated economic growth rates.432  
Returns on PRC fixed asset investment have predictably433 declined as the productivity 
of its capital continues to diminish, as shown in Figure 6.434 The decline in PRC GDP growth 
rates directly corresponds to increases in the PRC investment capital output ratio (ICOR), in 
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which a higher ICOR indicates less production efficiency and, as such, less economic growth for 
capital invested. 
Figure 6: Economic Growth and Declining Returns on Capital Investment in the PRC, 
1999-2018 
 
Sources: The World Bank, “World Development Indicators,” accessed December 7, 2020, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2019&locations=CN&start=1999; David 
Orsmond, “China’s Economic Choices,” Lowy Institute, December 17, 2019, 
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/china-s-economic-choices.  
 
Parallel to diminishing Chinese productivity and GDP growth is the starker World Bank 
and DRC assessment of a full collapse in fixed asset investment’s contribution to PRC 
economic growth across the mining, manufacturing, infrastructure, and service sectors. Even as 
the PRC’s share of global manufacturing increases by large margins, investment in China’s 
manufacturing sector has minimal returns.435  
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Figure 7: Contribution of fixed asset investment to growth in the PRC, 2005-2018 
 
Source: World Bank Group and PRC State Council Development Research Center, “Innovative China: 
New Drivers of Growth,” 2019, 5, 
http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/833871568732137448/pdf/Innovative-China-New-Drivers-of-
Growth.pdf.   
 
Analysts recognize several factors to be slowing PRC GDP growth, including 
government interference with resource allocation, an excessively high debt leverage ratio 
following the 2008 financial crisis, the collapse of demand growth for China’s exports, and the 
continuously rising savings and investment rate. Continuously high investment likely led to 
overinvestment in and thus overcapacity in some sectors.436 This explanation is reinforced by 
the proclivity of PRC provincial government officials, who are politically incentivized to use fixed 
asset investments as a constant stimulus, leading to a pattern of overinvestment in unnecessary 
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Diminishing returns on fixed asset investment is a critical enduring trend for PRC 
economic projections not only because it is a significant driver of the PRC’s domestic economic 
slowdown in its own right but also because it is the CCP’s favored tool to prop up the image of 
economic growth.  The CCP’s recent policy response to the slowing economic growth typical of 
the transition to an advanced economy has focused on encouraging local governments to 
increase their debt burdens in order to post artificially inflated growth numbers.438 Beijing again 
turned to capital investment as the solution in 2020 when facing the economic crises brought on 
by the COVID-19 pandemic. Beijing attempted to manage the economic decline with sizable 
state-led investment that benefitted SOEs and increased local government financial 
dependence on the central government yet did little to support smaller and privately owned 
companies; the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission assesses that this 
policy response does little to spur consumption, further compounding Chinese overcapacity and 
undermining the PRC’s economic recovery.439 The PRC has not demonstrated an ability to 
effectively move beyond investment-led growth in or out of crisis; instead, Beijing’s policy 
responses have suggested CCP leaders’ proclivity toward if not dependence on such.  
Asymmetry: Defense Budget Trajectories 
PRC defense spending is distinct in two ways from USG defense spending: PRC 
defense spending is 1) steady as a percentage of GDP and 2) growing as a proportion of the 
bilateral defense spending balance. Just as the CCP situates its claim to leadership of a “new 
era” on continuing PRC economic growth at elevated levels, future capital-intensive investments 
in the PLA, including a modernizing naval force structure, will depend on continued PRC 
economic growth.  
 
 
438 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Annual Report to Congress, November 2019, 51, 
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2019-11/2019%20Annual%20Report%20to%20Congress.pdf.  







The CCP demonstrates an enduring commitment to maintaining total military 
expenditures at around 2 percent of GDP, neither increasing during upswings nor decreasing in 
economic downturns.440 When facing a sharp economic contraction in the wake of COVID-19, 
the PRC National People’s Congress increased the PLA’s official budget by 6.6 percent while at 
the same time cutting all nonurgent government spending by 50 percent.441 By comparison, the 
overall U.S. defense budget, which well exceeds that of the PLA in dollars and in percentage of 
GDP, has varied with transient political shifts. From 2010 on, the U.S. defense budget faced 
pressures from enduring budget deficits, the residual impact of the Global Financial Crisis, and 
the Budget Control Act of 2011, which collectively drove a federal disinvestment in defense of 
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Figure 8: U.S. and PRC Military Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP, 1999-2019 
 




Similarly, the CCP’s steady defense investment of 2 percent of its rapidly growing 
economy, when weighed against the USG’s variable defense investment of a slowly growing 
economy means PRC defense spending is growing more quickly than USG defense spending. 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates find that PRC military expenditures 
reached one-third of total U.S. military expenditures in 2016, and the Chinese share of military 







Figure 9: Share of Military Expenditure in Constant (2018) U.S. Dollars, 1999-2019 
 
Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2020, https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex.   
 
PRC defense budgeting has for decades exhibited an asymmetric advantage, slowly but 
surely growing at a faster rate than that of USG defense spending by drawing on political 
resolve to track a 2 percent GDP defense expenditure as well as once-explosive economic 
growth. PLA services enjoy a comparatively predictable budget, which reduces uncertainties 
endogenous to long-term force planning. This pattern is most advantageous in a long-term 
peacetime competition: should current trends of PRC economic growth and CCP political 
resolve to maintain defense spending continue unarrested, the PLA is likely to become 
increasingly well-equipped and develop the potential to adopt a global force posture which rivals 
that of the United States military. Should the PRC fail to adopt a new growth model to maintain 
elevated economic growth rates, or should CCP leaders compromise defense spending in favor 
of other priorities, then this long-term advantage of faster-growing defense spending will be 
blunted. 
Asymmetry: The Costs of PRC Stability Maintenance 
Among the PLA’s most powerful competitors for funding in the PRC budget is a domestic 






equivalent. Reflecting the CCP’s paramount interest in perpetuating its regime and outsized 
concerns443 of social unrest, the PRC maintains a costly domestic security apparatus that 
exceeds the PLA in annual spending. This apparatus, termed “stability maintenance” [维稳], 
includes CCP control over secret police, courts, and various means by which to manage 
Chinese public opinion.444 Declining economic growth rates and constantly high CCP demand 
for stability maintenance create enduring challenges for funding the PLA. 
The CCP’s official stability maintenance budget has historically tracked its national 
defense spending and publicly exceeded the official defense budget in 2011, when the stability 
maintenance budget was 624.4 billion RMB and national defense was accorded only 601.1 
billion RMB.445 Adrian Zenz’s research has shown the PRC’s stability maintenance spending 
likely exceeded its external defense expenditures for the first time in 2010 and has maintained 
the larger share of the budget ever since.446 For reasons not made public, CCP leaders have 
since made efforts to obscure PRC stability maintenance spending. The official stability 
maintenance budget in 2019 was only 179.78 billion RMB compared to the official 1.19 trillion 
RMB for national defense.447 However, Chinese reporters have uncovered that the de facto 
2019 stability maintenance budget is at least 1.39 trillion RMB before counting SOE 
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expenditures toward stability maintenance made at a central or provincial government’s 
behest.448  
Slowing economic growth increases the PRC’s opportunity cost for its stability 
maintenance spending but may also trigger a need for increased stability maintenance 
operations, which increases budget pressures for other programs in turn. High rates of 
economic growth are an important component of modern social cohesion in the PRC. Testifying 
before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Barry Naughton impressed 
the importance of continued economic prosperity to young Chinese citizens’ view of the CCP 
regime, saying, “a young Chinese person today is not only better, much better off than his 
parents, he's much better off than he ever thought he could be.”449 In separate testimony, 
Anthony Saich pointed out the CCP’s continued accrual of debt in order to provide the public 
goods to which Chinese citizens have become accustomed.450 Some CCP elites consider 6% 
annual GDP growth to be the minimum required needed to “obscure” the PRC’s social problems 
and maintain social cohesion.451 
Even as PRC economic growth slows, PRC stability maintenance expenditures are likely 
to increase as Xi Jinping imposes more rigid standards of politically acceptable behavior in 
China and orders them enforced by methods of social control augmented by emerging 
technologies, for example by proliferating CCTV cameras with facial recognition capabilities and 
centrally managing the data through a nationwide program called Skynet.452 Xi also appears to 
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have a heightened concern of Chinese popular resistance to the CCP, with Chinese state media 
referencing the possible end of the CCP with record frequency since he assumed power.453 Xi’s 
apparent personal proclivities toward finding and suppressing the potential of public unrest 
against the regime reinforce the likelihood that, while he is in power, the PRC’s stability 
maintenance burden will increase only more rapidly as China’s economic growth slows. 
In addition to budget allocations, PRC stability maintenance also competes with national 
defense for human capital and command capacity. Funding for the People’s Armed Police 
(PAP), a paramilitary force tasked with leading the stability maintenance operations which 
require domestic riot suppression, is officially categorized as part of the PRC’s domestic security 
budget.454 The PAP was organized under both the Central Military Commission (CMC) and 
State Council until PLA reforms in 2017 organized the PAP exclusively under the CMC, with 
PLA resources responsible for directing PAP operations.455 This change in command structure 
did not change the PAP’s mission from stability maintenance to warfighting. PAP mobile 
detachments are located in areas the CCP is imposing oppressive social control measures on 
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Xi Jinping has publicly called for the PAP to integrate into the PLA joint operational 
system, a priority the National People’s Congress reinforced with the 2020 passage of a revised 
PAP Law providing for PLA-PAP joint noncombat exercises.457 This integration, which Joel 
Wuthnow assesses as still lacking, repurposes time and resources within the CMC command 
structure from PLA preparations for warfighting toward the breadth of PAP responsibilities, 
which continues to include riot suppression and disaster relief.458 The PAP regularly deploys to 
conduct these military operations other than war, taxing command resources that could 
otherwise be dedicated toward efforts to man, train, and equip the PLA, to the detriment of PLA 
readiness and lethality.459 The potential consequences of the PAP-PLA’s unfocused mission set 
likely extends beyond ground forces. While riot suppression is traditionally a task for the PLAGF 
rather than the PLAN, the CCG has also recently become involved in stability maintenance 
operations by capturing Hong Kongers attempting to flee the regime by sea.460 
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Indo-Pacific Strategic Geography 
The CCP’s maritime transformation takes place within an Indo-Pacific competition 
theater, and the USG and CCP have unequal claims to the theater’s strategic geography. This 
thesis does not argue that geography is destiny. Rather, it adopts Roy Kamphausen’s argument 
that some geographic features are “decisive,” these being “physical features that offer strategic 
advantages by establishing conditions for either the success or inhibition of military 
protagonists,” with military advantage “conferred on the power that assembles the more adept 
and mutually reinforcing set of strategies to control this decisive terrain in a conflict.461 
Kamphausen argues that Asia’s decisive terrain is its maritime features in “the aggregate of the 
island chain462 facing the eastern edge of the Asian landmass and straits that provide access to 
the Western Pacific and that extend laterally between the marginal seas.”463 These island chains 
form chokepoints464 that a dominant power can use to restrict naval access. CCP strategists 
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appear to adopt a similar mentality but adopt a broader view including chokepoints west of 
China, which attend to SLOCs through Southeast Asia into the Indian Ocean. 
Peacetime dominance over maritime Asia’s decisive terrain confers wartime advantages. 
The CCP recognizes that the USG has traditionally held the advantage on China’s eastern 
periphery and has a dedicated line of effort, dominated by the CCP’s defense establishment, to 
challenge this advantage. Yet a major thrust of CCP maritime transformation extends in the 
opposite direction by consolidating commercial investment at maritime chokepoints to China’s 
west, developing a competitive advantage for the CCP over SLOCs running through the Indian 
Ocean. 
Asymmetry: Two Maps: USG and CCP Views of Asia’s Strategic Geography 
Though both USG and CCP planners recognize the same island chains as strategic 
features in the Western Pacific, CCP interests and commercial responses emphasize SLOCs 
through island chains toward China’s West, reflecting dependance on maritime energy imports 
rather than a narrow focus on the eastern island chains themselves. While the USG remained 
narrowly focused on the security implications of the first and second island chains, the CCP built 







Map 1: Map of USG Focus: The First and Second Island Chains 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments 
Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011,” 2011, 23, 
https://archive.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011_CMPR_Final.pdf.  
 
U.S. and CCP regional force postures reflect distinct political interests toward Asia’s 
strategic geography. The U.S. maintains relative dominance over its view of the island chains 
with a forward military presence supported by alliances and military partnerships with other 
countries east of China.465 The USG’s demonstrated diplomatic interest is to maintain its 
alliance commitments and sustain them with a forward deployed military as a deterrent against 
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provocative military behavior.466 Indo-Pacific allies and partners serve as a force multiplier for 
this effort by aligning their own national policies on maritime access with the USG and by 
committing their diplomats and militaries to advocate for those standards.467  
In an eroding deference to U.S. and allied military preponderance over these island 
chains,468 the CCP adopted a two-pronged approach toward the island chains to its east: 1) 
develop land-based long-range strike capabilities able to delay, degrade, and ultimately destroy 
U.S. and allied bases in the Indo-Pacific as well as U.S. forces flowing into the theater; and 2) 
escalate the costs of U.S. military operations in and around the first island chain with gray zone 
activities such as provocative maneuvering of PLAN vessels or harassing U.S. warships with 
paramilitary CCG or PAFMM vessels.469  
In addition to securing access through Asia’s eastern island chains, the CCP also has an 
outsized interest in securing its SLOCs to China’s west, by which China receives most of its 
energy imports. PRC economic growth increased oil consumption: the PRC has been a net oil 
importer since 1993, and by the 2000s, over 80% of PRC oil imports passed through the Strait 
of Malacca, at the southern tip of the First Island Chain.470 CCP leaders recognize the risks 
inherent in depending on energy imports through one key strait and have taken mitigating 
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steps.471 First, CCP has attempted to reduce its reliance on energy shipments through the 
Malacca Strait by increasing overland pipeline capacity to import crude oil and natural gas; 
these successes have only been partially successful, as evidenced by the PRC’s continued 
reliance on Middle Eastern and African countries for oil imports.472 Second, the CCP has 
increased its commercial leverage along key waterways along its western SLOC. 
Map 2: Map of CCP’s Focus: China’s Energy Import Transit Routes (2016 Data) 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments 
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Trend: Consolidating PRC Commercial Power at Western Maritime Chokepoints  
Chinese investment through the BRI’s maritime component, called the Maritime Silk 
Road Initiative (MSRI), is concentrating PRC power through economic means at key maritime 
chokepoints to China’s west, such as the Strait of Malacca. Beyond securing China’s energy 
imports, Chinese commercial dominance and logistics software in key ports can give the CCP a 
significant surveillance capability over maritime supply chains with competitive. This trend poses 
a dangerous but unannounced whole-of-society challenge to USG dominance over Asia’s 
decisive terrain.  
Chinese investments at maritime chokepoints are unsurprising and not inherently 
competitive. Maritime chokepoints are geographic realities for shipping companies and business 
opportunities for port operators and maritime support services, such as ship repair and 
maintenance, ship brokering and chartering, and bunkering; because of the rich business 
opportunity, maritime support services are likely to be more concentrated at chokepoint ports.473 
These services help mitigate potential risks involved in traversing maritime chokepoints, which 
in the case of oil tankers could result in delays rippling across the global energy market.474 In 
accordance with this commercial reality, Chinese financial investments through the MSRI are 
arrayed along maritime chokepoints which happen to be critical for energy shipping along the 
Eurasian landmass. The Maritime Silk Road follows a SLOC beginning in the Mediterranean 
Sea, running through the Suez Canal and Strait of Hormuz, out through the Gulf of Aden, across 
the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, down through the Strait of Malacca, and up past the 
Gulf of Tonkin, where it meets the major ports on China’s coastline.475 
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Map 3: Visualization of the Maritime Silk Road 
 
Source: Michael J. Green et al., “China’s Maritime Silk Road: Strategic and Economic Implications for the 
Indo-Pacific Region,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2, 2018, 20, 
https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-maritime-silk-road.  
 
The PRC’s investments in key commercial ports along the MSRI extend CCP power and 
influence over Eurasia’s maritime chokepoints. Large MSRI projects have made the PRC the 
dominant investor in Greece’s Port of Piraeus, Egypt’s Suez Canal, Pakistan’s Gwadar Port, 
and Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port.476 With the large state-backed investment the PRC can direct 
to these port projects through the MSRI, the PRC can commercially dominate these ports with 
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capital-intensive infrastructure projects that raise barriers of entry for companies or countries 
competing for market share at the same port facilities.477  
The MSRI’s scope and scale indicate it is not a parochial or transient interest for the 
CCP: while weak disclosure requirements obfuscate the precise amount of Chinese investment 
in foreign ports, a Financial Times and King’s College London joint investigation estimates that 
companies from the PRC and Hong Kong have announced or completed agreements for 40 
overseas port projects worth approximately $45.6 billion between 2010 and 2017, with funding 
details for another dozen projects unannounced.478 Nor are strategically-positioned MSRI 
investments strictly an artefact of market demand for Chinese capital: an assessment from an 
official Marxist research center in the PRC describes strengthening PRC control over existing 
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Map 4: Maritime Silk Road Project Clusters Along Eurasian Chokepoints 
 




Current MSRI investments appear to presage Chinese dominance over global maritime 
shipping infrastructure. In early 2020, Isaac Kardon reported that PRC firms partially owned or 
operated 94 ports globally and had contracted projects developing the infrastructure of 
hundreds more.480 The ports partially owned or operated by Chinese firms are geographically 
dispersed, with an approximate distribution across the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans; 
among these, the greatest concentration in the greater IOR, to include the Mediterranean 
Sea.481 Cutting across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, Chinese port investments in Africa circle 
the continent and reach nearly every African country with a coastline.482  
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The commercial aspect of Chinese maritime influence is not satisfied with financial 
stakes across the world’s seaports; they must also be centrally linked. PRC policy since 1996 
has emphasized the integration of China’s domestic seaports into a cohesive system, defined 
not by “fragmented competition” [分散竞争] between the ports but rather “orderly cooperation” 
[有序协同], as a way to transform the PRC maritime shipping industry from “large” to “strong.”483 
Following a similar logic, PRC officials have championed a port cooperation system along the 
MSRI, for example by increasing Chinese contractors’ abilities to bid and work on foreign port 
projects; offering Chinese expertise for capacity building in port management; and advocating 
logistics information sharing through memoranda of understanding or the PRC Ministry of 
Transport’s LOGINK logistics information platform.484  
LOGINK joined the International Port Community Systems Association (IPCSA) in 2019, 
offering the Chinese government a membership in the global port systems community involved 
in setting international standards for shipping logistics, such as supply chain visibility.485 Media 
coverage of a report jointly produced by LOGINK, IPSCA, and the Chinese corporation Alibaba 
entitled “Enabling Logistics Visibility by Interconnecting Logistics Information Service Systems in 
a Standardised Way” recommends increasing data flows between port systems globally by 
standardizing the way they are connected—a service LOGINK provides by connecting ports in 
Southeast Asia across state borders.486  
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Should LOGINK’s services become standard in the commercial maritime shipping 
industry, the PRC Ministry of Transportation will have successfully formed a network structure 
by which it can asymmetrically derive and exert coercive economic power, imposing costs on 
other countries. Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman’s research into this sort of weaponized 
interdependence arising from economic globalization has found that networks such as LOGINK 
proposes have a “panopticon effect” whereby “states’ direct surveillance abilities may be 
radically outstripped by their capacity to tap into the information-gathering and information-
generating activities of networks of private actors,” in this case the ostensibly private port 
facilities transmitting data through a Chinese government network.487 Farrell and Newman find 
that “panopticon” capabilities confer decisive informational advantages, as exhibited by the 
USG’s own erstwhile panopticon in northern Virginia, which centralized much of the physical 
fiber optic cables supporting global internet transmissions and gave the USG unparalleled 
surveillance capabilities in the early stages of the Global War on Terror.488 LOGINK’s 
proliferation among Indo-Pacific ports and the PRC’s advocacy for its use to become a global 
standard would introduce a PRC panopticon capability to illicitly surveil and potentially coerce 
an adversary’s commercial maritime actors. 
Asymmetry: Latent Military Power of Chinese Commercial Systems Threaten Flow Security 
Systems such as LOGINK and the PRC’s commercial investment in civilian ports 
become even more strategically consequential given that the CCP’s military strategy considers 
civilian assets to have latent military purpose. The PLA has a critical operational asymmetry with 
the United States military insofar as PLA strategic documents explicitly call for mobilizing civilian 
systems to military purposes, matching a growing literature in which Chinese military analysts 
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describe civilian and military information systems as simply two facets within a single network 
domain. In times of crisis, the PLA may move beyond the commercial logic of maritime shipping 
and LOGINK’s potential panopticon surveillance capabilities, instead using such ostensibly 
civilian assets for overt military purposes. These are most prominent in the PLA’s effort to 
develop informatized warfare capabilities and to secure strategic strongpoints in place of 
overseas bases. 
Informatized Warfare. All PLA military strategic guidance released since 2004 define 
the character of future war to be “informatized” [信息化], in which information collection and 
distribution “shapes all aspects of society, including the economy and governance, as well as 
warfare.”489 PLA NDU Vice President and editor of the NDU version of the Science of Military 
Strategy Lt. General Xiao Tianliang [肖天亮] described the “essential character” [本质特征] of 
informatized war to be “systems confrontation”490 [体系对抗] between systems of digitally 
interlinked platforms.491 PLA strategists assert that military conflict under the framework of 
informatized war inextricably entangles civilian networks into systems confrontation.  
The 2013 AMS Science of Military Strategy, for example, calls for building a modern 
military system by “residing the military within the civilian” [寓军于民], referring to concealing 
military purpose and capabilities under the veneer of civilian labels.492 Similarly, PLA literature 
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describes civilian and military information systems as existing within a single “network domain” 
whereby “military and civilian spheres are not distinct; in fact, they constantly intersect.”493  
As such, the PLA’s discussion of systems confrontation includes an information warfare 
component which targets an adversary’s civilian networks, such as civil infrastructure or 
commercial entities, potentially with Chinese civilian networks.494 An adversary’s seaports 
integrated with a PRC Ministry of Transportation information system such as LOGINK provides 
the PLA precisely this opportunity to marshal ostensibly civilian government resources to 
damage the adversary covertly or overtly. Without specifying LOGINK in particular, the USG 
appears attuned to the threat the CCP poses to U.S. maritime infrastructure, describing the 
PRC as “a persistent cyber espionage threat to the United States military, economy, and critical 
infrastructure” in its 2020 National Maritime Cybersecurity Plan on cybersecurity risks in critical 
ship and port systems.495 
LOGINK is the most high-profile case of a civilian asset along the MSRI which may be 
harnessed to coercive or military effect, but it is not the only one. A Chinese SOE has is also 
building what it calls the “Blue Ocean Information Network” [蓝海信息网络] composed of 
permanent maritime sensors collecting and relaying hydrographic, meteorological, and marine 
traffic data to the SOE. PLA researchers have noted the potential value of this system, which 
effectively provides near-permanent real-time maritime domain awareness,496 for naval 
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operations. Corporate officials of the SOE running the Blue Ocean Information Network aspire 
to proliferate these sensors along the MSRI by 2035 and globally by 2050.  497  
The CCP also makes use of space-based assets for maritime domain awareness. The 
PRC operates a robust constellation of reconnaissance satellites, many of which are dedicated 
to the task of monitoring maritime spaces. Most important are the Haiyang ocean observation 
satellites and the Yaogan reconnaissance satellites.498 Although Chinese state media describe 
these satellites as having scientific research functions, they also comprise a critical link in the 
PLA’s situational awareness; triangulating ship location and tracking their movements are 
capabilities that are as useful for missile targeting as they are for scientific research.499 The 
bureaucracy of space policy in the PRC supports the assessment that military resides within the 
civilian with regard to space policy as well. The PLA Strategic Support Force, which is 
responsible for the PLA’s capabilities regarding space, cyber, electronic warfare, and 
psychological warfare, and other military bodies have important oversight roles in most of the 
PRC’s space activities; Alex Bowe assesses that the PRC’s “space policy in effect allows 
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Beijing to continue developing military space capabilities while publicly claiming to oppose 
militarization of space.”500 
Strategic Strongpoints. PRC investments along the MSRI also confer physical power 
projection benefits to the PLA. PLA strategists describe building “strategic strongpoints” [战略支
点] overseas that rely upon the Mainland, radiate to China’s periphery, and goes toward the Two 
Oceans region to provide support for overseas military operations or to act as a forward base for 
deploying military forces.501 While no official definition for “strategic strongpoint” exists, Chinese 
officials have used the term to describe foreign ports with strategic value,502 including civilian 
ports along the MSRI.503 Seaports along the MSRI with significant Chinese investment or which 
are owned or operated by Chinese firms are thus able to covertly provide peacetime logistics 
and intelligence capabilities even without formal military access agreements with the host 
country;504 a 2010 National Defense Mobilization Law and 2016 National Defense 
Transportation Law require key construction projects, including seaports along the MSRI, to be 
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built to military standards and further financially incentivize the private firms undertaking these 
projects to make additional contributions to national defense mobilization.505 
By situating the military within the civilian, the PRC’s consolidation of commercial power 
along the MSRI conceals latent military capabilities whereby the PLA is able to make use of 
ostensibly commercial investments to military benefit at critical maritime chokepoints along the 
island chains which make up Asia’s decisive terrain. CCP and PLA officials appear to treat overt 
commercial maritime and latent naval power as an original Chinese approach to sea power 
distinct from the Mahanian tradition; reflecting this position, some analysts, such as NDU 
Professor and PLAN Colonel Liang Feng [梁芳], have assessed the USG as being overly reliant 
on military tools to secure SLOCs to destabilizing effect.506 To that end, strategic PRC 
investments along the MSRI does not appear to pose a traditional sea power threat of a rising 
expeditionary navy challenging a dominant maritime hegemon.507 
The emergent commercial and latent military influence that the CCP accrues through 
strategic investments along the MSRI pose a threat to U.S. and global flow security. Global 
flows refer to: 1) the functional flows of international trade and travel making possible supply 
chains, technology transfer, and political exchange across state borders; and 2) the global 
ecosystems such as oceanic currents or atmospheric circulation making these flows possible.508 
The functional global flows most pertinent for security considerations are overwhelmingly 
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maritime, with global air traffic tightly entwined with maritime traffic through global SLOCs.509 
Global flows and the interstate interdependencies which arise thereby are made possible by the 
heavily-accessed but unowned global commons, which are for the same reasons highly 
vulnerable to exogenous shocks, such as overexploitation by free riders.510  
The PRC’s MSRI investments are more deeply integrating the CCP into the system of 
global maritime flows, with greatest emphasis on investments near strategic Eurasian 
chokepoints, increasing the system’s vulnerability to CCP policy.511 In this case, some projects 
along the MSRI make global maritime flows susceptible to PRC interference should the CCP 
elect to dominate maritime chokepoints with the commercial or latent military power it is building 
and disrupt the maritime flow of goods and resources to the United States. The PRC is 
approaching a position of power over the United States that the U.S. already holds over the 
PRC: Chinese vulnerability to the U.S. in the case of the Malacca Dilemma is precisely an issue 
of PRC maritime flow security.  
USG and CCP patterns of behavior with regard to the maritime commons suggest the 
CCP may be more willing to directly disrupt U.S. maritime flow security than the USG would to 
the PRC. Both states appear willing to ignore international law in pursuit of domestic interests. 
For example, both the U.S. and PRC have hedged against fully endorsing UNCLOS, which in 
governing maritime commons offers a framework for sustaining global maritime flows:512 the 
United States has not ratified UNCLOS at all for reasons described in Section V, and the PRC 
lacks a provision to incorporate international agreements into domestic law, seemingly flouting 
UNCLOS despite having ratified it by adopting controversial and widely-criticized legal positions 
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to assert that UNCLOS has no bearing on some of its maritime disputes.513 Still, the USG’s 
demonstrated interest is to maintain dominance along Asia’s decisive terrain by maintaining a 
robust array of regional allies and partners in part through the provision of public goods, such as 
by protecting free maritime transit in the region.514 By contrast, the PRC’s interpretation of 
international law are distinctly at odds with that of nearly all UNCLOS ratifiers and of the United 
States; Carla Freeman’s research shows that Beijing adopts a “situational” approach to high 
seas governance, whereby PRC policy toward an international agreement “depend upon 
Beijing’s assessment of how a given regime relates to its national goals and ambitions.”515 The 
CCP has demonstrated clear resolve in its opportunistic approach to maritime behavior, and 
strategic MSRI investments building Chinese commercial and latent military power along 
maritime chokepoints and key SLOCs increase the achievable range of the CCP’s opportunism. 
Naval Power 
The most obvious indicator of CCP maritime transformation is the development of the 
PLA Navy. A regime’s navy is its most direct tool for exerting sea power, and Mahan observed 
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that “the history of sea power…is largely a military history.”516 This is not to equate sea power or 
naval power strictly to warfighting. As Ken Booth’s framework details, navies have military, 
diplomatic, and constabulary functions across wartime and peacetime. Under this framework, a 
navy uses the “currency” of “actual or latent violence” by threatening or using force to military 
ends, such as by changing the balance of power in a theater with its presence,517 to lend a hard 
edge to the regime’s broader policy.518 This currency of emergent or latent naval violence 
assists in achieving the regime’s diplomatic objectives by reassuring allies and partners while 
threatening adversaries, with the navy’s margin of military superiority positively correlated to its 
regime’s credibility with states it would assure against other threats.519 As the U.S. margin of 
military superiority diminishes, so too does U.S. strategic influence as doubts about the United 
States’ ability to deter and defeat shared adversaries proliferate allied capitals.520  
The erosion of the U.S. Navy’s overmatching capacity and capability is deleterious to 
U.S. strategic influence and maritime peace. Sara Mitchell’s research uses the Issue Correlates 
of War dataset to find that “states with greater naval capabilities make more claims to offshore 
maritime areas and employ more coercive strategies unless they face countries with similar 
naval strength.”521 Mitchell’s research showed that U.S. naval power, measured in terms of U.S. 
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armed conflict. Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 282-284. 
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allies and partners, see Glenn Snyder’s discussion of reputational values, wherein a state’s security guarantee turns 
also on its capability to deliver on this guarantee. Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
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naval tonnage as a proportion of world naval tonnage, is inversely correlated with the number of 
maritime claims522 worldwide.523 The implication is clear: while it lasted, global U.S. naval 
overmatch was an important contribution to global maritime stability.  
Figure 10: U.S. Proportion of Global Naval Tonnage and Number of Ongoing Maritime 
Claims 
 
Source: Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, “Clashes at Sea: Explaining the Onset, Militarization, and Resolution 
of Diplomatic Maritime Claims,” Security Studies 29, no. 4, 637-670, 655, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2020.1811458.  
 
In this way, developing PLAN capabilities challenge U.S. strategic influence. The CCP’s 
pursuit of a world-class military has peacetime implications which threaten U.S. interests 
regardless of any actual outbreak of armed conflict. This section overviews trends and 
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asymmetries in the observable hardware—the tons, guns, and naval aviation—pertinent to the 
USG-CCP naval balance.  
Trend: PLAN Modernization: More Hulls, Better Missiles 
Ongoing PLA modernization is eroding U.S. naval primacy in the Indo-Pacific by 
shrinking the gap in capabilities, where the U.S. continues to lead, and growing the gap in force 
size, where the PLAN has overtaken the U.S. Navy. PLAN modernization involves a buildup 
which is overtaking the U.S. Navy by hulls and displacement. As of December 2020, DOD 
estimates the PLAN to operate a naval battle force524 of approximately 360 ships compared to 
the U.S. Navy’s battle force of 297.525 The Office of Naval Intelligence anticipates that the PLAN 
battle force will grow to 425 vessels by 2030, adding approximately 55 surface combatants and 
10 submarines over the next ten years.526 The PLAN’s warship preponderance is sharpened by 
disparity in U.S. Navy and PLAN operational theaters; although the PLAN endeavors for extra-
regional, possibly global power projection, its core operations remain within the First Island 
Chain, while the Indo-Pacific is only a priority theater within a global area of responsibility for the 
U.S. Navy.527 While nearly all of the PLAN aside from forces based in Djibouti can be expected 
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Figure 11: Office of Naval Intelligence Estimates of U.S. Navy and PLAN Battle Force, 
2005-2020 
 
Source: Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—
Background and Issues for Congress RL33153, Congressional Research Service, December 17, 2020, 
32, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33153. 
 
Nor can PLAN warships be discounted as low-quality platforms which would fare poorly 
in a high-intensity engagement with U.S. forces. As shown in Figure 12, Chinese naval 
shipbuilding by hulls and by full load displacement has consistently outpaced that of the U.S. 
Navy since 2011. Moreover, As shown in Figure 13, taking displacement as a crude metric for 
warship capabilities—and assuming that the density of combat power is approximate on modern 
warships—PLAN warships are comparable to those of the U.S. Navy. 
These figures also show the PLAN’s superior firepower dispersal; the tonnage of ships 
the U.S. Navy commissioned since 1999 is largely concentrated among its destroyers, and the 
service commissioned only a handful of corvette-styled littoral combat ships (LCS) over the past 
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two decades.529 By contrast, half of the surface combatants the PLAN commissioned each year 
since 2013 have been corvettes, dispersing PLAN surface firepower across a greater number of 
smaller ships. A surface fleet dispersing its firepower across greater numbers of vessels 
diminishes the damage that each of an adversary’s attacks’ can do to the fleet’s aggregate 
striking power, a clear benefit if an adversary has limited munitions and cannot simply target all 
ships indiscriminately.530 The U.S. battlefleet is heavily comprised of destroyers and cruisers 
equipped with the Aegis combat system531 and are densely equipped with weaponry to fulfill 
multimission roles; the loss of a single ship would be, by design, a significant loss to the U.S. 
fleet’s aggregate firepower.532 The U.S. Navy has over the past decade discussed and begun 
adopting a Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) concept to reverse this pattern, but 
reshaping the U.S. naval force structure will be a decades-long process; the U.S. Navy only 
awarded its first contract to build the first of a new class of guided missile frigates in 2020 as an 
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Figure 12: U.S. Navy and PLAN Surface Combatants and Aircraft Carriers Commissioned, 
1999-2020
 
Source: Jane’s Fighting Ships, accessed December 10, 2020. 
 
Figure 13: Full Load Displacement of U.S. Navy and PLAN Surface Combatants 
Commissioned, 1999-2020 
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A rough comparison of naval missile capacity and range also demonstrates PLAN 
warship competitiveness against U.S. Navy warships. The U.S. Navy’s DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-
class and DDG-1000 Zumwalt-class destroyers are equipped with 96-cell and 80-cell vertical 
launch systems (VLS) respectively.534 The PLAN’s Type 052D and Type 055 guided missile 
destroyers have 64 and 112 cells, respectively.535 With these four warship classes, the U.S. 
Navy retains a preponderant advantage: the U.S. Navy’s budget for Fiscal Year 2020 projects a 
total force of 68 DDG-51s and two DDG-1000s.536 As of the end of 2019, the PLAN has 
launched 23 Type 052Ds and 5 Type 055s.537 As the USG continues building DDG-51 Arleigh 
Burkes and the PLAN continues its run of Type 055s—to a total of at least 8 but rumored to 
grow to 24 within the next few years—the balance of total VLS capacity will shift toward the 
PLAN.538 
The PLAN is likely to maintain if not expand its larger force size through its advantages 
in shipbuilding. DOD finds that the PRC “is the top ship-producing nation in the world by 
tonnage and is increasing its shipbuilding capacity and capability for all naval classes.”539 The 
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PRC backs its shipbuilders with direct financing and subsidies, expanding the industry fourfold 
between 2010 and 2019.540 State-owned enterprises, led by the dominant China Shipbuilding 
Group, conduct the majority of Chinese commercial and military shipbuilding,541 and SOE 
dominance in both sectors supports the transfer of dual-use technologies through commercial 
channels to benefit PLA assets.542 
The Chinese defense industrial base’s shipbuilding capacity is a significant concern for 
U.S. military planners. First, the PLA defense industrial base’s shipbuilding capacity indicates 
that PLAN force structure is all but certain to maintain if not grow its advantage in surface fleet 
size. As shown in Figure 14, USG analysis projects an ascendant PLAN force structure while 
the U.S. Navy directs its efforts toward changing its composition from large surface combatants 
to small surface combatants. A second concern for U.S. military planners is the PLAN’s greater 
capacity for ship replacement in the event of a protracted conflict. Marine Commandant Gen. 
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shipbuilding capacity, will leave the United States “on the losing end of a production race—
reversing the advantage we had in World War II when we last fought a peer competitor.”543 
Figure 14: Projected U.S. Navy and PLAN Surface Fleets, 2020-2050 
 
Source: various.544  
 
Despite the PRC’s shipbuilding capacity, the PLA’s ability to maintain these vessels has 
not yet been tested at scale; the PLA’s defense industrial base had not needed to maintain a 
fleet at its current size and sophistication heretofore.545 Chinese state media indicates that 
environmental logistics such as managing corrosion on equipment at sea remains a challenge 
to be researched for the PLAN. For example, even following a 2018 research forum dedicated 
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to controlling corrosion on naval equipment and a comprehensive 2019 redesign of PLAN 
corrosion control policies, the PLA Naval Academy’s research director Cao Jingyi [曹京宜] 
reported in 2020 that the PLAN strategy to combat corrosion remains a superficial and 
piecemeal effort which begins protecting equipment too late to be effective.546 Similarly, PLA 
engineers and analysts have found the storage and management of damage control equipment 
aboard warships to be “irrational”: inadequate storage space leads to damage control 
equipment being strewn about the vessels, leak-plugging equipment are not updated or 
renewed to match vessel facility upgrades, and damage control procedures are not centrally 
coordinated.547 These shortcomings do not indicate a clear U.S. Navy advantage; the Navy’s 
Board of Inspection and Survey’s 2020 Annual Report evaluated U.S. Navy surface ships as 
“DEGRADED” in 11 of 21 functional areas, including key warfighting functions such as anti-
submarine warfare, weapons systems, Aegis weapons systems, and aviation.548  
More important for determining naval lethality is the PLAN’s decisive missile advantage. 
Any kinetic conflict in the near seas will involve an asymmetry of forces, weighing the 
capabilities of the part of the U.S. Navy deployed to the Indo-Pacific against the PLAN, the 
CCP’s paranaval forces, and the PLA’s shore-based firepower.549 PLA naval modernization has 
included a decades-long effort to improve the precision, range, and versatility of the PLA’s ship- 
and shore-launched missiles. Type 052D and 055 destroyers are equipped with HQ-9 surface-
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to-air missiles (SAM) with an operational range equivalent to the U.S. Navy’s currently deployed 
SM-2 SAM; protected from aerial assault behind the HQ-9’s threat envelope, PLAN 052D and 
055 destroyers can use the YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM), which boasts an operational 
range of 290 nautical miles, dramatically beyond the U.S. equivalent Harpoon’s 70nm range.550  
The navies’ ASCM gap will persist for years: the Office of Naval Intelligence first 
confirmed in 2015 that the YJ-18 ASCM entered service with the PLAN, while as of 2020, U.S. 
long-range options have a shorter reach or remain in testing stages.551 The much-trumpeted 
naval strike missile is only estimated to range above 100nm.552 The still-developing SM-6 
missile, which is marketed as capable across antiair, anti-surface, and ballistic-missile missions, 
has a projected upper operation range of 200nm, still leaving a 90nm ASCM missile gap against 
a YJ-18.553 The Lockheed Martin long-range anti-ship missile (LRASM) similarly has a 200nm 
range; worse, the U.S. armed forces have only ordered 121 LRASMs across three 
procurements, accumulating only enough missiles to use against high-priority targets.554  
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Raytheon’s Block V Tomahawk promises the ability to strike surface ships at a range 
between 675nm and 1350nm.555 If successful, the Block V will reverse the ASCM gap until the 
PLA reveals a YJ-18 successor. The U.S. Navy first tested the Block V Tomahawk on 
November 30, 2020, and additional tests are likely before Raytheon is able to deliver the 
missiles to the Navy, scheduled for some time in 2021.556 Details remain unclear as to whether 
the initial run of Block V Tomahawks will have the 675nm to 1350nm operational range or 
whether that will be deferred until a future delivery of Block Va and Vb Tomahawks; the former 
includes an upgraded target seeker, while the latter features improved warhead penetration, but 
testing and delivery timelines for either remain unspecified.557  
Asymmetry: Land-Based Sea Denial and the PLAN Fortress Fleet 
As long as the conflict theater remains the Indo-Pacific, the PLA maintains a significant 
advantage in sustaining its missile gap against the U.S. armed forces in the form of land-based 
firepower. This includes both shore-based systems, such as the 270nm ranging YJ-62 and YJ-
12B ASCMs, and ballistic missile systems that, with longer ranges, can be placed deeper inland 
behind PLA antiair defenses.558 PLA land-based firepower is a means of sea denial559 to contest 
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U.S. sea control in the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. armed forces have historically enjoyed hegemonic 
control over global strategic geography, which allowed it to rapidly project military power across 
the global commons—notably oceans and the airspace above them—and wage war against 
adversaries anywhere in the world on short notice even without a local military presence.560 In a 
distant maritime theater such as the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. faces a disadvantage in the land it 
has available for basing fleets and placing firepower, while the PLA asymmetrically benefits 
from a greater ability to integrate land power and sea power.  
U.S. naval theory prioritizes naval mobility in combat and cautions against compromising 
an erstwhile advantage by tethering themselves to fortifications on land or by engaging without 
decisive force any land-based opponents, which are typically capable of generating a rate of fire 
per unit, in a fixed geographic point.561 Mahan himself derided the Russian Navy of 1905 as a 
“fortress fleet” adopting a “radically erroneous” approach to naval warfare for geographically 
circumscribing its mobility to the limits of its shore-based fire support.562 The late Wayne 
Hughes, who taught naval warfare for more than thirty years at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate 
School, similarly observed that naval commanders “historically have sought to avoid having to 
fight in front of fortifications,” and modern naval officers should attempt to win a conflict “without 
having to confront the forts” or defeating them only “by finding an Achilles’ heel.”563 By contrast, 
PLA strategists describe “using the land to control the sea” [以陆制海] precisely to exploit the 
strategic benefits of augmenting a local navy with shore-based fire.564 As previously noted, this 
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land-centric framing of PLA strategy is endorsed by the PLA Academy of Military Sciences, 
whose 2013 Science of Military Strategy describes continental China as the “support and 
backstop” [本土为依托] from which power radiates to the “focal point” of the Indo-Pacific [两样地
区为重点].565  
Given technological advances, notably increased range and precision allowing ballistic 
missiles to strike targets thousands of nautical miles out at sea, Mahan’s criticism—and by 
extension, U.S. naval theory—appears outdated.566 The PLA’s DF-class ballistic missiles567 and 
the strategic depth they confer preserve PLAN mobility by extending a broad threat envelope 
thousands of nautical miles beyond China’s shores. Chinese media has been explicit about the 
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threat its land-based ballistic missiles pose to the United States; it referred to the DF-21D 
medium-range anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) as a “carrier killer” upon reveal in 2017 and 
similarly referred to its DF-26 intermediate-range ASBM variably as a “carrier killer” or a “Guam 
killer” missile, suggesting the missiles have the range and precision necessary to target U.S. 
military facilities on Guam or U.S. carrier strike groups.568 PLA analysts publish what Yoshihara 
and Holmes describe as a “real and intensifying interest in striking Aegis combatants at sea as a 
part of a broader anticarrier strategy,” for example in published research articles considering 
precisely how many and what sort of missile attacks would disable or sink an Arleigh Burke 
destroyer.569  
The CCP appears keenly aware of the threat its shore-based ASBMs pose to the U.S. 
Navy: the PLARF fired DF-21D and DF-26 missiles into the South China Sea on August 26, 
2020, which state-run media described as a gesture to deter U.S. military provocations along 
China’s periphery.570 Another report noted that the PLARF is expanding is DF-26 brigades and 
will likely position them where their extended reach can deter U.S. activities east of Guam while 
remaining far enough inland that the U.S. would be forced to resort to nuclear strikes to destroy 
the DF-26 launchers.571 PLA and U.S. officers appear convinced of the PLARF’s ability to strike 
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vessels at extended ranges: retired senior colonel Wang Xiangsui [王湘穗] reportedly said that 
the August 2020 ASBM tests successfully hit a moving ship.572 In November 2020, Commander 
of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command ADM Phil Davidson suggests that the PLA’s so-called “carrier 
killer” missiles are misleadingly nicknamed because, rather than targeting a specific type of 
vessel, “they’re targeting everything.”573 The PLARF has not rested easy on its existing anti-ship 
capabilities and is likely pairing ongoing expansions in PLARF capacity with more advanced 
missiles able to strike ships still further out from Guam.574 
In addition to range and precision, the PLARF has the ballistic missile capacity to protect 
its fortress fleet. In 2020, DOD reported that the PLARF fields 150 MRBM launchers and 200 
IRBM launchers;575 the standard IRBM launcher is expected to have 0-1 reloads, while a 
standard MRBM launcher may have 0-2 reloads, indicating the PLARF has the capacity to 
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discharge between 350 and 850 ASBMs in short order.576 The PLARF’s sheer ASBM capacity, 
able to allocate 1-3 ASBMs per ship in the U.S. Navy battle force at a low-end range of 540nm, 
diminishes the need to identify and prioritize targets in the event of a kinetic maritime conflict 
with negative implications for the U.S. Navy’s DMO concept. 
The PLA’s pursuit and cultivation of a missile gap, driven by ship-launched ASCMs and 
shore-based ASBMs, constitutes an effective sea denial capability that contests the U.S. Navy’s 
ability to exercise sea control in the Indo-Pacific.577 The erosion of U.S. primacy in the Indo-
Pacific is certain to undermine U.S. security guarantees and otherwise affect U.S. strategic 
influence: navies accrue and exert influence by exhibiting warfighting capability and agreeable 
intentions, and the U.S. Navy must for the foreseeable future maintain U.S. influence in the 
Indo-Pacific under the shadow of PLARF conventional precision strikes.578 While influence 
cannot be precisely measured, a downward trajectory for U.S. influence corresponding to its 
military balance in the region is likely.  
The USG is keenly aware of how the PLA’s missile superiority has shifted the Indo-
Pacific military balance. The DOD 2020 Tri-Service Maritime Strategy, guiding the United 
States’ Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard in global maritime competition, clearly articulates 
that the CCP is actively working to diminish the U.S. margin of military superiority at sea—
successfully so: 
 
China has implemented a strategy and revisionist approach that aims at the heart of the 
United States’ maritime power. It seeks to corrode international maritime governance, 
deny access to traditional logistical hubs, inhibit freedom of the seas, control use of key 
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chokepoints, deter our engagement in regional disputes, and displace the United States 
as the preferred partner in countries around the world… 
 
China’s and Russia’s aggressive naval growth and modernization are eroding U.S. 
military advantages. Unchecked, these trends will leave the Naval Service 
unprepared to ensure our advantage at sea and protect national interests within 
the next decade.579 
 
A key pillar of DOD’s response has been to seek new operational concepts to arrest this 
apparent decline.580 U.S. Naval strategy since the Cold War has attempted to use and sustain 
its dominant position of being able to assert local sea control anywhere in the world; sea control 
remained a U.S. Navy imperative as of the two maritime strategies preceding the 2020 Tri-
Service Maritime Strategy.581 The 2020 strategy settled on operational concepts combining 
“distributed fleet operations and mobile, expeditionary formations with sea control and sea 
denial capabilities” by making use of both “sea-based and land-based fires” to mass combat 
power despite an adversary’s missile threat envelope.582 Said differently, the U.S. is shifting 
from operational concepts informed by traditional Mahanian sea power to instead “using the 
land to control the sea.”583  
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By adopting a fortress fleet approach to sea denial and integrating its sea power with 
land-based assets, the PLA has successfully forced the U.S. sea forces to either adopt a land-
sea integrated sea denial approach of its own along China’s periphery or pull back from the 
theater altogether. Given that sea control is typically exercised by a dominant power against a 
weaker one, parity between the U.S. Navy and PLAN within the conflict theater will likely make 
sea denial rather than sea control the salient naval operation. Correspondingly, the PLAN’s 
ability to seize and exert sea control in wartime within and beyond the Second Island Chain 
remains uncertain. The PLA’s missile gap imposes significant costs on regional adversaries but 
does little to cultivate influence if for no other reason than diplomacy is more easily conducted 
with regular port visits, mil-mil contacts, and joint exercises than at the end of a missile. 
Trend: Outgrowth of PLAN Aviation Toward Sea Control 
The PLAN appears to be building the aviation capabilities needed to establish sea 
control along China’s periphery. Even without a near-peer challenge, the PLAN surface fleet 
would not likely be able to achieve regional sea control without command of maritime 
airspace.584 PLAN aviation currently plays a limited role in the existing Indo-Pacific naval 
balance, with most of the naval air fleet being land-based. Ongoing PLAN operationalization of 
its first aircraft carriers, with plans for additional construction, is converting PLA naval aviation 
from a land-based force to an increasingly sea-based one, adding a new domain to the naval 
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The PLAN carrier production schedule dictates when and how other PLAN aviation 
capabilities develop. As of 2020, the PLAN operates two ski jump carriers able to field a fighter 
force equivalent to an airborne brigade when operating in conjunction;586 DOD notes that the 
PLA expects a third carrier to enter service by 2023 and be operational by 2024.587 Though no 
official carrier production plans are publicly available, Chinese media has long published rumors 
that the PLAN aims to grow its fleet up to six carriers.588 The third carrier, currently in 
production, and all produced thereafter are reported to feature jet-launching catapults, and while 
the third carrier will likely be conventionally powered, some future carriers are likely to be 
nuclear-powered.589 
The PLAN is modernizing its naval air fleet in anticipation of its coming carrier fleet. The 
current PLAN aviation force remains small, reflecting the extended production timelines of 
aircraft carriers: only 24 J-15 fixed-wing carrier aircraft are confirmed, and “approximately” that 
figure has been produced; the number of naval aviators present at a recent carrier 
commissioning ceremony appear to confirm the limited force size.590 A second reason the PLAN 
has maintained a comparatively small J-15 fleet is its planned carrier aircraft modernization. A 
modified variant of the multirole FC-31 stealth fighter, sometimes called the J-31, is likely to 
replace the J-15 as the PLAN’s primary carrier-deployed fixed-wing aircraft.591 Although public 
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indicators point to the FC-31 with significant confidence, some conflicting indicators continue to 
suggest that the comparatively heavier J-20 stealth fighter will also be deployed for carrier 
operations.592 The PLAN does not appear to be preparing to operationalize the J-20 for carrier 
operations, however, given PLAAF dominance in J-20 production and the PLAN’s preference for 
one multimission fighter tailored to PLAN missions, for which the J-20—designed for contesting 
air superiority with minimal ground attack capabilities—is only a partial fit.593 
Either choice would be a significant improvement over the current carrier-operated J-15, 
an air superiority fighter modeled off the Russian Su-33. The J-15 is more heavily armed and 
has operational ranges and altitudes well beyond those of the U.S. F-18E and F-35 but is 
severely undercut by its incompatibility with catapult launch systems, which necessitate a lower 
fuel carriage and weapons payload for carrier takeoff.594 Notably, the J-15 only features stopgap 
means such as graphene coatings for radar evasion.595 Unlike the J-15, the FC-31596 is 
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designed to be a multi-role fighter capable of air combat, ground assault, and routine air 
patrols.597 Other improvements include an electromagnetic aircraft launch system and improved 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) technology.598  
Though current PLAN aviation mission sets remain immature, they appear inclined 
toward securing regional sea control. Official Chinese strategic guidance defines PLAN aviators’ 
primary mission as protecting Chinese waters and maritime airspace through “offensive strike, 
air defense, maritime reconnaissance and patrol, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and anti-
surface warfare (ASuW),” with future mission sets likely to include blue water operations.599 
While maritime strike and ISR have been the primary tasks for which PLAN aviation trained, 
since 2015, training operations have increasingly included surface fleet support and defensive 
counterair in realistic conflict conditions, developing capabilities needed to match Japanese or 
U.S. sea forces.600 This training has almost entirely originated from airfields, however, and how 
PLAN aviation training will adapt to carrier operations remains to be seen. 
Developments in PLAN carriers and carrier aviation foster increased power projection 
capabilities, which would for the first time make the PLAN capable of enforcing an air defense 
identification zone (ADIZ) over large swaths of airspace over the South China Sea, which 
Chinese officials have repeatedly suggested is a likely, if yet-unenforceable, objective. In 2016, 
A PRC Ministry of National Defense spokesperson described the Chinese decision to enforce 
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an ADIZ over the South China Sea as depending on “the threat that China faces in the air,” 
which spokespersons from Ministry of Foreign Affairs have since reiterated.601  
The PLAN currently lacks adequate infrastructure for enforcing a South China Sea ADIZ. 
Though the PLAN has access to its three increasingly-militarized artificial island bases in the 
South China Sea, each ostensibly able to base 24 aircraft, the harsh maritime environment of 
these bases are highly corrosive to stationed aircraft.602 Radomes likely housing radar and 
communications equipment on the islands imply the PLA has meaningful maritime domain 
awareness and ISR capabilities over the South China Sea,603 but sailors stationed at these 
bases are not well-trained in their operation.604 Moreover, 45.1 percent of PLAN sailors 
stationed in the island base report symptoms of poor mental health, diminishing force 
readiness.605 Current PLAN basing in the South China Sea is inadequate to enforce an ADIZ.  
These limitations would be largely resolved with carrier deployments. Mobile carriers can 
conduct patrols well beyond the limits of three island bases. Catapult-launched FC-31 are 
expected to have combat radiuses of 648nm using only internal fuel, comparable to the F-35C’s 
670nm radius.606 While the FC-31 cannot match the F-35 in stealth or combat capabilities, 
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PLAN aviation’s strategic imperative in enforcing an ADIZ has as much of a peacetime 
component as a wartime one: enforcing an ADIZ is effectively enforcing sovereignty over 
disputed waters and territories, and no South China Sea territorial claimant features a navy or 
air force capable of engaging the PLAN.  
Realizing these capabilities requires first overcoming problems in the PRC’s aeroengine 
manufacturing program, which longtime intelligence analyst Lonnie Henley describes as an 
“ongoing disaster.”607 PLA aeroengine manufacturers have yet to master several key 
components and technologies necessary for producing advanced jet fighters; foremost among 
them is the metallurgy of creating resilient turbine blades able to tolerate the high temperatures 
and pressure associated with an advanced jet engine.608 As a result, the PLA’s jet engines do 
not produce the anticipated thrust and have been known to explode during tests.609  
Asymmetry: CCP Paranaval Forces and Gray Zone Activities 
In addition to a navy and its burgeoning aviation wing, the CCP employs two sea forces 
to assert its interests in China’s near seas: the paranaval CCG and PAFMM. The CCG and 
PAFMM operate similarly to the PLAN but modify Booth’s framework of navies having military, 
diplomatic, and constabulary functions by extending a military threat only as a proxy of the 
PLAN and eschewing diplomatic functions altogether. By filling the strategic space of China’s 
near seas with paranaval forces and directing them to conduct gray zone operations (those that 
leverage nonmilitary tools to achieve competitive objectives through activities falling below the 
escalation threshold for open war), the CCP increases its ability to exercise sea control on 
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China’s maritime periphery against Southeast Asian countries while mitigating the likelihood of 
an adversary’s military response.610 In this way, the CCP’s paranaval forces have effectively 
introduced a new threat to Southeast Asian countries against which U.S. security guarantees 
have been largely ineffective. 
The CCP deploys its paranaval services in constabulary roles to assert CCP sovereignty 
in China’s near seas, maintaining administrative presence and taking coercive action against 
U.S. allies and partners to great effect.611 The anatomy of threat is simple and involves each 
service: the PAFMM initiates with aggressive maneuvers but “no force,” followed by CCG 
vessels “to demonstrate state commitment and add nonlethal coercion if necessary,” backed by 
the threat of the PLAN looming over the horizon.612 With these and similar tactics, the CCP has: 
maintained a constant paranaval presence around disputed features in the South China Sea;613 
harassed the vessels and platforms of neighboring countries attempting to extract energy 
resources;614 intimidated neighboring countries attempting to construct facilities on features in 
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the South China Sea;615 forced Japan’s maritime and air Self-Defense Forces to repeatedly 
mobilize frequently enough to erode combat readiness;616 protected the PRC distant water 
fishing fleets’ illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing activities against enforcement from the 
maritime law enforcement of other countries;617 and outright seized Scarborough Shoal from 
Philippine administration.618 Likely because all of these activities employ ostensibly constabulary 
rather than military force, the U.S. has only on rare occasion deployed military force to check 
CCG or PAFMM activity.619 Without the tools for proportional response to CCG/PAFMM gray 
zone coercion, the USG is less able to reassure allies and partners of the value of a U.S. 
security guarantees.620 
CCP policies since 2005 have increased paranaval capacity and militarization. The CCG 
benefitted from a ship construction program between 2010 and 2017 that more than doubled its 
offshore-capable vessels (displacing 500 tons or more) to 225—more coast guard hulls than 
those operated by China’s Southeast Asian neighbors combined.621 The CCG’s offshore-
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capable vessels are supported at over 200 CCG facilities, 40 of which are large bases able to 
accommodate offshore-capable patrol ships.622 
Table 3: China Coast Guard Force Levels By Ship Displacement, 2005-2020623 
FORCE LEVEL (VESSEL TYPE 
AND DISPLACEMENT IN TONS) 
2005 2010 2017 2020 
OCEANGOING PATROL SHIP 
(2,500-10,000) 
3 5 55 60 
REGIONAL PATROL SHIPS (1,000-
2,499) 
25 30 70 80 
REGIONAL PATROL 
COMBATANTS (500-999) 
30 65 100 120 
COASTAL PATROL CRAFT (100-
499) 
350 400 450 450 
INSHORE PATROL BOATS/MINOR 
CRAFT (<100) 
500+ 500+ 600+ 600+ 
TOTAL 900+ 1,000+ 1,275+ 1,300+ 
Source: Joshua Hickey, Andrew S. Erickson, and Henry Holst, “China Maritime Law Enforcement Surface 
Platforms: Order of Battle, Capabilities, and Trends,” in China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations, eds. 
Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2019), 110. 
 
While estimates for PAFMM size are not readily available in the open source, satellite 
technology has revealed as many as 300 fishing boats likely to be PAFMM vessels at PRC-held 
islands in the South China Sea; similarly, as many as 91 PAFMM vessels have surged near 
Philippines-administered Thitu Island within a day.624 These figures likely account for only a 
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fishermen, and boat fuel since at least 2013.625 In 2015, the PRC NPC promulgated the 
Technical Standards for New Civilian Ships to Implement National Defense Requirements [新造
民船贯彻国防要求技术标准] requiring all civilian ships to be built to military standards, which 
Chinese state media reported will “enable China to convert the considerable potential of its 
civilian fleet into military strength and will greatly enhance the PLA's strategic projection and 
maritime support capabilities.”626  
Chinese paranaval preponderance in the near seas may be less of an outright 
advantage insofar as it indicates the higher force level needs of its gray zone strategies; Peter 
Dutton assesses that the CCP believes it needs to outnumber its adversaries by 3:1 or 4:1 in 
order to physically block them from completing their operations.627 Consistent with the PLA’s 
approach of “residing the military within the civilian” for information warfare, the PLA also takes 
advantage of PAFMM numbers by reconceptualizing it as a floating ISR network, spanning 
China’s shoreline and near seas, able to provide “effective maritime intelligence” by feeding 
targeting and tracking information into PLA theater command intelligence infrastructures.628 
Contemporary PLA analysis discusses expanding PAFMM mobility and ISR capabilities, 
perhaps by augmenting the PRC’s distant water fishing fleets, to reliably provide the PLA with 
far seas maritime domain awareness.629  
 
 
625 Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “China’s Maritime Militia,” March 7, 2016, 25-27, 
https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/Chinas-Maritime-Militia.pdf.  
626 Zhao Lei, “New rules mean ships can be used by military,” China Daily, June 18, 2015, 
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-06/18/content_21036944.htm; Ni Dawei [倪大伟], “’Technical Standards for 
New Civilian Ships to Implement National Defense Requirements’ is Promulgated and Implemented” [《新造民船贯彻
国防要求技术标准》颁布实施], PLA Daily, February 19, 2016, http://www.mod.gov.cn/regulatory/2016-
02/19/content_4617916.htm.  
627 Inkstone News, “China doesn’t have the capability for sea control,” January 4, 2019, 
https://www.inkstonenews.com/opinion/peter-dutton-china-doesnt-have-capabilities-control-south-china-
sea/article/2180187.  
628 Shou Xiaosong [寿晓松], ed., The Science of Military Strategy [战略学], (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2013), 
271; Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “China’s Maritime Militia: An Important Force Multiplier,” in Michael 
A. McDevitt, China as a Twenty First Century Naval Power: Theory, Practice, and Implications, (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 2020), 221-223. 
629 Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “China’s Maritime Militia: An Important Force Multiplier,” in Michael A. 
McDevitt, China as a Twenty First Century Naval Power: Theory, Practice, and Implications, (Annapolis: Naval 






While PLAN-CCG-PAFMM C2 and interoperability remain in development and 
challenging630 for PLA commanders, the long-term trajectory of the CCP’s three sea forces is 
decidedly toward bolstering Chinese sea power with ostensibly civilian resources.631 The CCP’s 
burgeoning paranaval forces, while not likely able to exert outright sea control in a contested 
military environment, are increasingly capable of imposing prohibitive peacetime costs on 
Southeast Asian countries attempting to operate in the near seas; the CCP’s paranaval forces 
simultaneously adds capacity and acts as a force multiplier for the PLAN, which is able to shift 
its focus and resources toward far seas operations with a robust maritime intelligence network. 
This approach challenges U.S. security guarantees for Southeast Asian countries by tailoring 
paramilitary coercion against these countries below the threshold of U.S. military response. 
CCP paranaval sea forces also contribute a latent military intelligence capability sustained by a 
broad network of coastal facilities for which the United States has no regional analog, potentially 
leaving the U.S. military at an ISR disadvantage in a high-end kinetic conflict.  
Navies and their Defense Establishments 
A powerful navy is composed not just of hulls, high-tech sensors, and sophisticated 
weaponry; a military and navy must also have the “software”—skilled sailors with expertise, 
seamanship, naval doctrine, and defense establishment support: David Gompert cogently 
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observes that “sea power must be institutionalized, not just constructed.” 632  In the same way, 
the success of CCP maritime transformation will depend on its ability to institutionalize policies 
supporting its Navy. The most sophisticated ships and weapons will be less effective if 
suboptimally employed.633 Examples range throughout history. Imperial Rome initially built an 
impressive navy634 but trained no seamen, instead opting to bridge enemy warships with Roman 
ones using corvus635 to let Roman heavy infantry cross and conduct naval warfare as if fighting 
on land; despite early Roman successes, the Carthaginian navy eventually annihilated most of 
the Roman one in a single battle, leading Rome to eschew corvus and instead train sailors for 
naval warfare when rebuilding its navy.636 Imperial Germany’s naval buildup, beginning in the 
last years of the 19th century until the fleet’s destruction under the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, 
was a construction project without an accompanying plan for force employment necessary to 
comprise a sea power strategy, ultimately accruing enormous costs but no allies for Germany 
nor any hope of achieving the buildup’s chief objective of cowing the United Kingdom.637 Soviet 
leaders in pursuit of sea power consistently misunderstood naval technologies and set 
unbalanced shipbuilding policies focusing on either large surface fleets or ballistic missile 
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submarines without ever striking the appropriate surface-undersea balance advocated by its 
professional Navy leaders.638 
Whether a country’s defense establishment equips its navy to succeed is inherently 
difficult to measure, particularly in peacetime. Yet investigating whether software aspects 
amplify or dampen its hardware capabilities is a worthwhile endeavor even if precise 
determinations cannot be known with reasonable certainty. This subsection discusses important 
aspects of PLAN and broader PLA organizational cultures well as their impact on PLAN 
capabilities.  
Asymmetry: The Party Military and Dual-Command Structure 
Unlike the United States Armed Forces, the PLA is a party-army, not a national military; 
its command authority, the Central Military Commission, is a Party organization, and PLA 
members swear an oath to follow CCP leadership.639 Mao Zedong famously cast this identity for 
the PLA in a 1938 speech, wherein he reasoned that because “political power grows out the 
barrel of a gun,” so a CCP principle is that the “Party controls the gun.”640 This identity carries 
forward into the modern era: Jiang Zemin required that all PLA soldiers be “politically qualified,” 
Hu Jintao made reaffirming loyalty to the CCP the first of the PLA’s four “New Historic Missions,” 
and Xi Jinping signed a first-of-its-kind regulation on PLA Party-building in part designed to 
“ensure the absolute leadership of the Party over the PLA” [对确保党对军队绝对领导].641 
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Being a party-army has advantages not common to professional national militaries. The 
CCP’s leadership of the PLA, when joined with its leadership of the PRC government apparatus 
and interpenetration of Chinese civil society, gives the Party an outsized ability to centrally 
coordinate state and society to support military efforts. One way this ability manifests is as an 
advantage in large-scale mobilization: Larry Wortzel finds that China has repeatedly mobilized 
on large scale since World War II and in these instances demonstrated that deployed PLAN and 
PLAAF units are likely to be supported by Chinese militia, reserves, and particularly effective 
civil communication and transportation assistance.642 The PLA’s ability to benefit from 
mobilization of civil communication resources ensures military consequence to Chinese civil 
technological developments, for example access to the successful work of Chinese SOEs in 
developing communication networks secured with quantum technology.643 
Being a party-army also has notable disadvantages. For example, mechanisms for 
ensuring CCP control pervade and complicate the PLA’s command structure. The CCP 
guarantees its control of the PLA through a political work [政治工作] system, which places a unit 
Party committee within the headquarters of any PLA organization at or above the regiment 
level.644 The committee is typically composed of the commanding officer, a political commissar, 
deputy commanders and commissars, and administrative directors; the commissar typically 
leads these committees, with the commanding officer as his deputy.645 The PLAN considers 
each of its vessels an organization, and all PLAN vessels considered to be at the regiment level 
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or above646 have a dual-command structure [双首长制] in which the commanding officer leads 
the military chain of command and the political commissar represents Party authority647 through 
the Party committee onboard each regiment-level ship.648 As such, PLAN captains and 
commissars have co-equal authority: military commands abord the vessel are collectively 
determined under the vessel’s political committee, and the vessel’s commanding officer must 
accommodate and be held accountable to the directives set by its political committee.649  
The dual-command structure onboard PLAN vessels poses multiple potential command 
and control challenges. First, the time necessary to coordinate between two co-equal leaders 
and then convene the political committee to hear and approve an agreed-upon decision, if one 
is in fact reached, is likely to delay command decisions of any significance. In the event of an 
international crisis during which a theater command joint headquarters may not have the 
information or capacity to provide a PLAN vessel’s crew with detailed instructions, the 
personalities composing the vessel’s political committee will have an outsized role in ensuring 
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the vessel neither falls into operational paralysis nor exhibits unpredictable behaviors which may 
foster destabilizing adversary misperceptions.650  
The dual-command structure also poses a likely challenge to PLA professionalism, as 
commanding officers are likely to be overruled, outvoted, or noted to be out of step with Party 
objectives in the event their professional military assessments do not accord with the Party’s 
political imperative.651 Military professionalism in the PLA has measurably eroded since 2002, 
when David Shambaugh observed that senior PLA officers “are now promoted on meritocratic 
and professional criteria, while political consciousness and activism count for very little,” 
suggesting significant professional autonomy for the officer corps.652 Sofia Ledberg’s more 
recent research indicates this trend may have reversed, with the Political Work Department 
integrating itself into the military command structure such that, while PLA officers are given what 
appears to be a significant degree of professional autonomy, only the ideologically approved will 
be in a position to exercise this autonomy because “every leadership position in the regular 
military system simultaneously constitutes a checkpoint of Party control.”653  
These problems are likely to grow as the role and authority of political commissars 
continues to accumulate and overlap into those of military commanders. Chinese state media 
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reports indicate growing agitation within the PLA in response to an aggrandizing Political Work 
Department. Some PLA divisions are instituting new standards requiring political commissars to 
be able to organize military training654 and command troops in battle.655 Other units have 
reported a broad sense that political work has little to no bearing on combat capabilities, 
requiring commanders to retool political work to match combat requirements and, though left 
implied, reassert professional military interest against time-consuming political work 
requirements.656  
CCP leadership clearly favors commissars over commanders in this tension.657 Xi 
Jinping caustically undercut confidence in the PLA’s professional capabilities by describing the 
PLA as needing to “train a new type of military personnel who are competent, professional and 
possess both integrity and ability” in a 2019 speech.658 In the same month Xi impugned PLA 
commanders’ abilities, the CMC reaffirmed the role of political work in the PLA, issuing 
guidelines which described a need to “purify” the PLA’s “political ecology” from the corruption of 
past commanders.659 Tightening the CCP’s grip over the PLA, in 2020 the CMC issued trial, 
then final regulations on military supervision, which a PRC spokesman described as the “first 
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Trend: Ground Force Dominance and Resistance to Reform 
The PLAN’s operational capabilities are further undermined by PLAGF resistance to 
adopting the size, shape, and doctrine that top PLA and civilian CCP leaders sought, hampering 
military-wide reforms. PLAGF defense of its organizational interests, particularly those in conflict 
with the broader CCP vision for its military, likely contribute to repeated delays and failures of 
attempted PLA reforms and in so doing undermine overall force readiness and lethality.  
From its inception, the PLA has been overwhelmingly dominated by its ground force. 
Mao Zedong’s own military experience was in fighting protracted ground conflicts which 
leveraged force mobility and peasant mobilization to defeat the Japanese and Republic of China 
militaries from a position of weakness.661 The revolutionary stature of the PLAGF instilled it with 
institutionalized prominence among PLA services: until 2016, the PLA used a system of military 
regions, first devised in the 1940s around PLAGF defense of China’s borders, which provided 
the PLAGF with institutionalized C2 capabilities but relegated peacetime command of PLAN, 
PLAAF, or Second Artillery (now PLARF) forces stationed in the region to service leaders 
generally outside the theater.662 Because of the PLAGF’s advantage in sheer size and influence 
beyond other services, most commanders and important staff for each military region or for the 
general department tended to be PLAGF officers.663  
PLAGF commanders also dominated CMC membership to the exclusion of other 
services for the majority of their existence: PLAGF commanders had been CMC members since 
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1956, but the addition of top commanders from the PLAN, PLAAF, and Second Artillery Force to 
CMC membership were not institutionalized until September 2004, at which point no PLAN or 
Second Artillery Force commander had previously served on the CMC, though PLAAF top 
commanders Liu Yalou [刘亚楼] and Zhang Tingfa [张廷发] served on the CMC from 1956-1965 
and from 1977-1982, respectively.664 An apparent gap in prestige between services persisted 
into the recent past. Liu Huaqing, who served as the PLAN’s top officer and was known as the 
“Father of China’s modern navy” and the “Father of China’s aircraft carrier,” spent most of his 
military career in the ground force and changed his PLAN uniform for a PLAGF uniform when he 
joined the Central Military Commission under Jiang Zemin.665  
PLAGF dominance of the PLA has frustrated efforts at reform and modernization when 
they ran contrary to PLAGF organizational interests. Since adopting the 1993 Military Strategic 
Guidance, the PLA has been attempting to transition from a force geared to fight mobile, 
positional, or guerilla ground campaigns to one able to conduct joint operations that combine 
ground, air, and naval capabilities.666 Progress on this effort has been halting. Ten years after 
the 1993 MSG was adopted, the PRC released its 2004 Defense White Paper, reinforcing that 
“priority [is] given to the Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery Force” to strengthen the PLA’s 
“comprehensive deterrence and warfighting capabilities.”667 That same year, Hu Jintao 
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announced the PLA’s “New Historic Missions,” extending PLA missions well outside of China’s 
borders.668 Another ten years later, the lethargic rate of change in PLA reform strongly indicated 
that PLAGF was obstructing the long-term changes in force structure and prestige that would be 
necessary to shift from a focus on land warfare to joint expeditionary operations. For example, 
analysts have observed that the PLAGF did not adopt the largely noncombat and constabulary 
mission set required of PLAGF under the New Historic Missions.669 Further, the 2013 Science of 
Military Strategy specifically urged that the PLAGF needs to “conform to the development trends 
of informatized war [as first adopted in the 1993 MSG] and those of ground forces around the 
word by casting off the traditional “Big Army” mentality,” in order to successfully transition 
toward joint operations.670 Twenty years after the 1993 MSG called for the PLA to transition its 
operational model toward joint operations, PLA analysts recognized that bureaucratic opposition 
from the PLAGF has obstructed reform toward a joint command system or joint warfighting 
capability while militaries in other countries were able to make similar transitions successfully.671  
Xi Jinping spearheaded comprehensive, fundamental reforms to the PLA’s organizational 
structure to overcome PLAGF dominance and build a meaningful joint warfighting capability in 
the PLA.672 The CCP Central Committee first adopted a formal decision to undertake sweeping 
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PLA reforms in 2013, and the details of reform were laid out in a Xi Jinping speech in 2015, 
CMC guidance given in 2016, and the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan for Military Development also 
released in 2016.673 Joel Wuthnow and Phil Saunders summarize the reform’s objectives as: 
• rebalancing service composition to put more weight on naval, air, and missile forces 
• creating the PLA Strategic Support Force and PLA Joint Logistics Support Force, which 
provided critical operational support to joint commanders 
• removing the service chiefs from operational chain of command, while granting theater 
commanders operational oversight over all conventional forces within their respective 
regions 
• establishing an independent training department under the CMC to formulate and 
enforce joint training standards 
• revising professional military educational curricula to put more emphasis on joint 
operations 
• increasing specialized forces, such as amphibious and helicopter units, that would be 
essential to a joint campaign.674 
 
As of the end of 2020, PLA reforms have not successfully rebalanced influence among the 
services, and PLAGF officers remain in the majority of leadership positions in the reformed 
structure. One of the earliest and most important aspects of the reform was transitioning the 
PLA from its revolutionary-era system of seven military regions, designed for PLAGF defense 
against invasion, to five theater commands, intended to support joint expeditionary operations, 
presumably with PLAAF and PLAN leaders. The old system made military region commanders 
responsible for force building tasks and created ad hoc commands to conduct any wartime 
operations.675 To sharpen the theater commands’ focus on developing a joint warfighting 
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capability, the reforms shifted non-warfighting responsibilities to PLA organs outside the theater 
command and institutionalized theater command leadership with permanent C2 mechanisms for 
joint operations.676  
While PLAN and PLAAF commanders made marginal leadership gains because of these 
reforms, PLAGF generals maintained most of the senior leadership roles in the theater 
command as well as external organs responsible for noncombat military affairs. Where PLAGF 
generals led all seven of the PLA’s pre-reform military regions, they lead only three of the post-
reform theater commands, ceding leadership in the Southern Theater Command to PLAN 
Admiral Yuan Yubai [袁誉柏] and in the Central Theater Command to PLAAF General Yi 
Xiaoguang [乙晓光].677 In these theater commands, however, PLAGF influence persists through 
a preponderance of PLAGF officers staffed at the deputy level.678 The PLAGF maintained its 
hold on leadership of the CMC Joint Staff Department, which is responsible for joint operations: 
PLAGF General Fang Fenghui [房峰辉] held the inaugural position until PLAGF top officer Li 
Zuocheng [李作成] took over the position in 2017.679  
The theater commands’ permanent joint C2 mechanisms may in fact extend the power of 
PLAGF commanders leading the Northern, Eastern, and Western Theater Commands as well 
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as the CMC Joint Staff Department. Previously, the PLAGF commanders leading each military 
region only had peacetime command authority over the PLAGF forces in each region, with 
command authority for PLAN, PLAAF, and Second Artillery forces vested in other organs; under 
the new theater command structure, these PLAGF commanders now exert operational 
command over units of any service in their commands in wartime and peacetime.680  
Another way the PLAGF maintained its influence during the shift from military regions to 
theater commands is by maintaining a system of PLAGF headquarters parallel to the joint PLA 
headquarters in each theater command. While still the PLAGF top commander, Li Zuocheng 
argued that keeping PLAGF headquarters separate would foster joint capabilities by giving the 
joint structure space to shed the PLAGF’s influence.681 Whether or not that was the driving 
rationale, the headquarters were kept separate, to the significant organizational benefit of the 
PLAGF. As a result, the PLAGF headquarters in each theater command, not the joint 
headquarters, enjoys direct command responsibility for operational PLAGF units in the theater, 
and the joint headquarters must communicate with PLAGF units in its area of responsibility 
through the local PLAGF headquarters.682 The top PLAGF commander and political commissar 
in each theater command also serve as de facto deputy commander and commissar for the full 
theater command. 683  
A final service-wide metric of persistent PLAGF influence at the cost of other services is the 
service mix of top-level PLA officers. As shown in Table 4 below, PLAGF dominance over other 
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services also persisted in promotions to General/Admiral [上将], the equivalent of a U.S. four-
star officer. Even after the 2015 reforms broke the Strategic Support Force (SSF) out from 
within the PLAGF, the ground force dominated promotions to General rank with only a modest 
increase in promotions among other services.  
Table 4: PLA Promotions to General [上将] By Service and Year, 2012-2020 
YEAR PLAGF PLAN PLAAF PLARF SSF 
2012 5 0 1 1 0 
2013 6 0 0 0 0 
2014 4 0 0 0 0 
2015 8 0 0 0 0 
2016 1 0 1 0 0 
2017 2 0 1 2 1 
2018 0 0 0 0 0 
2019 9 3 2 1 1 
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PLAGF dominance and continued resistance to reform have negatively affected PLA 
reform efforts. While the effects of PLAGF resistance on the PLA’s joint warfighting capability, 
and on the PLAN in particular, is not addressed in the open source, several indicators of the 
PLAGF resistance’s negative impact on the PLA as a whole are publicly accessible. One 
measurable indicator is reform timeliness: the PLA has consistently missed self-imposed 
milestones and deadlines for reform. Joel Wuthnow has testified before the USG that, according 
to the CCP’s timeline for comprehensive reform, “the PLA has been consistently behind 
schedule over the last five years.”685 He cites as examples a delay of over a year for a 300,000-
person downsizing and delays of up to or over four years when reforming the military education 
system, the People’s Armed Police, and the PLA reserves.686 The PRC Ministry of National 
Defense has also confirmed that the PLA’s major policy reforms, initially scheduled for 
completion in 2020, was now projected to drag on into 2022.687 Similarly, the PLA appears likely 
to have missed the 2020 milestone in its three-step modernization timeline688 to “basically 
achieve mechanization.”689 Wuthnow describes the PLA as burdened with equipment and 
doctrine that are outdated by its own standards, with the PLAGF as the worst offender: as of 
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2017, half of the PLAGF’s infantry brigades were still considered “motorized,” the 
modernization690 stage the PLA designates as prior to being mechanized.691  
Another indicator is public PLA criticism of its ground force commanders. In an unusual 
step, the Eastern Theater Command produced a 43-episode TV drama entitled Blue Strike [《蓝
军出击》], about a PLAGF “Blue Force” that reveals the weaknesses of PLA brigades in 
adversarial trainings in order to highlight the “labor pains” [阵痛] of modernization stemming 
from the PLAGF officers’ halfhearted or false compliance with PLA reforms. One report explains 
that the series shows the extent to which “at the outset of reform, many leaders went through 
the motions of reform without internalizing it; their uniforms have changed, but their mindsets 
have not; and their ideas cannot keep up with the needs of a strong military.”692  
PLAGF capabilities lagging reform milestones puts the PLAGF role in joint operations in 
doubt and potentially imposes harsh trade-offs with other missions, including those that prioritize 
the PLAN. This tension is perhaps most keenly felt between PLA missions regarding Taiwan 
and those regarding the far seas. Although the PLAN was initially intended to support a PLA 
campaign to conquer Taiwan and its offshore islands, by the early 2000s, PLAN leaders and 
advocates were looking past Taiwan to tie the service’s importance instead to protecting foreign 
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investments and sea lanes—missions requiring a far seas naval capability.693 Rather, the 
PLAGF has positioned itself to be a likely interservice lead for a joint firepower strike or island 
invasion694 of Taiwan.695 Several factors make the PLAGF exceptionally well-positioned for this 
role: the ground forces have more and better-equipped amphibious assault forces than the 
PLAN Marine Corps; PLAGF headquarters exercise command over PLA border and coastal 
defense units in the Eastern Theater Command; and PLAGF headquarters organizes annual 
joint PLA exercises (“Firepower”) to develop artillery support capabilities.696 In addition to having 
greater amphibious capacity than the PLAN Marine Corps, the PLAGF is developing a multiple 
launch rocket system (MLRS) precision strike capability that is more affordable than comparable 
PLARF missiles; the PLAGF’s PCL-191 MLRS is reportedly able to target any installation on 
Taiwan or off the island’s eastern coast, and at a third of a cost of PLARF missiles at the same 
range, they will likely also be built in greater number.697 Amphibious assault is a core PLAN 
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Marine Corps competency, and conventional precision strike is similarly a core PLARF 
competency.698 The PLAGF’s development of redundant capabilities and bureaucratic jockeying 
to lead a joint amphibious invasion or joint firepower strike campaign magnifies the degree to 
which a joint Taiwan campaign will depend on the PLAGF’s competencies or fail on its 
weaknesses.  
The PLAGF’s organizational resistance against reforms toward a joint warfighting 
capability and against reforms toward a mechanized force translate the service’s weaknesses 
into operational vulnerabilities that threaten the prospect of a Taiwan campaign. Unification with 
Taiwan has since the founding of the People’s Republic been a critical policy objective over 
which the CCP has repeatedly threatened war.699 In 2005, the PRC National People’s Congress 
promulgated the Anti-Secession Law, which declared that “accomplishing the great task of 
reunifying the motherland is the sacred duty of all Chinese people.”700 Unification with Taiwan, 
by force if necessary, is a clear top-level priority the CCP has held for decades. By contrast, Hu 
Jintao only declared becoming a maritime great power to be a CCP objective in 2012. Given the 
unyielding and paramount importance of the Taiwan issue to the CCP, PLAGF operational 
inability to perform its role in a joint Taiwan campaign may force the PLA to reinforce it from the 
center with additional resources and CMC support at the expense of PLAN far seas operations 
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VII. Case Study: Southeast Asia and the South China Sea 
 The following section includes a case study considering how the CCP attempts to erode 
U.S. strategic influence in a critical maritime theater: the South China Sea. This thesis does not 
argue that the CCP’s maritime transformation and resultant sea power is the only or 
determinative variable in any changes to U.S. strategic influence in the South China Sea; 
everywhere they arise, influence and alignment are nebulous entities with many causes. This 
case study demonstrates that aspects of CCP sea power are mobilized in a broader service of 
reordering regional and global security architecture, the necessary precondition of achieving 
national rejuvenation. Moreover, it demonstrates how exertions of sea power which fall below 
the level of outright military competition upends U.S. strategic influence and so undermines U.S. 
military primacy. 
South China Sea 
For the same reasons that maritime chokepoints on China’s eastern and western 
peripheries make up Asia’s decisive terrain, islands and partially submerged reefs in the South 
China Sea constitute the disputed sea’s decisive terrain: whoever controls these features can 
station land-based assets on them to monitor and extend threats over the surrounding waters 
and airspace. The PRC is in effective control over two major groups of South China Sea 
features—the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands—which it has subsequently militarized. 
Outposts at Mischief Reef, Subi Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, and Woody Island currently feature 
hardened airbases, anti-ship missiles, anti-surface missiles, radar and sensor arrays, and 
jamming platforms which cover much of the PRC’s maritime claims in the South China Sea.701  
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 PLA militarization of decisive terrain within the Nine Dash Line does not extend to a final 
important feature: Scarborough Shoal. The group of islets, some 300nm east of the Paracel 
Islands and nearly 465nm away from Hainan Island, is only 120nm off the shore of Luzon, the 
main Philippine island. Analysts from the United States and Japan have referred to Scarborough 
Shoal, in conjunction with the Paracel and Spratly Island groups, as a “strategic triangle” (see 
Map 5) positioning the PLAN to complicate U.S. and Japanese operations in the South China 
Sea, potentially by exercising sea control over SLOCs that run through the CCP’s “nine-dash 
line” maritime claims in the South China Sea.702 Greg Poling and Zack Cooper observe that PLA 
assets stationed on Scarborough Shoal, if similar to those on the Paracel or Spratly Islands, 
would extend PLAN power projection and ISR capabilities over the main Philippine islands, 




Physics Laboratory, 2020, https://www.jhuapl.edu/Content/documents/IntroductiontoSCSMILCAPStudies.pdf.  
702 Yoji Koda, “Japan's Perceptions of and Interests in the South China Sea,” Asia Policy 21, January 20, 2016, 
https://www.nbr.org/publication/japans-perceptions-of-and-interests-in-the-south-china-sea/; Sasakawa USA, 
“Scarborough Shoal key to strategic triangle of disputed territories within South China Sea,” June 7, 2016, 
https://spfusa.org/spfusa-news/scarborough-shoal-key-strategic-triangle-disputed-territories-within-south-china-sea/; 
Joel Wuthnow, “Beyond Imposing Costs: Recalibrating U.S. Strategy in the South China Sea,” Asia Policy 24, July 
2017, 123-138, 129, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26403211.  
703 Gregory Poling and Zack Cooper, “Developing a Scarborough Contingency Plan,” Asia Maritime Transparency 






Map 5: The South China Sea 
  
Source: Kōda Yōji, “Confronting China’s Island-Building Campaign,” nippon.com, August 11, 2015, 
https://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00190/.  
Disputes over Scarborough Shoal, 2012-2018  
Events at Scarborough Shoal between 2012 and 2018 demonstrate how the CCP 
employed its growing naval and paranaval capacity in conjunction with economic tools to 
undermine U.S. alliance cohesion. By provoking a paranaval conflict with the Philippines and 
resolving it with economic benefits while the USG remained myopically focused on South China 
Sea island militarization, the CCP approach to Scarborough Shoal strained the U.S.-Philippines 
alliance.  
With its proximity to Luzon, Scarborough Shoal sits easily within the Philippines’ 200nm 
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf claims but is claimed as sovereign territory by 
both the PRC and the Philippines.704 The legal dispute escalated into a tense standoff on April 
 
 







10, 2012, when Philippine frigate BRP Gregorio del Pilar enforced the Philippines’ claims to the 
islet group by boarding and preparing to arrest Chinese fishermen operating by Scarborough 
Shoal; the fishermen issued a distress call and drew two unarmed China Maritime Surveillance 
vessels with the charge to protect the PRC’s “maritime rights and interests,” a priority codified 
into law under Jiang Zemin and continually reaffirmed by every subsequent CCP General 
Secretary, at the islet group. These developments began the standoff of PRC and Philippine 
government vessels.705 
 U.S. diplomacy likely played a role in precipitating this standoff. Beginning in 2010, the 
USG began a concerted diplomatic campaign to embolden Southeast Asian countries against 
CCP provocations in the South China Sea. In July 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
spoke at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum to urge 
compliance with UNCLOS in settling South China Sea sovereignty disputes and encouraged all 
parties to reach a code of conduct, becoming at that time the highest-level U.S. official to 
publicly express a position on the South China Sea.706 The following year, the United States 
indicated its increased attention to the region with a presidential tour, in which President Obama 
became the first U.S. President to attend the East Asia Summit with the leaders of Southeast 
Asian countries one day after he announced that “the United States is turning our attention to 
the vast potential of the Asia Pacific region” in an address to the Australian Parliament.707 The 
USG matched its rhetoric with varied capacity-building efforts for Southeast Asian countries, 
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including the sale of a U.S. Coast Guard cutter to the Philippines, inducted into the latter’s navy 
as BRP Gregorio del Pilar.708 Taylor Fravel observed, “given U.S. diplomacy in previous months, 
Manila may have concluded that it would be backed by the United States if it challenged China,” 
or that challenging the PRC may have been a way to “elicit even more direct intervention from 
the United States.”709  
This USG support almost certainly emboldened Philippine action in the 2012 standoff 
with PRC vessels at Scarborough Shoal. On April 26, Philippines Secretary of Foreign Affairs 
Albert del Rosario responded to a PRC threat not to “internationalize” the dispute by telling 
reporters, “we are going to the United States in order to be able to maximize the benefits 
derived out of this mutual defense treaty.”710 Researchers from the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies found that the PRC began building up its presence at the standoff shortly 
after, deploying an additional ship to Scarborough Shoal on April 28 and steadily increasing to a 
peak of 14 vessels standing off against the Philippines’ 5 by April 30.711 In private, Philippine 
officials began “seeking clarity” on which circumstances would trigger U.S. military intervention 
under the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty signed in 1951.712 
Despite its interest in empowering Southeast Asian countries to check PRC behavior in 
the South China Sea, the Obama Administration was unwilling to do so directly, including in 
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defense of a treaty ally. Rather than activating the Mutual Defense Treaty to assist the 
Philippines, the Obama Administration sought to tie the dispute to the South China Sea’s lack of 
a collectively-supported Code of Conduct agreement and encouraged ASEAN members to find 
ways to make progress in the ongoing Code of Conduct negotiations.713 In the service of these 
negotiations, President Obama did not publicly clarify the U.S. position on circumstances which 
trigger U.S. military support under the Mutual Defense Treaty during a June joint press 
conference with Philippines President Benigno Aquino III. Instead, he returned to the 
importance of having “a strong set of international norms and rules governing maritime disputes 
in the region.”714  
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell 
reportedly brokered an agreement with Chinese officials for a mutual withdrawal to end the 
standoff over Scarborough Shoal in June 2012.715 This narrative has been contested from 
various sources, not least because, for unconfirmed reasons, the Chinese vessels did not 
complete their withdrawal after the Philippine vessels left, effectively establishing PRC 
administrative control over Scarborough Shoal.716  
 While public knowledge of the Obama Administration’s decision-making process around 
Scarborough Shoal remains incomplete, one factor appeared to be President Obama’s 
disinterest in competing against the CCP for strategic influence. In a 2014 joint statement with 
President Aquino, Obama used the language of CCP propagandists to declare, “we welcome 
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China’s peaceful rise…our goal is not to counter China. Our goal is not to contain China.”717 Far 
from seeing PRC activities at Scarborough Shoal as challenging the U.S. security guarantee to 
the Philippines, President Obama recorded in his memoirs that the PRC’s behavior would only 
thicken U.S. alliances: “The one thing [the United States] had going for us was that in recent 
years China had started overplaying its hand…[by] threatening the Philippines and Vietnam 
over control of a handful of small but strategic islands in the South China Sea. U.S. diplomats 
reported a growing resentment toward such heavy-handed tactics—and a desire for a more 
sustained American presence as a counterweight to Chinese power.”718 President Aquino 
affirmed this perspective in 2014 by signing the U.S.-Philippines Enhanced Defense 
Cooperation Agreement, a new vehicle by which the U.S. military could rotate forces through 
bases in the Philippines on a nonpermanent basis.719 To the Obama Administration, the CCP’s 
use of its growing maritime paramilitary appeared to bolster U.S. strategic influence.  
 To Southeast Asian countries, however, the United States’ threshold for responding to 
incidents in the region appeared to leave significant space for Chinese coercive economic 
dominance over the region, giving rise to a “two Asias” dichotomy defined by a “security Asia” in 
which the United States remains the security partner of choice and an “economic Asia” 
dominated by the Chinese market.720 The CCP’s enforcement of its maritime rights and interests 
around Scarborough Shoal had economic impacts: after seizing the islet group from Philippine 
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administration, Chinese-erected barriers and CCG patrols denied Philippines fishermen entry to 
Scarborough Shoal’s inner lagoon, which is rich with fish stocks.721 Denial of access to these 
fish stocks increased economic pressure on Philippines fishermen and became an important 
issue for Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte, elected in 2016.722 Unlike President Aquino, 
who was a reliable U.S. ally, President Duterte navigated the “two Asias” by triangulating 
between the PRC and United States and distanced Philippine policy from the United States to 
secure the comparatively greater marginal benefits of thicker ties with the PRC.723  
 The change in Philippines policy toward the United States and the PRC is not defined 
entirely by Duterte’s unconventional personality. Manila’s shift also indicates the inherent 
limitations in a U.S. security guarantee that does not extend to coercive gray zone actions that 
undermine economic, in this case fishing, security. By the time of Duterte’s election, Asia-Pacific 
interdependence through Chinese markets had reached sovereignty-eroding levels.724 For 
example, a 2017 poll in Indonesia found 32 percent of Indonesians believed the benefits of 
Chinese investment outweigh potential threats to sovereignty following reports that Chinese 
hackers attempted to manipulate an Indonesian national election.725 Philippines public opinion 
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followed a similar course. In 2015, 43 percent of respondents to a Pew Research poll supported 
having a strong economic relationship with the PRC while 41 percent instead supported being 
tough with the PRC on territorial disputes; by 2017, these figures were 67 percent and 28 
percent, respectively.726  
Figure 15: Shifts in Philippines Public Opinion on the PRC, 2015 and 2017 
 
Sources: Jacob Pushter and Caldwell Bishop, “People in the Philippines Still Favor U.S. Over China, but 




With Rodrigo Duterte leading the Philippines, the CCP had an opportunity to benefit from 
a two-track effort on the South China Sea by pushing Manila in “security Asia” and inviting them 
in “economic Asia.” Whether or not the CCP did so intentionally, in 2016 the CCP managed to 
drive a wedge further in the U.S.-Philippines relationship by conceding on inflated demands in 
“security Asia” while proving a tough but engaged negotiating partner for the Philippines on 
economic issues. Since the CCP’s seizure of Scarborough Shoal in 2012, U.S. analysts had 
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been exceptionally concerned about the possibility the CCP may militarize the islet group.727 In 
2015, the Obama administration began to publicize its FON program in response to Chinese 
militarization on Spratly Islands.728 In March 2016, President Obama was reported to have 
successfully warned General Secretary Xi Jinping away from militarizing Scarborough Shoal as 
well.729 In the Fall of 2016, the CCP appeared to ignore Obama’s reported warnings by 
positioning ships capable of conducting artificial island building operations near Scarborough 
Shoal, which in the cases of Paracel and Spratly features preceded militarization.730 This 
provocation was well-timed; Duterte was scheduled to meet Xi for the first time shortly 
afterward. In that meeting, the two leaders agreed to manage any disputes in the South China 
Sea bilaterally, a thinly-veiled reference to excluding U.S. engagement in the South China 
Sea.731 Immediately after this visit, Duterte announces a new policy of “separation” from the 
United States and increased alignment with the PRC.732 As an apparently-unannounced part of 
the two leaders’ agreement, Filipino fishermen were now permitted to access fish stocks at 
Scarborough Shoal.733 Regional expert Ashley Townshend described this development as a 
“diplomatic masterstroke” in which the CCP built leverage from its 2012 seizure of Scarborough 
Shoal and subsequent threats to militarize it, then offered a pause in its provocative behavior as 
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a concession to entice Duterte to reduce Philippine alignment with the United States.734 In so 
doing, the CCP also reinforced to Manila that bilateral diplomacy on Beijing’s terms yields 
results, while attempting to involve the United States ended with the loss of Scarborough 
Shoal.735 
 Beijing’s agreement with Manila granting access for fishermen to the lagoon in 
Scarborough Shoal traded transient concessions for enduring benefits. Strong U.S.-Philippines 
military alignment, signaled by the USG’s “pivot to Asia,” the 2014 Enhanced Defense 
Cooperation Agreement, and President Obama’s specific warning about militarizing South 
China Sea islands and Scarborough Shoal indicated the CCP may be exposed to military costs 
from the allied forces if it built military facilities on Scarborough Shoal. Granting Philippine 
fishermen access to the lagoon necessarily precluded the island-construction operations 
needed to build a military outpost on the islet group, likely assuaging U.S. concerns. But 
regional expert Bill Hayton observes, “China’s policy in the South China Sea is akin to a ratchet. 
It moves forward, sometimes takes a break but never moves backwards,” further explaining that 
administrative steps the PRC took in 2020 clearly indicated an enduring CCP intent to occupy 
Scarborough Shoal.736 Beijing’s agreement with Manila in 2016 was not an abandonment of the 
CCP’s long-held interest in completing its control over the South China Sea’s decisive terrain by 
occupying and militarizing Scarborough Shoal; rather, the agreement was a bid to delay such 
occupation in order to weaken U.S.-Philippines alignment in an effort to create future, more 
permissive conditions.737 The CCP used nonmilitary aspects of sea power, in this case flexible 
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interpretations of its maritime rights and interests enforced by a robust paranaval force, while 
the USG remained strictly focused on the potential naval power of militarized islands. As a 
result, the CCP weakened U.S. strategic influence over Manila and furthered its objective of 
reordering the Indo-Pacific security architecture.  
 CCP success is indicated by shifts in Manila’s behavior toward USG-CCP 
disagreements on maritime policy. On January 17, 2018, the USS Hopper, an Arleigh Burke-
class destroyer in the U.S. Navy, sailed within twelve nautical miles of Scarborough Shoal. The 
PRC Foreign Ministry called the transit a violation of Beijing’s sovereignty and sparked a 
monthlong diplomatic pressure campaign ultimately once again weakening the USG alliance 
with the Philippines.738 
Five days after the Hopper’s transit, Chinese state media outlet The People’s Daily ran a 
column under the “Zhong Sheng” [钟声] byline, which generally indicates a column reflects the 
official CCP position on international matters.739 Zhong Sheng called the Hopper’s transit a 
destabilizing action that will escalate tensions in the South China Sea and force the PRC to 
improve unspecified capabilities in the theater.740 Although the Zhong Sheng article was 
textually ambiguous, its threat was a clear extension of existing Chinese military policy: in 2016, 
PLAN Admiral and Deputy Chief of the PLA General Staff Sun Jianguo [孙建国] warned that 
military transits in the South China Sea “could even play out in a disastrous way,” and that the 
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Speaking on the same day the Zhong Sheng article was published, a Manila palace 
spokesperson was careful to create distance with the U.S. and minimize distance with the PRC 
in its response, calling the issue “America’s problem” while maintaining that the PRC continues 
to operate in “good faith” in the South China Sea.742 On February 12, 2018, Manila announced a 
delegation from the PRC Foreign Ministry will meet representatives from the Philippines 
Department of Foreign Affairs to discuss “contentious issues concerning the South China 
Sea.”743 The same announcement specified that the dialogue would constitute the second 
meeting through the bilateral consultation mechanism on the South China Sea, which was 
formed in January 2017, hosted first bilateral meeting on May 19, 2017, and for which a second 
meeting was initially planned for late 2017.744 The two parties released a joint statement on 
February 13 in line with Zhong Sheng’s criticisms of the United States: Manila and Beijing agree 
to “exercise self-restraint” over South China Sea activities that “would complicate or escalate 
disputes and affect peace and stability.”745 Later that year, Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin 
Lorenzana questioned the U.S.-Philippine alliance’s utility and whether it constitutes a 
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The U.S. naval transit was a strategically unhelpful action that gave the PRC an 
opportunity to express outrage, which the Philippines mollified by thickening diplomatic ties with 
the PRC at enduring cost to U.S.-Philippine alliance cohesion. 
Consequences of Diminishing Strategic Influence in Southeast Asia 
 Developments in the U.S.-Philippine alliance are mirrored throughout the region. In 
December 2019, CCG vessels began harassing Malaysian drillship West Capella in response to 
a Malaysian submission to the United Nations that month extending its continental shelf and 
exclusive economic zone claims.747 The Chinese deployment began a months-long standoff that 
did not end until the Royal Malaysian Navy dispatched a destroyer and the CCG vessels 
withdrew. The CCP reinitiated this standoff in April by dispatching a survey ship, the Haiyang 
Dizhi Bahao, with a CCG and maritime militia escort occuping waters near the drillship and 
within Malaysia’s new claims under the guise of conducting a survey.748 The CCP’s persistent 
coercion won results: when the USG launched a sustained presence operation by the West 
Capella to check the Chinese presence, the Malaysian foreign ministry criticized warship 
activities in the region generally as raising tensions and undermining regional stability, a tacit 
rebuke delivered immediately after the introduction of U.S. military presence yet noticeably 
absent throughout the CCG harassment episode.749 Chinese vessels did not withdraw until May 
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15, in which the standoff was apparently resolved following a call between Chinese defense 
minister Wei Fenghe and Malaysian defense minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob and after a public 
statement from the Malaysian defense ministry expressing “gratitude to the medical aid 
sponsored by China” and “mutual interest” in South China Sea stability, with no indication that 
the standoff had occurred.750   
Such hedging and growing alignment with—or deference to—the PRC751 is pervasive in 
ASEAN member country statements and policy. Following the release of the U.S. Department of 
Defense’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Report in 2019, ASEAN published an “ASEAN Outlook on the 
Indo-Pacific” noting that “geopolitical and geostrategic shifts” have pervaded the Indo-Pacific in 
recent years, further noting that “the rise of material powers, i.e. economic and military, requires 
avoiding the deepening of mistrust, miscalculation, and patterns of behavior based on a zero-
sum game.”752 Describing geopolitical competition as a “zero-sum game” is in line with CCP 
framing of the USG-CCP competition wherein the USG is attempting to be the sole winner in a 
game of power politics while the PRC opts for “win-win cooperation.”753 ASEAN policy in 
implementation reflects this effort to hedge between the U.S. and the PRC, for example by 
simultaneously agreeing to participate in separate joint military exercises.754 
The inability of the USG to realize its policy goals in the South China Sea similarly 
indicates diminishing U.S. strategic influence in Southeast Asia as pertains to the South China 
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Sea. Michael McDevitt summarized U.S. policy objectives toward the South China Sea as 
including the following: 
1. No use of force or coercion by any of the claimants to resolve sovereignty disputes or 
change the status-quo of disputed South China Sea features. 
2. Freedom of navigation, which includes unimpeded lawful navigation for commercial, 
private and military vessels and aircraft. Coastal states must respect the UNCLOS 
language that all “high seas freedoms,” including peaceful military operations, are 
applicable in the EEZs of coastal states. 
3. All maritime entitlements to any of the waters of the South China Sea must be based on 
international law and must be derived from land features in the South China Sea. 
China’s nine-dash line does not meet these criteria. In short, only land (islands and 
rocks) generates maritime zones, not vice versa. 
4. The United States takes no position on the relative merits of competing sovereignty 
claims. It does not choose sides; nor does it favor one country’s claim over another’s. 
5. An effective Code of Conduct that would promote a rules-based framework for managing 
and regulating the behavior of relevant countries in the South China Sea is essential. A 
key part of such a document would be mechanisms such as hotlines and emergency 
procedures for preventing incidents in sensitive areas and managing them when they do 
occur in ways that prevent disputes from escalating. 
6. The United States supports internationally recognized dispute resolution mechanisms, 
including those provided for in the UNCLOS treaty. 
7. Washington will respond positively to small South China Sea littoral countries that are 
U.S. allies, officially designated “strategic partners,” or “comprehensive partners,” who 
want to improve their ability to patrol and monitor their own territorial waters and EEZs. 
8. The U.S. government wants to improve access for U.S. military in areas proximate to the 
South China Sea.755 
 
U.S. policy has been largely unsuccessful in realizing these outcomes, in large part due 
to the USG’s inability to mobilize the collective action of ASEAN countries to deny the CCP’s 
maritime coercion or secure a behavioral Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. USG 
inactivity in the 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident sacrificed the first three, sixth, and seventh 
items McDevitt lists in favor of the fourth and fifth. Arguably, the Philippines’ and Malaysia’s 
responses to U.S. military operations in 2018 and 2019 suggest negative trends for the eighth 
item as well. The priorities that the USG did defend throughout the Scarborough episode—
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neutrality on claims and endorsement of a Code of Conduct—have been subsequently 
abandoned or stalled, perhaps indefinitely.756  
What progress has been made toward regional balancing has been without apparent 
USG leadership. Between 2019 and continuing into 2020, South China Sea claimant states 
began issuing diplomatic notes at the United Nations aligning their national positions with an 
international tribunal’s 2016 ruling that in part rejected the CCP’s claim to “historic rights” in the 
South China Sea; the United States publicly aligned its position with the tribunal ruling months 
after the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia did.757 Even Southeast Asian countries’ appeals to 
U.S. military presence despite PRC pressure serves primarily to hedge against PRC domination 
over both “economic Asia” and “security Asia” without securing the USG’s position in USG-CCP 
competition; predictably for peacetime, countries in Southeast Asia generally value the PRC’s 
economic influence over the USG’s security influence.758 
 The USG’s inability to gain preponderant influence in Southeast Asian countries 
sufficient to align them against a PRC security threat has high-end kinetic consequences which 
bear themselves out in peacetime behaviors. The U.S. military is heavily dependent on forward 
operating bases in allied countries to conduct operations in East Asia and needs options for 
expansion in order to maintain a combat-credible military threat in the event a high-end kinetic 
conflict arises with the PLA within the first island chain. As shown in Table 5 and Map 6, the 
U.S. military is overwhelmingly dependent on bases in Japan for power projection on China’s 
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periphery.759 A 2017 study found the PLARF was at that point able to strike every fixed 
headquarters and logistical base, strike every U.S. ship in port in Japan, crater every runway 
and runway-length taxiway on major U.S. airbases in Japan, and destroy more than 200 U.S. 
aircraft on the ground in a pre-emptive strike on U.S. forces.760 This study likely dramatically 
underestimates the PLA’s potential destructive firepower insofar as the USG has since revealed 
that the PLA has approximately 350 road-mobile MRBM and IRBM launchers, not the estimate 
of 100-125 MRBM launchers and zero IRBM launchers DOD publicly announced in 2016.761 In 
the event of a high-end kinetic conflict in East Asia between the U.S. military and the PLA, the 
PLARF’s precision strike capabilities will likely force the U.S. military to prosecute the conflict in 
part from bases which do not yet exist.  
Table 5: U.S. Military Footprint in the Western Pacific 






SOUTH KOREA 28,500 
THAILAND 300 
U.S. (GUAM) 8,150 
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2020, (London: Routledge, 
2020), 58-60.  
 
To present a more robust basing infrastructure, the U.S. military’s ability to posture 
combat-credible forces in East Asia depends on the active agreement of allies and partners to 
accept a greater U.S. troop presence and host combat systems able to threaten the PLA. On 
the former, current treaty allies Thailand and the Philippines have become increasingly 
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disinclined to host U.S. forces, with President Duterte motioning to terminate the Visiting Forces 
Agreement authority for stationing U.S. forces in-country.762 On the latter, even Japan has been 
reluctant to host new U.S. platforms, particularly land-based MRBM and IRBMs that can 
threaten the Chinese mainland.763 While the Freely Associated States, a grouping of Micronesia, 
the Marshall Islands, and Palau with which the USG has current military agreements through 
signed Compacts of Free Association, has indicated interest in hosting a larger U.S. military 
footprint, the closest island remains over a thousand nautical miles from Japan and are more 
useful for flowing forces to the theater than for hosting forward operations.764  
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Map 6: U.S. Military Presence in the Pacific 
 




 The USG is losing the contest for influence over Southeast Asia in the South China Sea. 
As the CCP leverages economic and paranaval assets to circumvent international agreements 
by operating below the threshold the USG determines justifies U.S. military intervention, 
Southeast Asian countries are increasingly forced to hedge between the U.S. and CCP. To 
hedge is not to be indecisive; a Southeast Asia that hedges between the United States and the 






economic engagement or vice versa. Even U.S. allies and partners decisively triangulate their 
interests between “economic Asia” and “security Asia.”765  
By situating the policy implementation trends within an established framework of the 
CCP’s intentions, the net assessment approach systematically examines the PRC’s actions in 
the South China Sea in strategic terms. Other leading explanations for why the CCP pursues 
sea power, including naval nationalism, protecting trade, and survival, are overly focused on 
whether the PLA develops high-end naval warfighting capabilities able to defend China’s shores 
or secure its supply lines. As a result, these explanations give insufficient attention to the 
peacetime implications of the CCP’s sea forces. This case study describes the CCP’s 
peacetime maritime operations, occurring under the shadow of the PLAN, and the ways it 
undermines U.S. strategic influence while managing escalation to avoid high-end military 
competition. 
As described in Sections IV and V, the USG and CCP have asymmetric objectives which 
make ASEAN’s hedging enough for CCP success. The CCP does not have publicly stated 
objectives to establish primacy in the region, nor should U.S. policy be commended for 
Southeast Asia’s hedging. The CCP’s stated policy is the rise of a multipolar order with a tacit 
acknowledgment that, in a multipolar system, the PRC would by default be a regional economic 
and military hegemon that enjoys the privileges of such.766 The U.S. foreign policy objective is to 
maintain regional primacy by denying Chinese military expansion in the South China Sea, in 
part by mobilizing and aligning regional allies and partners around that objective.  767 If the USG 
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successfully rallies its partners to this cause, it succeeds; if it does not, and regional opinion is 
equivocal, then it fails. While it is the USG’s objective to succeed, the CCP need only not fail.768  
VIII. Alternative Futures 
  How CCP efforts at maritime transformation develop and the threat it will pose to the 
United States from 2021 to 2049 leaves significant room for uncertainty. As an effort to bound 
that uncertainty, this section presents four alternative future scenarios of the likely “pace and 
intensity of long-term competition” against a given adversary.769 This section modifies a 
framework developed by experts at the RAND Corporation to account for the identified trends in 
the CCP’s maritime transformation. Rather than make decisive predictions on whether trends in 
CCP maritime transformation as described in Section VI are enduring or not, this section offers 
four representative scenarios covering a range of potential permutations should the identified 
trends be accelerated, maintained, slowed, or reversed altogether.  
 The bulk of this thesis has accumulated the pieces available to conduct a threat 
assessment of CCP maritime transformation. Section IV argued that the CCP is undergoing a 
maritime transformation amid a broader competition against the United States with an objective 
to reorder the global superstructure and aggrandize itself while removing obstacles such as the 
U.S.-led security architecture. Section V argued that the USG objective is to maintain its military 
primacy in part by drawing on the current security architecture to preserve its freedom of 
maritime access, or freedom of the seas. Section VI identified five key trends that shape the 
potency of CCP maritime transformation and sharpen the threat it poses to USG interests: 1) 
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at western maritime chokepoints, 3) ongoing PLAN surface fleet modernization, 4) an outgrowth 
of PLAN aviation, and 5) continued PLAGF service dominance and resistance to CCP-directed 
reforms. Section VII offered a case study in how some of the CCP’s maritime developments 
have already been used to weaken U.S. strategic influence over its allies and partners.  
 This section considers how potential trajectories in the trends identified in Section VI 
affect the CCP’s ability to achieve its objectives described in Section IV at the cost of USG 
objectives as described in Section V. To do so, it makes use of a RAND framework led by 
Andrew Scobell to summarize four scenarios as ideal types770 of what the CCP and its 
instruments of power will look like in 2049. The four scenarios RAND considers are as follows: 
1. A triumphant China, in which Beijing is remarkably successful in realizing its grand 
strategy; 
2. An ascendant China, in which Beijing is successful in achieving many but not all of the 
goals of its grand strategy; 
3. A stagnant China, in which Beijing has failed to achieve its long-term goals; and 
4. An imploding China, in which Beijing is besieged by a multitude of problems that 
threaten the very existence of the CCP-PLA-PRC.771 
  
As Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping have posited, the success of CCP maritime transformation is 
an important component of realizing CCP grand strategy. A successful maritime transformation 
is to continue or accelerate the commercial maritime and naval trends building CCP sea power 
(e.g., trends 2-4) while arresting or reversing the trends which restrict maritime transformation 
(e.g., trends 1 and 5). Table 6 summarizes how degrees of success in CCP maritime 
transformation map to degrees of its success in realizing its grand strategy, aligning with the 
four scenarios RAND developed. The table also characterizes the probability and magnitude of 
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likely conflict between the CCP’s maritime transformation and USG interests772 before offering 
an assessment of CCP maritime power773 and the projected outcome of CCP maritime 
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Table 6: Alternative Scenarios for CCP Maritime Transformation in 2049   












 Likelihood Less likely More likely More likely Less likely 
Conditions (RAND 
summary)774 
PRC becomes world's 
largest economy and 
an innovation leader. 
PLA is modern, 
capable, and has 
global reach. 
PRC becomes 
strongest Asian power 
with sustained 
economic and 
innovative growth but 
is not dominant. PLA 




discontent in PRC. 
PLA has slowly 
growing capabilities. 




Conflict with USG 
(probability/magnitude) 
High/High High/Medium Medium/Medium Low/High 
CCP maritime power Global contest for sea 
control 
Regional sea denial, 
local sea control 
Regional sea denial  Local sea denial 




transitions to a new 
economic growth 
model, overcomes 





to seize sea control in 
theaters far from 
China’s shores. MSRI 
investments in 
strategic strongpoints 
gives rise to a 
network of overseas 
naval bases. Very 
High threat. 
PRC finds partial 
success in new econ. 
growth models but 
does not entirely root 
out entrenched 
PLAGF interests. 
Development of joint 
capabilities continues 
but does not reach 
objectives as 
envisioned; PLA 
formidable but not a 
“world-class military.” 
Improved PLA can 
secure sea control 
near China and 
position sea denial 
capabilities globally. 
More countries give 
CCP strategic 
strongpoints through 
MSRI, but most do 
not permit them to be 
converted to full 
military bases. High 
threat.  
Substantial shift 
toward PAP/ PLAGF, 
away from overseas 
interests. In econ. 
downturn, CCP still 
tries to rely on 
investment-based 
growth to little avail 
due to overcapacity. 
PLAN is maintained 
but carrier program is 
halted due to massive 




investment in PLAN 
aviation undermines 





forces maintain sea 
denial capabilities. 
Moderate threat. 
CCP faces a 
sequence of black 
swan catastrophes 
making it unable to 
compete 
internationally. The 
PLA, including the 
PLARF’s stockpile of 
ballistic missiles and 
launchers, are not 
well-maintained, 
posing challenges to 
current regional sea 
denial capabilities. 
Primary threat to the 
United States is low-
likelihood high-








 Diminishing economic 
growth 
Reversed Slowed Maintained Accelerated 
Commercial power at 
maritime chokepoints 
Accelerated Maintained Slowed Reversed 
PLAN modernization  Accelerated Slowed Slowed Reversed 
Outgrowth of PLAN 
aviation 
Accelerated Slowed Slowed Reversed 
PLAGF dominance, 
resistance to reform 
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Scenario 1: Triumphant CCP 
The most optimistic scenario for the CCP is, along with the most pessimistic scenario, the 
least likely. In this scenario, the CCP succeeds in all major lines of effort deriving from its grand, 
maritime, and military strategies, succeeded in finding new drivers of economic growth, and is 
able to effectively convert power across all dimensions into strategic influence at the expense of 
the United States. The CCP’s success validates its competitive approach against the USG and 
positions it extremely well to hold USG interests at risk in waters near and far from China’s 
shores. The probability of conflict with the USG and likely magnitude of this conflict are both 
high, posing a very high threat to U.S. interests. The CCP’s successful maritime transformation 
poses a high threat to the USG-led global security architecture. 
As a political baseline, this scenario requires stability for CCP rule for the next thirty years. 
Prerequisites for such include transfers of power between CCP paramount leaders without 
significant, publicly visible power struggles and the successful and sustained pacification, by 
whatever means, of frontier provinces with non-Han ethnic majorities: Xinjiang, Tibet, and Inner 
Mongolia. To realize the grand strategy of national rejuvenation, the CCP will also need to have 
successfully annexed Taiwan, by conquest if necessary.775 Costs of domestic security 
maintenance have grown at a sustainable rate or have declined as currently emerging 
technologies by which the CCP will pervade Chinese civil society becomes more affordable and 
are deployed at scale. 
 CCP economic successes in this scenario drive strategic success. In this scenario, the 
CCP successfully transitions away from investment-led economic growth to identify a new 
growth model and implements a disciplined approach to managing the PRC economy during 
crises. These developments successfully reverse the current trend of diminishing economic 
 
 







growth for the PRC and end the proclivity of CCP officials to inflate growth figures with 
overinvestment.  
Increasing economic growth rates have three second-order effects for maritime 
transformation. First, they bolster the range and depth of MSRI investment, giving the CCP 
significant breadth of international port surveillance and potential cyberattacking capability. 
Second, a steadily growing Chinese economy indicates a steadily growing PLA budget, 
accelerating ongoing naval shipbuilding programs, including the development of nuclear aircraft 
carriers fielding advanced carrier aviation. Finally, the demonstrated reality of the CCP’s 
accelerating economic growth underpins the CCP’s Marxist claim to a greater role in 
international leadership. 
Taken together, these three products of rising economic growth rates are likely to expand 
the range of PLAN power. As the PLAN conducts more mil-mil engagements with MSRI 
countries receiving significant port investments, the CCP is likely to expand its network of 
commercial “strategic strongpoints,” with several strongpoints becoming overseas PLA bases 
outright. CCP successes extends the maritime competition to theaters beyond the Indo-Pacific. 
Europe, Africa, and South Asia become integrated into the CCP’s overseas security 
architecture, and traditional U.S. allies in the regions, facing local pressures, will have more 
incentive to hedge between the USG and CCP. The PLA’s ability to station ASBMs and parts of 
its growing navy at overseas bases will extend the PLA’s model of sea denial to distant theaters, 
potentially culminating in a global sea denial capability. Expeditionary fleets stationed at forward 
PLAN bases will be positioned to exert sea control where U.S. military presence, particularly 
sea denial capability, is limited.  
In addition to reversing the trend of diminishing economic growth rates, a triumphant CCP 
would successfully transition from a ground-centric force to an expeditionary joint force by fully 
implementing the PLA reforms Xi Jinping announced in 2015 and uprooting entrenched PLAGF 






the ground component of a joint military, and the CCP is sufficiently confident in PLAGF-led joint 
operations, such as those in a forced Taiwan unification scenario, with no deficiencies that 
would distract from the PLAN’s expeditionary mission set. By clearing PLAGF obstructions to 
the trajectory of military development, the PLA abandons its land-sea integrated approach to 
military activities and actively seeks a global presence with forces that need not radiate from the 
Chinese mainland. The PLAN thus enjoys elite CCP backing to become a world-class, blue-
water navy with a largely expeditionary mission set.  
While the U.S. Navy continues to focus its attention on the First and Second Island Chains, 
its eroding margin of military superiority weakens U.S. treaty alliances with the Philippines, 
Thailand, and South Korea. Given rising pressure from the PLA and the strategic application of 
Chinese investment, these alliances may end altogether. In deference to the changing regional 
balance, Singapore begins drawing down some of its mil-mil interactions with the United States, 
and ASEAN breaks its balance between the United States and PRC when scheduling joint 
military exercises. While the U.S. may be able to increase its military footprint further from the 
theater in Guam and along the FAS islands, the CCP’s restrictions on maritime access and 
continued efforts to foster a less permissive maritime environment will impose mounting costs 
on, and eventually effectively suspend, the U.S. military’s ability to operate with impunity in 
peacetime within the First Island Chain.  
Scenario 2: Ascendant CCP 
The second scenario, more likely than the first or fourth, is one in which the CCP continues 
to accrue power but does not resolve its structural limitations or enduring proclivities. In this 
scenario, the CCP’s accrual of resources and capabilities makes it the dominant power in 
continental Asia and China’s near seas, but its power recedes along a gradient stretching out to 
the reaches of the Indo-Pacific. While the CCP remains focused on its longstanding objectives 






economic growth and persistent resistance to PLA reform restrain the CCP’s competitive 
capabilities. Conflict with the USG is just as likely as under the Triumphant CCP scenario, but 
the CCP’s recognized economic and military reform limitations will lead to a lower standard to 
which the PLA will calibrate its prosecution of conflict. With a high likelihood of moderate-
intensity conflict, the CCP’s maritime transformation will pose a high threat to U.S. interests.  
Like under the Triumphant CCP scenario, the Ascendant CCP scenario requires that the 
CCP’s hold on power remain secure, including the succession of paramount leaders after Xi 
Jinping without significant, publicly visible power struggles. Unlike the Triumphant CCP 
scenario, perceived domestic unrest in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia—and cross-Strait 
tensions with Taiwan—need not be definitively resolved so long as the costs of stability 
maintenance and the PLA’s cross-Strait military posture do not grow to consume budgets or 
manpower that CCP leaders intend for other programs.  
While the CCP in this scenario does not find and fully realign itself to a new economic 
growth model that continues Chinese economic growth in the past decades, the PRC economy 
still benefits from enough new financial and technological innovations to slow its decline. Central 
CCP authorities restrain the proclivity of provincial officials to continue feeding overinvestment, 
though the proclivity persists and becomes less well-managed during economic crises. Notably, 
the slowing of PRC GDP growth, by some estimates to between 2.7% and 4.2% in 2049, still 
indicates decades of robust, if not mold-breaking, growth.776  
With moderately increasing stability maintenance expenditures and slowing economic 
growth, the CCP’s expenditures on its commercial and military maritime transformation efforts is 
likely to slow and transition from investment to operations. The PLA budget, likely to track the 
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PRC’s GDP, will have falling growth rates unable to sustain the explosive growth of PLAN 
shipbuilding demonstrated from 2000 through 2020. The resources for current naval 
shipbuilding programs will be slowly diverted to the PLAN’s burgeoning costs for ship 
maintenance and recapitalization. The CCP will similarly commit to fewer new MSRI 
investments as the costs of maintaining current MSRI projects grow. While the CCP may make 
the investments necessary to convert some flagship strategic strongpoints, such as the Gwadar 
Port, into overseas PLA bases, the financial incentives available to do so or to create new 
strategic strongpoints along the MSRI will need to be selectively deployed.  
While neither the PLAN nor its network of commercial strategic strongpoints will be 
adequately resourced to grow into globally dominant forces, their continued growth offers 
significant sea denial capabilities through much of the Indo-Pacific and a limited sea control 
capability in China’s near seas. The PLAN will still be the largest navy in the world, and it will 
still have access to a network of strategic strongpoints and limited options for forward operating 
bases in Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean Region, and East African countries. While the PLA is 
unlikely to have adequate basing to seize sea control in these waters, it will have the capability 
to intimidate Indo-Pacific countries weighing security cooperation agreements with the United 
States and to execute dangerous maneuvers that threaten U.S. Navy ships operating in the 
Indian Ocean. These capabilities harden in China’s near seas, where the PLAN will face more 
robust pressure from the U.S. military positioned along the First and Second Island Chains, but 
the ever-expanding reach of the PLA’s anti-ship missiles and expansive naval/paranaval 
presence disincentivize Southeast Asian countries from aligning further with the United States.  
An Ascendant CCP will have completed its reforms to the PLA, building new joint 
warfighting capabilities and making progress toward balanced service interests, without 
successfully uprooting entrenched PLAGF leaders or the service’s willingness to hold military-
wide reform hostage to service interests. The PLAN will be a robust force hindered in budget 






demand the PLA remain focused closer to China’s borders. The PLAN’s mission set and force 
structure will be tied to strategies emphasizing land-sea integration, in which the Chinese 
mainland serves as the necessary source of power and backstop for PLA operations.  
As with a Triumphant CCP, the USG-CCP maritime competition in Southeast Asia is likely 
to tip in the CCP’s favor, following the local balance of forces. With the U.S. military’s margin of 
military superiority diminished or closed altogether, U.S. allies, particularly those interested in 
keeping USG-CCP maritime competition contained within the Indo-Pacific, may send military 
forces to conduct presence operations and insist on freedom of access. The United Kingdom, 
France, and Canada may conduct regular or semi-regular freedom of navigation operations 
near the First Island Chain. These will likely be performative gestures that do not indicate allied 
militaries will balance against the PLA in the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait, however, and 
the CCP’s sea forces will be able to punish or deny access to waters within large parts of the 
First Island Chain to the U.S. military and its allies. Recognizing the shifting military balance, 
Southeast Asian countries will continue to hedge between the USG and CCP, with U.S. allies 
Thailand and the Philippines decreasing the volume of joint exercises and partners such as 
Singapore expanding defense cooperation with the CCP to match their engagements with the 
USG.  
Scenario 3: Stagnant CCP 
The third scenario, more likely than the first or the fourth, is one in which the CCP does not 
make needed adjustments to its economic and military policies. This scenario is primarily 
characterized by lethargic economic growth and the harsh limits of budgetary constraints on 
ongoing CCP lines of effort. Anemic growth and domestic instability force the CCP to turn its 
focus inward, suspending its focus on contesting global influence against the United States. Due 
to harsh budget limitations on PLAN and MSRI investments, neither the probability of maritime 






with both remaining at moderate levels. With a moderate likelihood of moderate-intensity conflict 
with the USG, CCP maritime transformation will pose moderate threats to U.S. interests. 
The defining attribute of this scenario is the CCP’s inability to find new models of economic 
growth and continued reliance on an investment-led growth model. Continued overinvestment 
will maintain the current trend of diminishing growth rates and poorly position the PRC to 
recover or respond to a major economic downturn, as experienced during the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis or the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic. In the event of another similar exogenous 
shock in the 2030s, the overinvested CCP will not be able to recover as rapidly as in the 
previous two. The PRC will suffer serious budget shortfalls, growing financial pressure for social 
welfare as jobs are lost, and diminished spending leading to anemic economic growth. 
The absence of visible economic growth poses an existential threat to the CCP. The elite 
CCP narrative that robust economic growth is necessary to distract or appease the Chinese 
citizenry and ward off dissent will foster paranoid behaviors from political leaders hypersensitive 
to perceived popular unrest, even if the Chinese public does not demonstrate against the 
CCP.777 This hypersensitivity will exacerbate political fissures between the CCP elite that 
become publicly visible during important policy debates and leadership successions. If popular 
unrest does materialize in response to poor economic conditions, they will likely be 
compounded by general unrest in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia as well as 
worsening cross-Strait relations. The demands and costs of stability maintenance will 
significantly increase and begin consuming a greater share of budget, manpower, and CCP 
leader attentions. The PLAGF may be deployed to supplement PAP capacity in armed stability 
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With rapidly falling economic growth rates, PLAN shipbuilding will need to be significantly 
curtailed, and spending on costly prestige platforms like on the aircraft carrier program will likely 
be suspended. Ship maintenance will likely suffer, and a small number of already-constructed 
warships may be scuttled to relieve maintenance and sustainment costs. Similarly, growth of 
Chinese investment along the MSRI will slow or actively recede, uprooting the commercial 
instruments of CCP influence in the Indian Ocean Region and Mediterranean. Where MSRI 
investments are maintained, the project’s potential value as a strategic strongpoint will be in 
harsh competition with its value as a commercial port in which a Chinese company has 
ownership; with lax economic growth, the CCP may not readily risk the economic value of 
overseas investments by leveraging latent dual-use capabilities that may draw international ire. 
The CCP will operate an aging, potentially shrinking navy with limited naval aviation capacity 
along fewer potential seaports from which it can conduct military operations. Collectively, these 
factors will preclude the PLA from establishing a distant sea control capability.  
A Stagnant CCP will be increasingly reliant on the PLAGF to maintain domestic stability and 
as such will be poorly positioned to uproot enduring PLAGF bureaucratic interests that contract 
the move toward joint warfighting capabilities. In fact, the CCP’s interest in domestic stability will 
make it beholden to the PLAGF, restoring part of the service’s influence lost from the reforms. 
With stagnant or shrinking defense budgets, the PLAGF’s return to influence will come at the 
cost of other services, including the PLAN in terms of budget, manpower, and political 
investment in mission sets. In conjunction with the paranaval PAFMM, the PLAGF and PLARF 
will be able to maintain robust sea denial capabilities in China’s near seas using anti-ship 
missile platforms that are comparatively cheaper than aircraft carriers or other prestige vessels. 
Unlike the Triumphant or Ascendant CCP scenarios, a Stagnant CCP will find itself on the 
losing end of USG-CCP maritime competition in Southeast Asia. With the U.S. military’s margin 
of superiority growing once again, CCP influence in the region that came at the cost of USG 






to security cooperation activities with the United States and returning to a hedged posture. A 
Stagnant CCP is likely to face regional military competition against countries like Vietnam and 
the Philippines instead of fighting against the United States to win their alignment. The CCP will 
remain the largest economic and military power in the Asia-Pacific, but it will be more dependent 
on its neighbors to create a stable peaceful environment fostering peace and prosperity for the 
region.   
Scenario 4: Imploding CCP 
The fourth scenario is highly unlikely. Sustained social turmoil and an Imploding CCP forced 
to lurch from crisis to crisis is altogether unable to dedicate resources to international 
competition, with the United States or China’s Southeast Asian neighbors. Maritime 
transformation, as well as the CCP’s grand strategy involving competition and a national 
rejuvenation, will be abandoned.  
An Imploding CCP faces a parade of black swan catastrophes: the PLA initiates and loses a 
war with a bordering country, the PRC faces a sudden collapse of its financial system, Sino-
Soviet ties break down, persistent infighting and power struggles among CCP elites 
factionalizes the PLA, and persistent popular protests give way to anomie across the country. 
Demonstrations against the Party-government, especially in oppressed areas like Xinjiang, 
Hong Kong, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia, could quickly become violent protests, then outright 
armed revolt.  
The probability that the CCP orders military conflict against the USG, which would draw in a 
competitor when the CCP’s hold on power is weak, is extremely low. However, a CCP with 
weakened or contested legitimacy may also not be in firm control of PLA activities. In this 
scenario, the USG would not be able to deter or compel the end of a military action through 
established diplomatic channels in Beijing. At the high end of the risk spectrum, this could lead 






unauthorized nuclear strike. The CCP’s primary threat to the United States in this scenario is 
this low-likelihood, high-magnitude risk of an unauthorized attack made possible by weak Party-
state institutions.  
IX. Implications for Policymakers and Conclusion 
This thesis used a net assessment approach to align CCP capabilities with its intent over 
a span of decades to arrive at a characterization of the threat CCP maritime transformation 
poses to U.S. interests. While prior efforts to explain the CCP’s bid for sea power tended to 
extrapolate CCP intentions from observed capabilities, an overemphasis on capabilities—
particularly current capabilities—provides too narrow of an assessment to be useful for defense 
planning. In the most urgent cases, defense establishments require years if not decades to 
reshape a military in response to a new threat; after identifying a threat requiring change in 
military force structure, a defense establishment must procure new platforms, develop doctrine 
and train their servicemen for their use, and foster service cultures around the reshaped force. 
Transient developments, such as the rise of popular nationalism, are inadequate for assessing 
the threat posed by a state engaged in long-running competition. The net assessment 
framework takes a broad analytical approach that considers the dynamics a competition 
unfolding over time and considers capabilities as trends that advance or hinder a defense 
establishment’s progress toward its enduring objectives. This section summarizes the thesis’ net 
assessment of CCP maritime transformation and concludes with discrete findings from the 
assessment.  
Review of the CCP’s Maritime Transformation 
The CCP’s enduring grand strategic objective is realizing its national rejuvenation in 
opposition to a superpower rival state, in this case transforming the global order in opposition to 






great power” is a secondary objective that CCP leaders believe is necessary but insufficient to 
realize national rejuvenation. The CCP’s maritime transformation was initiated and propelled 
forward by the activist foreign policy preferences of first Hu Jintao, then Xi Jinping as part of 
broader grand strategic shifts toward a greater international role for the PRC. For its part, the 
United States’ enduring objective has been military primacy, by which it denies potential 
competitors and secures the international status quo. Military primacy and deep engagement in 
the global status quo secure longstanding American interests, including freedom of the seas for 
U.S. civilian and military vessels.  
Through maritime transformation, the CCP is developing sea power that is increasingly 
able to contest the United States’ erstwhile primacy and simultaneously threaten its Indo-Pacific 
security architecture. The Indo-Pacific’s largely maritime theater makes sea power a potent 
force in the USG-CCP strategic balance. Trends in the CCP’s maritime transformation 
collectively demonstrate an emerging maritime posture that undermines U.S. military primacy by 
extending sea denial capabilities throughout the Indo-Pacific and consolidating sea control 
capabilities in China’s near seas. Assessments of sea control and sea denial capabilities remain 
untested in peacetime, and the naval balance will likely shift over a long-running competition. 
Several operational asymmetries between the USG and CCP defense establishments serve as 
potential inflection points in the emergent trends of that competition.  
The CCP has exerted sea power to stress the United States’ ties to its Indo-Pacific allies 
and partners. Because reordering China’s regional security environment in opposition to the 
U.S.-led security architecture is an important step toward national rejuvenation, the CCP’s 
maritime campaign against U.S. strategic influence is likely to intensify as it develops new 
capabilities. How this conflict will progress remains uncertain; although the CCP’s sea power is 
growing, CCP maritime transformation is also hindered by two negative trends reflecting 
structural weaknesses for which CCP leaders have not demonstrated an ability to arrest: a 






While I initially hypothesized that the CCP is building Mahanian sea power but struggled 
to do so because of ossified continentalist interests in the Party-state, my findings from this 
research did not strictly support this hypothesis. CCP maritime transformation is not on a course 
to sea power as Mahan understood it, in terms of overseas market access and naval battlefield 
command. Two important differences between the CCP’s emerging sea power and Mahanian 
sea power emerge from this analysis. First, while Mahan emphasized decisive battles between 
concentrated battlefleets, the CCP’s military and civilian assets both confer threat: CCP military 
doctrine emphasizes “residing the military within the civilian” to situate military capability and 
purpose within civilian resources, ensuring a maritime conflict will involve ostensibly private 
seaports and their civilian software as well as the PLAN’s battlefleet.778 The use of civilian 
assets such as a maritime militia ostensibly composed of Chinese fishermen dramatically 
expands the geographic scope of modern maritime competition while lowering its intensity. 
Chinese sea power is a weapon for peacetime as well as wartime. Second, while Mahan—and 
subsequent U.S. naval tacticians—derided the “fortress fleet” which makes use of shore-based 
fire, modern technology has made it possible for the PLA to radiate significant striking power 
from the Chinese mainland into maritime theaters in the Indo-Pacific, reportedly with dangerous 
precision.779 This is not to say Mahan’s theories of sea power are now obsolete; the CCP’s 
interdomain approach to sea power continues to support the Mahanian concepts of national 
expansion through overseas markets. Rather, modern technology has rendered obsolete 
Mahan’s approach to naval warfare despite the U.S. Navy’s inherited “tendency to focus 
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attention too readily on the big battle” without adequate engagement with land campaigns and 
control of the littoral seas.780 
The net assessment approach’s focus on interaction between competing defense 
establishments clarifies the nature of these differences. Recognizing the civilian and 
interdomain characteristics of CCP sea power, USG national security and defense documents 
have acknowledged a need to develop new operational concepts in order to maintain a 
competitive advantage over the CCP; further, the USG has begun to seek options to emulate 
the PLA by establishing American land-based maritime strike capabilities in the theater.781 The 
USG defense establishment’s response suggests that the CCP’s land-sea integrated approach 
to sea power convers an advantage vis-à-vis the USG despite the approach originating from a 
political compromise with ossified continentalist interests in the CCP.  
Key Findings 
 Seven findings emerge from this net assessment. 
 
1. There is no future in which CCP maritime transformation poses a low threat to 
U.S. interests.  
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Whether the CCP is triumphant, ascendant, stagnant, or imploding between 2020 and 2049, 
the CCP’s maritime transformation will only increase the threat that regime poses to the USG 
and its interests. The threat a competitor poses is a factor of its capabilities and its intentions.782  
The CCP’s intention to use its growing power to the detriment of U.S. interests has been 
remarkably consistent. The CCP has maintained a grand strategy of national rejuvenation, 
varyingly defined, since the formation of the People’s Republic in 1949. Since 1993, the CCP 
has considered the United States its primary adversary on the road to rejuvenation, and 
successive CCP leaders have maintained this assessment through the present day. While the 
CCP may modulate the tempo and intensity of their competitive activities in response to 
geopolitical or economic flux over time, in only one future scenario does the CCP turn from its 
march through U.S. interests toward national rejuvenation. An Imploding CCP faced with 
significant challenges to regime survival is most likely to forego policies of national rejuvenation 
and instead focus narrowly on survival. In this instance, CCP competitive intention poses little 
threat to the United States, but it is quickly displaced as a threat by the potential for failures of 
governance giving rise to activities undertaken by rogue military and paramilitary agents who 
may be armed with part of the CCP’s nuclear arsenal. These or other threatening developments 
may just as likely not happen, but uncertainty over whether they will happen leaves threat 
conferred essentially unknowable in this scenario. The Imploding CCP scenario leaves plausible 
a wide range of potential outcomes and cannot be confidently designated as posing a low threat 
to the United States and its interests.  
In Triumphant, Ascendant, and Stagnant CCP scenarios, the CCP’s intention remains 
focused on national rejuvenation achieved by defeating the United States in a competition over 
the U.S.-led security architecture in the Indo-Pacific. The distinguishing factor in these three 
scenarios for the USG’s threat calculus is their range of likely capabilities. In the Triumphant and 
 
 






Ascendant CCP scenarios, the CCP’s maritime capabilities grow significantly, as surging 
economic growth rates fund continuations and expansions of programs to build sea power such 
as targeted MSRI investments and PLAN modernization. These programs will extend the PLA’s 
sea denial capabilities and introduce a sea control capability, particularly in waters near China’s 
shores. Growing CCP influence through MSRI investments in Europe, Africa, and South Asia 
threaten to open a second front of maritime competition for which the USG is apparently 
unprepared. A Stagnant CCP in 2049 will have as a baseline the ships, jets, and missiles still to 
be provided under current acquisition programs, though they may be degraded by poor 
maintenance and sustainment. Under those circumstances, the CCP would still possess the 
world’s largest navy, coast guard, and maritime militia concentrated in a region covered by a 
robust threat envelope from ship- and shore-launched anti-ship missiles boasting the longest 
operational ranges in the world. The USG cannot be assured of military primacy in the Indo-
Pacific even when facing a Stagnant CCP, and the still-shifting military balance will have 
deleterious effects on the credibility of U.S. security guarantees, stressing and potentially 
weakening U.S. ties in the Indo-Pacific security architecture.   
CCP maritime transformation has already passed the point at which the PLA’s capabilities 
seriously challenge U.S. primacy and so undermine U.S. credibility in the Indo-Pacific. That it 
reached such a point at all indicates the enduring competitive intentions of the CCP to accrue 
sea power and exert it in a maritime competition with the United States. 
 
2. PRC economic growth determines the intensity of maritime transformation, but it 
is not the object of such. 
The CCP’s vital objectives are not fundamentally economic. While the CCP in years prior 
clearly stated that its focus was on economic development and that it considered national 
security a secondary factor, authoritative Party statements at the Fifth Plenum and the revised 






priorities and now coordinates development and security interest as equals. The elevation of the 
CCP’s security interests in its decision-making calculus, particularly when presented and 
institutionalized in high-profile documents resulting from the CCP’s consensus-building process, 
suggests that USG and allied countries are now less able to shape CCP security-driven 
decisions by imposing costs on the Chinese economy alone.  
Maritime transformation is a political decision with security and economic components, and it 
is a decision the CCP made to advance toward national rejuvenation. Xi Jinping’s description of 
it and its objective of transforming the PRC into a maritime great power have two implications. 
First, it is a pillar of the CCP’s grand strategy reflecting a complex of interests beyond having 
the means to secure economic interests. Maritime transformation is about more than having a 
constabulary navy able to patrol SLOCs to secure seaborne trade. Second, the CCP will not 
reverse its commitment to maritime transformation merely because it is expensive or 
unprofitable. Cost imposition on the PRC economy will serve to limit the resources available to 
fund maritime transformation programs, potentially restricting their frequency and scale, but it 
will not force the CCP to cease or reverse its accrual of sea power.  
 
3. Sea control in the Indo-Pacific is on track to become prohibitively costly. 
The United States faces an enduring challenge to its sea control capabilities with no 
apparent answer. The PLA’s ballistic and cruise missiles, which DoD considers to be more 
advanced than those fielded by the U.S. military, constitute a robust ability to contest or deny 
any foreign military attempts to gain and maintain sea control within its threat envelope.783 The 
PLA has been able to fire anti-ship missiles able to reach targets as far from China’s shores as 
Guam since at least 2019 and is likely increasing its capacity of missiles and launchers while 
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simultaneously testing still more advanced anti-ship missiles that range beyond Guam. The 
PLA’s land-based sea denial will likely soon extend its coverage beyond the Asia-Pacific to 
cover larger swaths of the Indo-Pacific.784 In response, the USG will need to make significant 
investments in theater missile defense just to maintain the credible functionality of its forward 
operating bases in the event of war; recognizing this reality, former USINDOPACOM 
commander ADM Phil Davidson advocated for a $4.68 billion missile defense system on 
Guam.785 The USG appears to have limited options beyond Guam for theater missile defense, 
as even Japan has declined to continue developing the Aegis Ashore missile defense system 
and has thus far declined to commit to the alternative Aegis Afloat.786  
Without credible theater missile defense, U.S. sailors in the Indo-Pacific are forced to 
operate under threat of PLARF strikes. This does not preclude outright U.S. military forces or 
operations near China. However, U.S. military efforts to seize air and maritime superiority—
prerequisites for permitting the conduct of maritime or air operations—will face highly 
sophisticated sea denial operations conducted by a PLA with sufficient accuracy, munitions, and 
electromagnetic support to contest or in some cases outright deny U.S. efforts.787 Sea control 
for operationally useful durations at acceptable cost within the First and Second Island Chains 
may soon be outside of the U.S. military’s capability if it is not already. The U.S. military’s 
response has been to explore land-based sea denial capabilities within the theater and standoff 
maritime strike capabilities outside the current threat envelope in apparent recognition of this 
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reality. 788 Future peacetime operations, such as presence operations designed to assure 
regional allies and partners of the combat-ready credibility of a U.S. security guarantee, will be 
reduced by the likely outcomes of escalation. Future wartime operations will likely need to 
include at least in part beyond the weapon engagement zone. While at least one flag officer has 
suggested for reasons not revealed that the PLA’s anti-ship threat does not target U.S. assets 
that would be instrumental for victory in “the next war,” this suggestion is countervailed by ADM 
Davidson’s assessed need for a Guam Defense System and by the thin history of militaries that 
are deterred by secret plans.789  
Even if the United States loses command of the seas in the Indo-Pacific, the PLA is unlikely 
to gain it. Despite its robust surface fleet modernization, the PLA still lacks a mature naval 
aviation capability critical for improving situational awareness at sea and for conducting 
antisubmarine warfare operations. Both are necessary to establish sea control against a peer 
adversary. What assets the PLA has successfully built are also likely to operate in the face of 
U.S. forces postured with precision strike capabilities that lend themselves to sea denial and 
may include strikes on PLA assets at sea or on the Chinese mainland. Most of all, the Indo-
Pacific countries most familiar with Chinese military power are also the most disturbed by it. As 
such, the likely effect of the CCP’s sea denial capabilities is sharply restricting prospects for any 
military to gain sea control for operationally useful durations in the Indo-Pacific, particularly 
within the First and Second Island Chains. The future Indo-Pacific security architecture and the 
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United States’ individual security guarantees are likely to suffer severe losses if they are made 
credible by operations requiring sea control at acceptable costs. 
 
4. The CCP’s vision of sea power is one that is deeply integrated across domains 
and elements of national power, military and civilian. 
The CCP’s land-sea integrated approach to maritime transformation and the PLA’s principle 
of “residing the military within the civilian” foster sea power that is integrated across land and 
maritime domains at the same time that it is integrated across informational, military, and 
economic elements of national power. The PLA’s embrace of its fortress fleet and dedicated 
augmentation of its naval forces with shore-based fire gives the PLA a significant operational 
advantage over forward-deployed U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific. However, while the bulk of the 
PLA’s traditional military hardware has been oriented to China’s east, civilian components of 
maritime transformation efforts run along informational and economic lines toward China’s west. 
The 2013 Science of Military Strategy describes continental China as the “support and 
backstop” from which power radiates to the “focal point” of the Indo-Pacific, with space and 
cyber forming the “crux.”790 This description entails more than the strategic depth conferred by 
surface fleets and ballistic missiles. Financial power radiates from China along the MSRI and 
contributes to a complex information network stretching into waterways both east and west of 
China. Civilian assets are critical nodes in this network and make clear contributions to CCP 
maritime domain awareness and targeting capabilities.  
In China’s near seas, the PLA’s operational picture is supported by surveillance equipment 
aboard civilian maritime militia vessels and the permanent maritime sensors constructed in the 
early stages of the Blue Ocean Information Network. In the waters beyond, ports that are 
 
 







owned, operated, or have received significant funding from Chinese companies through the 
MSRI are positioned to become nodes in an information network feeding into the PLA’s ISR 
networks; in times of crisis, these information nodes may extend further to include ports that are 
not owned or operated by Chinese companies but use the PRC Ministry of Transportation-
sponsored LOGINK logistics management software. By 2035, the Blue Ocean Information 
Networks’ sensors are also projected to have spread along the MSRI. The PRC’s ocean 
reconnaissance and surveillance satellites, under the PLA’s oversight, reinforce the CCP’s 
maritime domain awareness in both the near seas and the far seas.  
A broader common operating picture than that enjoyed by one’s adversaries is an important 
advantage with applications in wartime and peacetime. Shared situational awareness can 
enable or hobble an organization as its component parts attempt to operate in concert, whether 
those operations be battlefield maneuver, surveillance of international waters, or enforcement of 
international maritime law. The USG’s maritime challenge is not posed by the PLA alone; it is 
posed by the CCP and the state, military, and civilian society apparatuses it can manipulate.  
 
5. The USG’s focus on high-end threats takes a narrow view of the maritime 
competition’s decisive terrain and does not adequately account for the peacetime 
implications of the CCP’s military and paramilitary power.  
The USG began competing against the CCP long after the CCP first began the competition. 
The USG first joined the contest by placing a disproportionate focus on high-end military threats. 
While CCP leaders designated the United States as their primary strategic adversary in 1993 
and actively accelerated preparations for strategic competition in 1999, the USG was distracted 
by other engagements until years later. The Office of Net Assessment’s 2001 Defense Strategy 
Review and 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review considered the need for enhancing military 
capability against the PLA, but U.S. foreign policy did not publicly recognize the CCP’s 






renewed publicization of the Freedom of Navigation program in 2015, and the USG did not do 
so on a larger scale until the 2017 National Security Strategy.  
The USG’s policy toward the PRC in 2015 and thereafter appear motivated by concerns 
about the Indo-Pacific military balance and positioning for the high-end fight; the timing of the 
2015 FONOP appeared to indicate that the Obama Administration was concerned about 
Chinese militarization, not international law, in the South China Sea. While the Trump 
Administration’s policy toward the PRC led with economic competition, the administration also 
adopted a more aggressive FONOP schedule and conducted several high-profile naval 
exercises in the South China Sea.791 In the last days of the Trump Administration, Congress 
also established a $2.2 billion Pacific Deterrence Initiative to strengthen deterrence against the 
CCP by modernizing U.S. forces in the theater, improving logistics and sustainment 
requirements, and building the partner defense capability and capacity.792 These measures, 
centered on military capabilities, do not respond to threats to U.S. strategic influence posed by 
civilian assets or in the gray zone.  
In the South China Sea, the USG’s focus on the prospect of kinetic conflict between 
high-end systems has at times been out of step with what is needed to assure regional allies 
and partners. When the Obama Administration was faced with Chinese provocations at 
Scarborough Shoal in 2012, it declined to clarify its interpretation of the U.S.-Philippines alliance 
in support of its treaty ally and only appeared to take public action on the islet group by warning 
the CCP against building military facilities on Scarborough Shoal.793 When the Trump 
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Administration observed a Malaysian drillship experiencing a harassment campaign from 
Chinese vessels, it conducted a sustained, high-end joint presence operation in support of an 
ungrateful partner that had accustomed to Chinese harassment and mercurial U.S. support.794 
In both cases, the USG led its engagement with its Southeast Asian ally or partner with a focus 
on whether high-end military assets might be at risk or the solution, with consistently poor 
results. As Bill Hayton advised, “engagement means more than just showing up with a gunboat, 
or even an aircraft carrier, every few weeks or months and expecting everyone to love you.”795 
Preparing for a high-end fight against the PLA may position the U.S. military to make its security 
guarantees more credible, but it alone is not enough to reassure allies and partners facing 
maritime coercion from the CCP.  
The focus on high-end capabilities is also visible in the asymmetries between the USG and 
CCP on what constitutes the Indo-Pacific regions’ strategic geography. The decisive terrain from 
U.S. defense planning perspectives continues to be the First and Second Island Chains, where 
the PLA is able to hold U.S. forces at considerable risk. But the decisive terrain from a CCP 
maritime power perspective is the aggregate of maritime chokepoints both east and west of 
continental China, through which energy resources and hollowed-out Chinese capital flow. The 
USG’s response to the CCP’s maritime transformation has been piecemeal, with U.S. forward 
deployments and the Pacific Deterrence Initiative along the chokepoints to China’s east and a 
patchwork of economic initiatives, including the Clean Network and the Blue Dot Network, 
responding to the Belt and Road Initiative. By targeting the BRI writ large, these initiatives only 
address the investments along maritime chokepoints to China’s west by default.796 In the same 
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way that the USG may not have been actively competing against the CCP for before 2017, it is 
not clear that the USG is directly competing against the CCP’s instruments for accruing and 
exerting sea power in the Indian Ocean Region or Mediterranean Sea today.  
 
6. Converting power into strategic influence remains a weakness for the CCP.  
Just as eroding U.S. sea control capabilities in the Indo-Pacific are not giving way to new 
PLA sea control capabilities, the CCP’s use of sea power to erode U.S. strategic influence in 
Southeast Asia has not given rise to CCP strategic influence over Southeast Asian countries. 
Exactly what effect CCP sea power has on the PRC’s foreign relationships is difficult to 
separate from other potential variables, such as blame for the COVID-19 pandemic or ongoing 
genocide in Xinjiang. What can be known is that efforts DoD describes the PRC as having likely 
made to establish military bases in Namibia, Vanuatu, and the Solomon Islands have thus far 
been unsuccessful.797 Nor has the PRC announced any new maritime access agreements to 
support expeditionary operations for its blue-water navy, with the potential exception of the 
naval base at Ream, Cambodia.798  
Some investments along the MSRI have met resistance or limited host country support. In 
Malaysia, officials across several governments were eager to cooperate with the CCP to fund 
an expansion of the Kuantan Port, which sits on Malaysia’s east coast and is the Malaysian port 
closest to China. Despite support from local officials, Malaysian officials at the federal level did 
not support a similar investment into the Melaka Deepwater Port, which sits in the Malacca 
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Strait and received significant public scrutiny for the strategic implications of positioning a 
Chinese port in the region’s energy lifeline.799  
Other public indicators describe the CCP as facing significant challenges in accruing or 
exerting strategic influence. The 2021 ISEAS poll reports over 75% of respondents named the 
PRC as the most economically influential power, and nearly 50% of respondents named the 
PRC as the most strategic-politically influential power in Southeast Asia; in both cases, the vast 
supermajority of respondents also reported this influence as worrying rather than welcome.800 
The Lowy Institute’s Asia Power Index assesses that the PRC exerts only modest power in the 
Indo-Pacific through military diplomacy, and its metrics suggest that the PRC’s ability to 
advance its diplomatic interests appears to underperform its significant investments in 
diplomatic networking and regional summits.801 The CCP is not without strategic influence, but it 
consistently fails to fully convert its economic, diplomatic, and military power into strategic 
influence. This weakness may be preventing the CCP from establishing foreign military bases, 
investing in strategic strongpoints, or building soft power. There is no reason to believe the 
CCP’s efforts to convert sea power into strategic influence will be different.  
 
7. The PLAGF’s continentalism remains an enduring vulnerability for CCP sea 
power. 
Continentalist interests, including the PLAGF, contributed to a successful CCP effort to 
pursue land-sea integrated sea power rather than outright Mahanian sea power. Although this 
fostered distinct inter-domain operational advantages for the PLA’s prospective operations 
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against a forward-based adversary, the PLAGF’s obstinate pursuit of its interests, backed by its 
sizeable bureaucratic heft, constitutes an enduring vulnerability for CCP maritime transformation 
and for the future of CCP sea power. The PLAGF competes against the PLAN for resources 
and leadership roles in joint command structures. This is typical of professional militaries. Less 
typical is the PLAGF’s determined, decades-long resistance against the orders of successive 
CCP General Secretaries to modernize into a smaller, better-trained ground component of a 
joint force.  
The ground force’s failures of reform and modernization hold at risk PLAN modernization in 
two ways. First, the PLAN will not be able to complete its own reforms into the naval arm of a 
joint force if it cannot rely on the PLAGF to be responsive to its reform obligations. Second, 
halting PLAGF modernization weakens the PLA’s defense posture in the theaters nearest to its 
own borders, increasing the tension between a PLAN aspiring to blue-water operations and a 
PLAGF that may not be able to secure CCP interests. In critical cases such as Taiwan, the 
PLAN may be required to supplement PLAGF deficiencies at cost to its budget, manpower, and 
mission set.  
This is a vulnerability, not simply a weakness. Borrowing Toshi Yoshihara and Jack 
Bianchi’s definition, a weakness is an impediment to an entity’s ability to reach its goals, while a 
vulnerability is a weakness that can be subjected to an adversary’s strategy.802 The CCP’s 
weakness in converting power into strategic influence is in part driven by its sweeping demands, 
hostile behavior, and resistance to compromise. The USG is unable to reliably increase that 
effect. However, the USG can increase tension within continentalist and sea power factions 
within the CCP, for example by, unilaterally or with allies, adopting a force posture that tests the 
CCP’s interest in militarily dominating Taiwan or a force posture that confers greater threats 
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near China’s disputed land borders. In such cases, the guiding principle for taking advantage of 
the PLAGF as a vulnerability for CCP sea power is to lure it into making the mistakes that, 
because of its robust bureaucratic interests, it cannot help but make. 
Conclusion 
 CCP grand strategy has undergone a sweeping reorientation toward the sea. Driven by 
an apparent faith that sea power will lead to or evidence national rejuvenation, CCP leaders 
have cultivated and exerted sea power, in part to erode U.S. strategic influence in the Indo-
Pacific’s maritime theater. The strategic logic of CCP maritime transformation has also become 
clear over time and various iterations; the CCP’s sea power can directly stress U.S. security 
guarantees by cutting into its margin of military superiority, test the USG’s ability to assure its 
allies and partners through gray zone coercions, and shape the regional security environment 
with civilian investments hollowed out to conceal military purposes. Maritime transformation has 
not made the CCP a dominant power commanding the alliance of most Indo-Pacific countries, 
but it has posed significant challenges to the United States’ ability to sustain such a position.    
Because it is the leading power, strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific remains the 
United States’ to lose. The rise of PLA sea denial in China’s near seas has compromised the 
U.S. military’s ability to establish sea control, and potentially command of the commons 
altogether, within the First and Second Island Chains. While U.S. defense planners remain 
focused on the eastern half of the Indo-Pacific, commercial investments along the MSRI and the 
PLA’s doctrine making military use of civilian assets extend gradients of PLA power through the 
Indian Ocean Region and Mediterranean Sea under cover of economic interests and win-win 
cooperation.  
The United States faces a daunting challenge in the CCP as a sea power. CCP leaders 
are committed to supplanting U.S. influence and have prepared for decades to do so, in part by 






umbrella of the world’s first anti-ship ballistic missiles. CCP leaders have also publicly indicated 
that their security interests are no longer secondary to their economic interests, blunting the 
USG’s potential for constraining the CCP’s military expansion by holding its economy at risk. 
Countries in the Indo-Pacific have repeatedly declined to bandwagon into an anti-CCP coalition, 
instead choosing to hedge between great powers in competition. As these countries continue to 
hedge, the United States bleeds strategic influence over its allies and partners. 
How the PRC’s economy develops will have significant impact on the future of CCP sea 
power, but barring total Party-state implosion, the capabilities that the CCP has already built will 
impede the USG’s pursuit of its foreign policy objectives in the Indo-Pacific for decades to come. 
The USG faces moderate to extreme threats from the CCP and its sea power in every future. 
Trends favor the CCP, and USG platitudes to work more closely with allies and partners will not 
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